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ABSTRACT.
THE STRUCTURE OF THE ALUMINUM INDUSTRY IN TBE UNITED STATES
1937-1957.
The Aluminum Industry for the purpose of the study
is considered to embrace the complete gambit of activi-
ties associated with the manufacture of aluminum goods.
The marketing practices of the Industry have not been
discussed at any length. The purpose of this study is
to examine the developments that have taken place in the
Aluminum Industry in the United States over the last
twenty years (in particular the breaking-up of the Alcoa
monopoly and the entry of the other integrated producers)
and to relate the causes and specific effects of the
changes in the structure of the Industry.
The Industry is seen to consist essentially of three
groups. Firstly, there are the large integrated producers
who dominate the reduction and fabrication stages of
the Industry. They compete in the fabrications market
with the second group - the non-integrated producers.
The third group - the end-product manufacturers produce
a diverse range of goods thereby bringing them into other
industries. The end-product-manufacturers compete with
both the integrated producers and the non-integrated
producers in the aluminum goods markets. End-product
manufacture is usually a "small business" and is able
to compete effectively with larger companies because of
a differentiated product and service combined with a
close customer relationship.
The supply of raw materials for the non-integrated
manufacturers is seen to be the critical determinant of
the size of this part of the Industry. The present in-
dications are that the non-integrated producers will
receive a decreasing proportion of the total ingot supply
since imports cannot be relied upon to fill the gap
created by the integrated producers expanding their own
fabrications facilities to utilise their increased
primary ingot production. Assuming there is no long-run
improvement of the supply position to the non-integrated
producers, it is believed that their importance in the
Industry must decrease. Consequently the entry of any
new integrated producers into the reduction industry from
amongst the non-integrated fabricators, without consider-
able Goverggent support, is made extremely unlikely.
The growth in the demand for aluminum goods will be
accompanied by an increase in the number of end-product
manufacturers and in the size of the present integrated
producers.
iii.
The oligopolistic structure in the fabrications
market is seen as a continuing condition. Alcoa's price
leadership in the primary ingot market can only be
challenged by a very large scale imports from Canada or
Europe, neither of which is likely in the immediate future.
The degree of competition in the ingot and fabrica-
tions markets is seen to be largely at the discretion of
the Courts and -requires constant vigilance of the United
States Government agencies for continuance.
The secondary production of aluminum is not seen as
any real alternative source of supply for an expanded
non-integrated section of the industry since secondary
production will be restricted because of the wastage of
aluminum in consumer non-durables and the time-lag in
obtaining for smelting the aluminum in durable goods.
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7.
THE STRUCTURE OF THE .ALUMINU1M- INDUSTRY IN THE UNITED STATES,
1937 - 1957
Introduction.
The aluminum industry has undergone a remarkable
change in this period from a virtual monopoly to an
effectively competitive industry. The world-wide increase
in the use of aluminum in all types of activity together
with the build up in war material prior to 1939 brought
the problem of supply shortages to the manufacturers
using this material. Reynolds who in 1938 was an important
foil roller, entered the primary ingot and pig production
phase of the industry, with the assistance of Federal
Government Agencies, to enable them to have adequate and
reliable supplies of rolling ingot. The Anti-Trust
Division of the Department of Justice began a long legal
action which together with the Government expansion pro-
grams, in the early years of the war, removed the barriers
to Reynolds continued existence and the entry of other firms.
The pre-1942 period of the industry was studied exhaustively
by Engle, Gregory and Masse, ( 1), with Wallace (2 ), examining
the marketing situation.
(1) Engle, N.H., Gregory, H.E., and Masse, R., "Aluminum - An
Industrial Marketing Appraibal". Richard Irwin Inc. 1945.
(2) Wallace, Donald G., "Market Control in the Aluminum
Industry". Cambridge,Harvard University Press, 1937.
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The'expansion of production facilities by Alcoa,
Reynolds and the Government during the war period,
changed Alcoa's dominance of the industry.
At the close of the war, Government policy was
directed at making the industry competitive - the surplus
plant disposal program augmented by extraordinary financial
benefits enabled Kaiser to become the third integrated
producer in the industry. The development of the post
war paiod of the industry is investigated by Peck ( 3)
and Martin ( 4) with attention given to regional cost
structure by Kutilla ( 5).
The 1950-57 period is particularly important for
two reasons : (i) the virtual closing the Alcoa Anti-
Trust case with the judgement of Knox in the United States
District Court, Southern District of New York. ( 6) and,
(ii)the encouragement and assistance
afforded to the new integrated producers (Ormet - Olin
Mathieson-Revere), Harvey Machine Company and Anaconda
Aluminum Company to enter into and expand in the aluminum
industry; and further, the encouragement and assistance
given to the established integrated producers to expand
their production.
(3) Peck,Merton.,"Market Structure of the Post-War Aluminum
Industry in America". Harvard Univ. Ph.D. Thesis. Unpublished
1953.
(4) Martin, Willian, "An Economic Analysis of the Aluminum Case".
Harvard Univ. Ph.D.Thesis. Unpublished.
(5) Kutilla, John.,"The Structure of Costs and Regional Advantages
in the Primary Aluminum Industry". Harvard Univ. Ph.D. Thesis
1951. Unpublished.
(6) United States Dist.Court.Southern Dist.of N.Y. Knox.J.
Opinion. United States of America V Alcoa. Equity No. 85-73.
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It appeared -to the writer that a new look at the
industry and its development would prove informative and
fulfil a useful purpose, since the earlier studies were
either restricted to some particular aspect of the
industry or had by eflux of time, in which new develop-
ments have occured, in particular the entry of more
integrated producers since 1951, lost some of their
interest as relating to the present conditions and future
trends.
Procedure.
The writer has attempted to follow the development
of the industry beginning with a brief description of the
technology of the primary reduction of aluminum, followed
by a discussion of the raw materials cost supply position.
The structure of the industry is then examined in
some detail with the intention of identifing the causal
factors in their effects in the changing structure and
behaviour of the industry.
A detailed discussion of supply and demand considera-
tions is undertaken as a preliminary to the examination of
the industry proper.
In the detailed inquiry into the industry, an attempt
is made to look closely at the relationships of the primary
10.
integrated producers with the non-integrated producers
and end-product manufacturers - the users of aluminum in
all its forms.
More specifically detailed attention has been given to -
1. The extent of competition in the various parts of
the industry as affected by -
(a) conditions of supply of raw materials,
(b) Government policy and public policy,
(c) patents licenses and manufacturing agreements,
(d) concentration of primary, secondary and non-
integrated production capacities,
(e) pricing policies and market structures,
(f) conditions and developments in Canada and
elsewhere,
(g) business conditions in the economy generally,
2. The dealings and business relations of the various
groups in the industry as determined by their
own special requirements and motives.
In particular the inddiatry marketa2 are examined
for evidence of an. emerging pattern which could be
expected to continue into the future - thereby enabling
a prediction to be made as to growth potentialities and
capital requirements of the industry in the future.
i.
The sources of information on general technical
material are large in number and a selection has been
made of those which give it is believed the more useful
description of the industry for this particular study.
In the matter of the sources of information on the
behaviour and policy of the firms in the industry,
intentions of the various managements and detailed re-
ports of the operations of the companies in the industry,
the reports of the relative committee of Congress have
provided most of the material for this work. Hearings
before the Subcommittee on Study of Monopoly Power of
the House Judiciary Committee Parts I and II (7 ) and
the Hearing and Report of the Subcommittee No. 3 of the
House Select Committee on Small Business ( 8 ). The
opinions rendered in the Courts on the U.S. v Alcoa case
have also proved invaluable, particularly that of Knox J.
in the U.S. District Court for the Southern District of
New York on June 2, 1950 ( 9). This document has pro-
vided the basis for much of the discussion of the 1940-
1950 period. The references are perhaps restricted in
number but the comprehensiveness and quality of the material
makes their use as references almost exhaustive of the
subject.
(7) U.S.Committee on the Judiciary.Subcomnittee on Study of
Monopoly Power.House of Representatives 82d Congress Hearing
Serial I PartsI, II,"Aluminum -Study of Ionopoly Power".
(8) (i)U.S.Sele't 
-Committee on Small Business,Subcommittee No.3
House of Reps. 84th Congress Parts I, II. The Aluminum
Industry.
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Credence has been given to much of the evidence
given in the House Committee hearings because of the
responsibility of the witnesses and the searching cross-
examinations by committee members.
Subsequent events have proved their accuracy axid
the intentions of policy nade therein.
Finally an aDpraisal has been made of the present
structure of the industry and a pattern is seen to emerge
which shows strong indications of lastingand being
expressly typical of the aluminum industry because of
its unique conditions.
(8) (ii) U.S. Select Committee on Small Business. Reports of
Subcommittee No. 3 on Minerals and Raw Materials. House
of Reps. 84th Congress 2nd Session. Small Business and
the Aluminum Industry.
(9) See (6) supra.
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CHAPTER I
A BRIEF DESCRIPTION OF THE INDUSTRY.
The Aluminum Industry is not a unified whole but
is a series of somewhat closely integrated industries
which produce end products of aluminum and its alloys
from sheet and plate, extruded shapes and tubing,
electrical conductors, foil, merchant rod, bar and
wire, powder, flake and paste; and castings which can be
either produced by using dies and pressure - die castings,
or simply molds.
The five stages into which the Industry can be di-
vided are, (1) mining raw materials, (2) production of
alumina, (3) production of aluminum pig,ingot, (14.) fabri-
cation of aluminum and its alloys, and (5) production of
finished goods of aluminum, or aluminum alloys.
The- linea of separation between these divisions of
the Industry are also applicable for the integrated pro-
ducers. The integrated producers are the largest group
by size of production, assets, and value of production
in the Industry. This study will be concerned mainly
with the relationships between this group and the non-
integrated producers who comprise the'bulk of the firms
in the last division of the Industry.
ALUMINUM
11j..
FLOW IN THE UNITED STATES.
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(A) Not .Accounted For. (B) Melting Losses. (C) Direct Exporta.
NOTE: Diagram not drawn to scale.
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TABLE I
WORLD PRODUCTION OF PRIM4ARY ALUMINUM 1951-1956 -'SHORT TONS ('000s)
1951 1952 1953 1954 1955 1956
Austria 29.1
Canada 447.1
France 99.6
Germany W. 81.7
Gt. Britain 31.1
Italy 54.8
Japan 40.7
Norway 55.4
Switzerland 29.8
U.S.S.R. 225
(tentative)
U.S.A. 836.9
Others 8.8
Total 1,970
40.5
499.9
117.0
11o.8
31.4
58.2
47.0
56.3
30.2
275
937.3
66.5
2,260
47.9
'548.4
124.6
117.9
34.6
61.1
50.1
58.6
35.5
325
1,252.0
72.3
2,710
52.9
557.9
132.4
142.4
35.4
63.5
58.1
67.6
28.7
375
1,460.6
115.1
3,050
63.1
612.5
142.7
151.1
27.4
67.7
63.4
79.5
33.1
475
1,565.7
188.81
3,470
65.4
514.7
165.1
162.4
32.9
69.9
72.7
102.2
35.3
500
1,679.0
212.4
3,710
Source: United States Bureau of Mines. Minerals Year Book.
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TABLE II
UNITED STATES PRODUCTION OF ALUMINIM - 1937- - 1957.
YEAR TOTAL U.S. PRIMARY PRICE SE03NDARY WORLD
PRODUCTION PRODUCTION PER LB. PRODUCTION PRODUCTION
(SHoRT TONS) (SHORT TONS) CENTS (SEORT TONS) (SHORT TONS)
(PRIVrARY)
1937'
1938
1939
1940
1941
1942
1943
1944
1945
1946
1947
1948
1949
1950
1951
1952
1953
1954
1955
1956
1957
208,900
182,241
217,492
286,642
415,924
717,570
1,234,140
1,102,091
793,447
687,703
916,587
910,233
784,224
962,288
1,129,489-
1,241,852
1,620,579
1,752,606
1,900,762
2,018,722
146,340
143,441
163-545
206,280
309,067
521,106
920,179
776,46
495,060
409,630
571,750
623,456
603,462
718,622
836,881
937,330
1,252,013
1,460,565
1,565,721.
1,678,954
*1,649,013
20.08
20.00
20.00
18.7
16.16
15.00
15.00
15.00
15.00.
15.00
15.00
15.64
17.00
17.7
19.0
19.4
20.9
21.8
23.7
26.0
62,560
38,800
53,947
80,362
106,857
196,464
313,961
325,645
298,387
278,073
344,837
286,777
180,762
243,666
292,608
304,522
368,566
292,o41
335,041
339,768
* Preliminary.
Source: United States Bureau of Mines. Minerals Year Booka
530,800
-619,300
868,o000
1,009,949
1,525,800
2,123,400
1,875,600
1,009,700
870,000
1,189,ooo
1,398,000
1,441,000
1,655,000
1,971,ooo
2,260,00o
2,710,oo00
3,050,000
3,470,000
3,710,000
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TABLE III
APPARENT CONSUMPTION OF ALUMINUM 1937 - 1957 IN THE UNITED STATES
YEAR TOTAL U.S. PRIMARY DOMESTIC RECOVERY PRIMARY ALUMINUM
APPARENT ALUMINUM SECONDARY ALUMINUM IMPORTS EXPORTS
CONSUMPTION (APPARENT (SHORT TONS)
(SHORT TONS) CONSUMPTION) OLD NEW
(SHORT TONS) SCRAP SCRAP
(SHORT TONS)
1937
1938
1939
1940
1941
1942
1943
194.
1945
1946
1947
1948
1949
1950
1951
1952
1953
1954
1955
1956
1957
167,979
89,523
167,646
227,107
302,788
588,969
877,349
744,627
696,750
575,687*
571,789
684,575
635,956
896,384
898,653
1,072,334
1,542,054
1,696,887
1,754,925
1,781, 813
(62,860)
(38,800)
37,763
45,806
68,388
28,939
19,647
22,899
27,311
90, 535
163,847
95,648
44,596
76,358
76,591
71,264
78,940
59,989
76,372
71,673
16,184
34,556
38,469
115,755
176,736
302,746
271,076
187,538
:180,990
191,129
136,166
167,308
216,017
233,258
289,626
232,052
259,622
268,905
of Mines. Minerals Yearbooks.
81,213
205, 000
272,823
395,000
630,000
910,000
693,500
724,061
666,000
735,500
780,000
680,552
972,742
975,244
1,143,598
1,620,994
1,756,876
2,116,000
2,259,000
22, 589
8,870
14,336
18,084
13,413
112,136
135,822
102,753
339,285
57,100
31,329
160,881
125,326
255,692
161,816
15o,738
359, 481
243,750
239,745
264,975
2,692
6,309
37,108
37,841
7,462
38,779
117,638
188,021
6,703
17,334
63,121
.49,546
37,179
23,236
13,415
10,614
15,355
50,096
33,834
67,977
Source: United States Bureau
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TABLE IV
BAUXITE (QUANTITIES IN LONG TONS) (DOOs)
YEAR PRODUCTION SH.IPMENT IMPORTS- EXPORTS WORLD
CRUDE.O DR IED (FROM MINES) FR ODUC-
BAUXITE GROSS DRIED TION
EQUI- WEIGHT BAUXITE
VALENT EQUI-
VALENT
1937
1938
1939
1940
1941
1942
1943
1944
1945
1946
1947
1948
1949
1950
1951
1952
1953
1954
1955
420.2
311.3
375.3
510
1,o85
3,018
7,283
3,322,
1,145
1, 353
1,427
1,724
1,352
1,9585
2,192
1,980
1,864
2,352,
2,139
439.0
323.8
375.3
439
937
2,602
6,232
2,i23
981
1,104
1,202
1,4.57
1,149
1,335
1,849
1,667
1,58o
1,995
1,788
1956 2,061 1,743
1957
420.2
311.4
375.3
435.0
1,037
2,878
7,o5o$
3,283
1,347
1,399
1,607
1,413
1,524
1 ,452
1,622
2,118
1,949
2,037
2,012
1,901
425.0. 507.4
310.9 455.7
375.3 520.2
438.9 630
897 1,250
2,750 884
6,012 1,548
2,790 560
1,099 740
1,o8o 852
1,357 1,821
1,196 2,488
1,287 2,688
1,337 2,516
1,532 2,820
1,898 3,498
1,745 4,391
1,766 5,284
1,727 5,225
1,644 6,075
210.7
90.3
51.6
82
151
261
417
147
126
97.8
94.4
54-1
34.9
45
90
41
28
16
14
4,238
4,321
7,340
8,292
13,945
7,3 58
3,376
4,307
6,216
8,083
8,169
8,041
1o,675
12,539
13,425
15,55
16,400
15 17,400
Source: United States Bureau of Mines. Minerals Yearbooks.
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1. MINING THE RAW MATERIAL. (1)
The chief ores of aluminum are bauxites. They con-
sist essentially of aluminum in chemical combination with
oxygen and water, plus other impurities. The grade of
bauxite is determined by its alumina content (that is
aluminum oxide) and the type and amount of impurities
present. Standard metal-grade bauxite contains upwards
of 55 percent alumina, and a maximum of 7 percent silica.
Besides silica the other main impurity is iron oxide.
The effect of iron oxide and silica together is to reduce
the yield of alumina in the ore, whilst silica alone has
the added disadvantage of causing alumina losses in the
refining process. Approximately four pounds of bauxite
produces two pounds of alumina from which in turn is re-
duced one pound of aluminum.
While bauxite is the principal commercial ore of
aluminum, research has been undertaken to discover a
method of extraction of alumina from alunite and aluminum
bearing clays on a commercial basis. One commercial
plant has been built for the extraction of alumina from
Utah alumites near Salt Lake City by the Kalumite Corpora-
tion. Several plants are also contemplated for the utili-
sation of clays, but further research is required.
(1) See Technical Literature on Aluminum Industry. References
1 - 9. Bibliography.
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Mining is comparatively simple, consisting usually
of open-pit operations with power shovels, after the over-
burden has been removed. Where underground operations
and consequent hand-sorting is Employed mining costs are
somewhat higher. Essentially the same mining methods are
applied to alumite and clays as to bauxite, except that
larger quantities have to be moved, since these ores are
not so rich in alumina as bauxite.
After mining, the ore is loaded into trucks or dump
cars and taken to an ore extracting plant vhere it is crushed
and dried in preparation for the production of alumina.
2. ALUMINA PRODUCTION. (2)
The second stage of making aluminum is the production of
alumina from bauxite, alumite, clay or other suitable materials.
Two processes - the Bayer and the Pederson, have proved success-
ful in securing from bauxite the high purity alumina which is
required for aluminum production.
For every ton of alumina produced the following ingre-
dients are required in approximately the quantities indicated-
2 tons grade A bauxite
0.06 - 0.09 ton quicklime
0.07 - 0.1 ton soda ash
8 - 10 million B.T.U. *
Based on U.S. experience 0.6 - 0.8 tons of coal or
10 - 13 m. c. ft. of natural gas are required.
(2) See 'echnical Literatuve on Aluminum Industry.
References 1 - 9. Bibliography.
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Labor requirements vary with the scale of operations,
ranging from 10-12 man hours per ton for small plants to
5-6 manhours per ton for plants with a capacity of 500,000
tons or more annually.
(j )
The Bayer Process is a chemical process for separa-
ting the alumina from the silica, iron, oxide, and other
minerals in the bauxite. Firstly, ground bauxite is mixed
with soda ash and quicklime. This mixture is conveyed to
digesters containing a heated solution.of sodium hydroxide,
which under the steam and pressure dissolved the alumina.
After filtering and washing, the residue, appropriately
called'ed mud" is pumped into a tailing pond. After the
mud settles, the water from the pond is reused in further
washings. Sodium aluminate solution, remaining after
filtering, is pumped into the tanks where it is mixed
with what is called a "seed" charge of aluminum hydrate
fed in from another cycle of the process. The mixture
is cooled gradually under constant agitation, resulting
in the precipitation of aluminum hydrate. After fil-
tering, the spent liquid is returned in part to the
aluminum hydrate seed cycle, and in part, to the digesters.
After another filtering, and washing, the aluminum hydrate
(3.) See Technical Literature of Aluminum Industry
References 1 - 9. Bibliography.
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is conveyed to a rotary kiln for calcining at tempera-
tures in excess of 1,0000 centigrade. This process is
facilitated by the addition of small quantities of alu-
minum fluoride or hydrofluoric acid. Pure alumina
(aluminum oxide) is the end product. From the final
washing the. liquor is concentrated by evaporation and
re-cycled to the digestion step.
The Bayer Process must have low silica ore if costs
are not to be excessive. Under normal conditions not
over 3 percent silica is preferred, but more can be
handled with a maximum of seven percent.
During the last war ores up to 14-15 percent of
silica have been handled successfully by the use of the
soda-lime-sinter process. The reason for any limitation
on silica content of the ore is twofold: firstly, alumina
combines with silica to some extent on heating and is
lost in the red mud and secondly, there is heavy loss
of soda. It is said by operators that each pound of
silica in the bauxite represents a loss of approximately
one and a helf oounds of alumina, and two pounds of soda.
The Pederson Process a second process for making
high grade alumina from low grade ore has been used in
Norway since 1929 in the-Norse Aluminum Company plant at
See Technical Literature of Aluminum Industry
References 1 - ,9. Bibliography.
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Hoyanger. ~ It would. appear to offer advantages over the
Bayer process for a region like the Pacific North West
where there is abundant and relatively cheap electric
power.
."In this process the bauxite is smelted
together with limestone and coke in large
electric furnaces. A slag is thus formed,
and the alumina content of the bauxite is
recovered in this slag as an aluminate of
lime. Similtaneously the iron compounds
of 'the bauxite are transformed into a pig
iron of excellent quality, which finds a
sale at favorable prices. The slag is
pulverised and treated with soda solution,
whereby as in the other processes, a solu-
tion of sodium aluminate is formed together
with an insoluble mud. Ontreating this
solution with flue gases a pure aluminum
hydrate is procipitAtdd. The hydrate is
separated from the solution and calcined,
and the solution itself is used without
concentration for the treatment of new
slag. The loss of soda is low and no fuel
for concentration or evaporation is neces-
sary. The. alumina obtained has about the
same purity as the Bayer product and is
well suited for use in electrolytic pots". (5)
3. PRODUCTION OF PIG ALUTMINUM. (6)
Production of aluminum is an electrolytic process
which requires a continuous supply of electrical energy
For every pound of virgin aluminum metal produced the
following inputs are needed -
2 pounds of Alumina
0.58 - 0.65 pounds of Carbon Paste
(5) Murer, J. Romcke, O.E. and Nichelsen, D. Processes
of Production.
(6) See Technical Literature of Aluminum Industry.
References 1-9. Bibliography.
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0.05 pounds of. Cryolite
0.03 pounds of Aluminum Fluoride~
8 - 10 killowatt hours of electric energy
0.015 manhours of labor.
The Hall-Herault process for aluminum reduction is
the only method used in the United States. Briefly the
process is: The alternating current supplied to the plant
is converted to D.C. and distributed to the rows of pots
which have size and weight g6verned by the anode process
used. The pots are open steel boxes each with firebrick
linings and with carbon blocks or casings in vhich are
imbedded the cathode connections to the negative or
return bus lines. The electrolytic bath in these pots
is composed of molten cryolite into which alumina is
dissolved. Aluminum fluoride or synthetic cryolite
may be substituted for natural cryolite. Above the
pots and extending down into the bath are carbon anodes
which are connected with the incoming or positive bus
lines.
The incoming A.C. after conversion into D.C. is
distributed into the pots with a low voltage (four to
seven) but high amperage (32,000). The passing of the
current from the anodes through the bath and out through
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the cathodes electrolyses the aluminum oxide, liberating
the oxygen which recombines with the carbon to form car-
bon monodide or dioxide. The aluminum collects in a
molten state in the bottom of the pots. These pots which
in the modern plant are twelve feet by fifteen feet and
three to four feet high have a capacity for about five
hundred pounds of aluminum every twenty-four hours. They
are arranged in lines or rows each line having a total
capacity of twenty-thirty million pounds of metal annually.
The molten metal is tapped periodically by the use
of compressed-air syphons into ladles which are brought
by overhead cranes and lowered into pits in the floor
adjacent to each pot. As the pure aluminum is formed
and removed alumina is fed into the bath as needed to
keep the bath up to proper content. The process is a
continuous one operating on a twenty-four hour day basis
the year round. Pots are connected with each other in
a series through bus lines, but individual pots may be
closed down temporarily for repairs. Pot linings, for
example, wear out and have to be replaced about every
two and a half years. Workers are in constant attend-
ance on the pot lines to keep them functioning without
interruption.
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Anodes: The prebaked process. (7f)
Two different methods are following in the construc-
tion of the anodes, previously mentioned. The most common
as well as the oldest process utilised the prebaked carbon
anodes which are blocks of baked carbon mixture composed
of petroleum coke and pitch about twelve to fourteen
inches square and approximately twelve inches deep. Copper
cores fitted into these carbon blocks are attached to the
positive or incoming bus line with cast iron connections.
The anodes are lowered into the molten bath as the carbon
is gradually consumed in the process of electrolysis.
The number of these anodes varies with the size of the
pots, the largest of which requires twenty-four. When
the carbon has been practically consumed the anodes are
removed usually through the use of an overhead crane
without the stoppage of operations. Care is exercised
to ensure removal of the anodes before the metal, core or
is exposed, as the copper may dissolve, and contaminate
the aluminum. The burnt out anodes retain a residue of
carbon which is used in making new anodes. The copper
bars are reused.
An integral part of each plant using prebaked anodes
comprises the carbon, mill, presses and ovens where the
(7) See Technical Literature on Aluminum Indus try.
References 1 - 9. Bibliography.
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anodes are prebaked. The carbon mill utilises petroleum
coke and coal tar pitch. These ingredients are mixed in
proper proportions (about 70 percent coke to 30 percent
pitch) to provide the basic material for the anodes.
The mixture is pressed into squaie blocks in preparation
for baking in the ovens. After baking each anode is fitted
with a metal case and a copper core as previously men-
tioned. The quality of the carbon and pitch must be high
to prevent impurities from entering the bath. An ash
content of less than one percent is essential.
Anodes: The Soderberg Process. ($)
An alternative method for making anodes known as the
Soderberg Process utilises a single continuous anode which
is self-baked in place in the pots. The size of the Soderberg
cell has increased in recent years. In the larger plants
the anode is about ten feet long by four feet wide and
extends into the bath over its entire surface. In the
place of the bars or handles which connect the separate
prebaked blocks of carbon to the bus line, each pot is
equipped with a hopper at the top into which is fed a
mixture of carbon and pitch which settles down inside an
aluminum casing and is baked by' the heat of the bath,
thus forming an anode. Cast iron studs are driven into
the carbon mass to carry the electric current into the
(?) See Technical Literature roh' Aluminum Industry
References 1 - 9. Bibliography.
28.
anode from the incoming lines to which they are attached.
As the carbon anode is consumed, and more paste
is added, the weight of the mixture causes the anode to
settle into the pots,. The cast iron studs are removed
before they are exposed to the heat of the bath to pre-
vent contamination of the virgin aluminum from dissolu-
tion of the iron.
Using the Soderberg Process the baking ovens and
the presses are eliminated, and the carbon plants become
a small department for the mixing of the coke and pitch.
The smaller pots of the Soderberg Process plants may be
covered with adjustable metal screens or covers and
equipped with an overhead ventilating system designed
to draw off the gasses. In practice, however, such equip-
ment seems to make relatively little difference in the
atmosphere of the plants.
Both the prebaked and the Soderberg anode processes
yield aluminum of a very high degree of purity. The
molten metal which is collected in ladles holding about
1,000 pounds is transported by overhead cranes to pouring
rooms or platforms where it is poured into molds accoinmo-
dating approximately 50 pounds of aluminum each. As the
metal cools, the pigs are loosened in the molds, stamped
or marked to indicate the, batch or pot number for checking
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and testing, piled up andcarried away by automatic electric
lift trucks, a ton or more at a time to the shipping docks
for loading into cars for dispatching to rolling mills
or other fabrication plants. Continuous testing in modern
laboratories by chemical and spectrum analyses controls
the quality of raw materials and products.
While virgin aluminum is the chief product of the
aluminum reduction works, some of the plants make limited
amounts of the more common alloys. However, the mixing
furnaces for production of alloys are more often found in
the rolling mills and foundries.
Production of Secondary Aluminum Pig.(9)
The scrap from the production of finished aluminum
goods and reclaimed junked aluminum goods are smelted down
and cast into secondary aluminup pig and alloys of aluminum
which primarily supply the raw materials requirements
of the finished goods producers. This metal therefore,
is competitive with primary aluminum.
More detailed work has been done on the substitut-
ability of secondary for primary aluminum. See Martin. (10)
4.; FABRICATION OF ALUMINUM. (11)
Properties of the Metal.
The end product of the process just described is pig
(9) See Technical Literature on Aluminum Industry.
References 1-9. Bibliography.
(10) Martin, William. Ref. 14. Bibliography.
(11) See Technical Literature on Aluminum Industry.
Refs. 1-9. Bibliography.
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aluminum metal with a high degree of purity (99.7 percent
or even higher). The aluminum reduction process corres-
ponds with the pig-iron stage of iron. and steel produc-
tion. In other words, aluminum pig is the raw material
to be used for further processing. Aluminum in its pure
form possesses certain properties which explain its
wide ap'pal as an industrial raw material. It is extremely
light, having a specific gravity of 2.71. Weighing about
one third as much as copper or steel it is exceeded in
lightness among commercially important metals only by
Magnesium- and Beryllium. Aluminum is also highly resist-
ant to corrosion, malleable and easy to work and lends
itself readily to extrusion processes. It is a good
conductor of both heat and electricity, and a good reflec-
tor of radiant heat. Its affinity for oxygen makes it
mluable as a reducing agent in the separation of refractory
metals, and in the deoxidation of steel. It lends itself
to commercial surface treatment and may be finished in
various colors.
Pure aluminum however has a low strength, but it
has other desirable physical properties. Aluminum is
usually more frequently alloyed with copper, silicon, and
manganese; with zinc, nickel, chromium, lead and bismuth
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used less frequently. The aluminum alloys have improved
strength and hardness, but retain the lightness and other
favorable qualities of pure aluminum.
COMPARISON OF ALUMINUM AND ITS ALLOYS WITH MILD STEEL. (3p)
METAL OR ALLOY ULTIMATE STRENGTH USES
TENSILE WEIGHT
STRENGTH FACTOR
p s.i. MILD STEEL
EQUALS 1
Mild Steel
Aluminum, Commercial
Aluminum, Silicon Alloy
Aluminum,Manganese Alloy
Y-Alloy
Aluminum, Magnesium Alloy
Duralumin
R.-R. Alloys
26.27
9
12
11.
20
23
28
27
1.0
1.0
1.2
1.5
2.05
2.95
2.95
Varied
Varied
Castings for
machinery,
Sheet
Sheet
Castings and
forgings
Sheet and
castings
Sheet, extruded
sections
Forgings
In addition to the comparative strength-weight ratio
based on ultimate strength there are of course other pro-
perties which determine the utility and economy of aluminum
f or stressed members.
(1) Smith, J.H. Ship Construction, Perusing Field for Light
Alloys.
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Among these other properties are endurance arrfatigue strength,
wearing and shear strength, modulus of elasticity, forma-
bility and weld-ability. The variety of alloys and their
differing specifications requires that the user will
be able to select the appropriate alloy for his purpose.
In other words aluminum is considered for the purpose
Iof this study not a natural (pure) metal, but rather an
array of special purpose metals which may be expected to
give maximum satisfaction only when selected functionally.
Aluminum and its alloys may be rolled into sheets, plates,
rods and structural shapes, or cast, extruded, forged
spun and shaped into various forms.
Rolling Mills. (13)
Modern rolling mills have been specifically designed
for handling aluminum. While an aluminum rolling mill
could be used for steel, steel rolling mills cannot be
used for aluminum without considerable modification, be-
cause of the difference in the structure, and physical
properties, particularly hardness.
Aluminum received at the rolling mills is charged
into furnaces with the alloy metal in carefully adjusted
proportions. The molten metal is syphoned into a setting
chamber from which it is tapped and cast into billet-molds
(13) See Technical Literature on the Aluminum Industry.
Refs, 1-9 Bibliography.
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for rolling. A billet maylweigh as much as 3,000 pounds.
Before rolling the billets are carried by overhead cranes
to scalping machines to remove the thin coating of copper,
which comes to the surface in casting, thereby facilitat-
ing the rolling process by providing a smooth surface.
In the large modern rolling mills these billets are hot
rolled, reheated, rolled again-and put through a continu-
ous strip process at a rate of 10 miles per hour or faster.
The sheet is rolled into large coils and taken to anneal-
ing ovens after which it is cold rolled. The sheets may
be put throtigh annealing ovens depending on the require-
ments of the consumer.
Certain types of sheet aluminum resist atmospheric
corrosion better if they are coated with pure aluminum.
Aluminum clad, or pure clad sheet as this material is
called, is made by snadwishing alloy billets of standard
size between two thin quarter inch sheets of pure aluminum
shorter than the billet. When rolled the pure aluminum
stretches and covers both sides of the finished sheet
with a thin coating made integrat with it by pressure
of' the rolling process. Aluminum sheet may be had in a
substantial variety of alloys, sizes and tempers designed
to meet specific industrial uses. (14)
(13ij) Technical Literature on Aluminum Manufacture.
Refs. 1-9 Bibliography.
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5. PRODUCTION OF FINISHED ALUMINUM GOODS.
The final stage of aluminum production is the con-
version of aluminum sheet, shapes, forgings, extrusions,
and castings into final producti Por use by customers.
To describe this part of the industry in any detail.
would require an industrial encyclopedia since aluminum
consuming industries cover the spectrum of American manu-
facturing. The significance of this stage lies in the
fact that it comprises the market for aluminum and aluminum
alloys and hence determines the level of production at
all earlier stages. §ke major portion of this study will
concern itself with the relationship of this part of
the industry with the integrated producers.
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CHAPTER II
SOME CONSIDERATIONS OF SOURCES AND SUPPLY OF RAW MATERIALS
IN THE ALUMINUM~INDUSTRY.
1. BAUXITE.
In addition to bauxite reserves, it is estimated (1)
that there were in 1941 some 3,347,330 long tons of alunite
rock containing 2,377,475 long tons of 50 percent alunite
content and nearly 22 million long tons of rock with 9,432,775
long tons of 30 percent alumite content. Alunite adds
but little to the effective alumina reserve since too little
of it can be used, perhaps not over 700,000 long tons
alumina equivalents
The reserves of bauxite in the United States and the
world are shown in the accompanying table. It can be seen
that there has been a depletion of the domestic reserves
of high grade ores particularly in the more favorable
locations - for instance, Arkansas. However, it is apparent
that the reserves owned and leased in the Carribean close
to'the South East coast ports are ample at the present rates
of production for many years hence. It is also clear that
there can be no monopoly restriction on the supply of bauxite
(ii) Thoenen, J.R.- Alunite Reserves of the United States.
U.S. Bureau of Mines Report of Investigations No. 3,561,
p. 41, Feb. 1941.
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BAUXITE (000's QUANTITIES IN LONG TONS)
YEAR PRODUCTION SHIPMENT IMPORTS EXPORTS WORLD
CRUDE DRIED (FROM MINES) PRODUC-
ORE BAUXITE GROSS DRIED TION
EQUIVALENT WEIGHT BAUXITE
EQUIVALENT
1937 420.2
1938 311.3
1939 375.3
1940 ~510
1941 1,085
1942 3,018
1943 7,283-
1944 3,322
1945 1,145
1946 1,353
1947 1,427
1948 1,724
1949 1,352
1950 1,585
1951 2,192
1952 1,980
1953 1,864
1954 2,353
1955 2,139
1956 2,061
1957
439.0
323.8
375.3
439
937
2,602
6,232
2,823
981
1,104
1,202
1,457
1,149
1, 335
1,849
1,667
1,580
1,995
1,788
1,743
420.2
311.4
373.3
435.0
1,037
2,878
7,050o
3,283
1,347
1,399
1,607
1,413
1,524
1,452
1,622
2,118
1,949
2,037
2,012
1,901
425.0
310.9
375.3
438.9
897
2,750
6,012
2,790
1,099
1,080
1,357
1,196
1,287
1,337
1,532
1,898
1,745
1,766
1,727
1,644
507.4 210.7
455.7
520.2
630 .
1,250
884
1,548
560
740
852
1,821
2,488
2,688
2,516
2,820
3,498
4,391
5,284
5,225
6,075
90.3
51.6
82
151
261
417
147
126
97.8
94.4
54.1
34.9
45
90
41
28
16
14
Source: United States Bureau of Mines. Minerals Yearbooks.
4,238
4,321
7,340
8,292
13, 945
7,358
3,376
4,307
6,216
8,083
8,169
8,041
10, 675
12,539
13,425
15,550
16,400
15 17,400
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TABLE VI
WORLD RESERVES OF BAUXITE (MILLIONS OF METRIC TONS)
AREA 1945 1954
TOTAL ESTIMATED TOTAL ESTIMATED
RESERVES MINIMUM RESERVES MINIMUM
PROVED PROVED
HIGH GRADE HIGH GRADE
RESERVES RESERVES
World Total 700 - 1,200
North America:
United
States 29
South America:
Brazil 19 -
Columbia 10
Guiana Bt. 50 -
Guiana Dutch 40 -
120
375 unknown
nea.
19
60
50
150
n.a.
unknown
unknown.
1,600
40
30
10
60
50
Venezuela
Jamaica
Haiti
Europe:
France
Greece
Hungary
Italy
Yugoslavia
Rumania
Large but unproved.
unknown
unknown
60 -
20 -
250 -
10 -
20 -
2 -
50
460
13
50
10
very large
large
55
20
25
10
20
unknown
unknown
250 - 460
15
150
U. S.S.R.
Africa:
Gold Coast
Guinea Fr.
Morocco Fr.
Nyassaland
Asia:
Carolina Is.
D.E. Indies
India
China
Australasia
30 unknown unknown
45-
20
20
20-
5
20 -
30
60
30
45
20
20
5
20
13
150
5
(1,000)
large
300
large
60
50
25
10
50
30
5
30
30
50
30
Sources: Minerals Yearbooks. U.S. Bureau of Mines.
U.S. Department of Commerce B.D.S.A.
The Times Review of Industry.
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TABLE VII
TOTAL BAUXITE RESERVES - UNITED STATES (BY GRADES) 1945.
(LONG TONS).
GRADE A-LVMINA ESTIIA TED RESERVES ALUM4INUM
CONTENT BAUXITE ALUMINA EQUIVALENT
PERCENT RESERVES EQUIVALENT
A 55 plus 9,343,000 5,193,000 2,569,000
B 50 - 55 8,898,000 4,671,000 2,335,000
C 45 - 50 8,439,000 4,009,000 2,004,000
D 30 - 45 2,348,000 880,000 140,000
Total 29,028,000 14, 699,000 7,349,500
TOTAL BAUXITE RESERVES - UNITED STATES - STATE DISTRIBUTION, 1945.
(LONG TONS).
STATE TOTAL A (55% B(50-55) c(45-50) D (30-45)
plus)
Arkansas 27,354,000 9,090,000 8,443,000 7,803,000 1,918,000
Alabama 358,000 16,000 79,000 33,000 230,000
Georgia 1,029,000 237,000 311,000 481,000
ississippi 323,000 - 23,000 100,000 200,000
Tennessee 58,o00 - 36,000 22,000 -
Virginia 6,000 - 6,000 -
Source; U.S. Bureau of Mines. Minerals Yearbooks.
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TABLE VIII
BAUXITE SHIPPED FROM MINES AND PROCESSING PLANTS IN THE UNITED STATES,1947-
1957 BY CONSUMING INDUSTRIES (000's LONG TONS)
AR IALUMINA CHEMICAL ABRASIVE OTHER
AS SHIPPED DRIED EQT.
37
38
39
40
41
42
43
44
'45
46
47
48
9
50
521
:2
3
54
5
,211.275 209.476
146.687 146.4
161.008 161.0
240.947 239.897
618.763 597.607
2,183.3 2,023.9
6,075.6 5,404.1
2,628.5 2,335.1
833.5 772.3
872.3 733.0
1,032.161 907.852
1,297.6 1,149.1
1,130.6 1,007.5
1,288.1 1,143.5
.75.6
61.5
81-44
92.735
161.037
164.1
244.4
127.5
98.7
109.5
91.7
102.9
80.8
71.1
1,369.6
1,332.4
1,594.6
1,741.6
1,765.0
75.3
61.2
79.54
90.645
158.294
159.1
241.9
127.5
97.0
109.1
91.3
102.9
8o.8
71.1
126.3
92.9
55.3
90.522
148.6
151.8
178.3
143.4
117.5
98.7
86.3
54.2
34.1
47.1
75.6
79.7
74.4
88.7
87.8
146.3
105.7
82.3
144.276
240.0
224.5
258.4
209.1
174.3
146.9
129.1
82.7
51.3
72.1
60.6
36.3
16.1
18.8
7.00
7.1
10.3
14.2
14.2
51.4
42.3
38.9
26.5
33.1
21.1
26.6
35.5
33.1
46.0
7.8
10.5
26.5
28.3
56.3
43.9
43.5
33.1
39.6
29.8
31.9
38.6
39.2
50.1
68.9
76.1
59.6
68.o
68.0
7
ce: U.S. Bureau of Mines. Minerals Yearbooks.
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TABLE IX
BAUXITE CONSUMED IN THE UNITED STATES, 1955-1956 BY
INDUSTRIES-IN LONG TONS (TOTAL) (000' s) DRIED EQUIVALENT.
YEAR ALUMINA CHEMICAL ABRASIVE REFRACTORY
AND (1949 AND
REFRACTORY LATER)
(UP TO
1948)
1945
1946
1947
1948
1949
1950
1951
1952
1953
1954
1955
1956
1957
2,053.1
1,515.6
2,127.9
2,279.1
2,288.4
289.1
3,709.1
4.,985.3
5,844.9
6,388.1
7,141.3
134.8
19.9
145.1
157.9
141.9
163.5
157.8
169.2
160.3
182.2
188.6
201.1
205.4
259.3
247.3
191.8
201.9
254.8
354.1
325.2
296.3
277.5
44.4
28.3
32.1
40.8
55.7
76.3
106.6
119.6
97.3
122.1
144.7
Source: Minerals Yearbooks. U.S. Bureau of Mines.
to any prospective user.
Shipments from domestic mines show a decreasing
percentage of the total supply over the last years as
would be expected with the relatively higher costs.
2. QUICKLIIE.
An abundance of quicklime is produced in the Mid-
United States with a wide geographical distribution of
active plants. Upwards of 150 plants produced lime in
33 states in 1954. Output was 1,487,416 tons in 1950
and 8,629,119 short tons in 1954. Average value per
ton(has fluctuatedfrom $11) ranging from $11.93 in 1950
to $11.79 in 1954. Over half of the total output in
1954 was consumed in chemical and industrial uses, some
20 percent going to metallurgical industries including
aluminum.2) The average price to the metallurgical
industries in that year was 9.80/short ton or substan-
tially below the price for other consumers.(3)Since the
aluminum industry requires only about 3 - 5 percent of
the total available output of this material, there is
little real concern about the material. Even on a re-
gional basis there is adequate capacity for the aluminum
industry.s requirements.
3. - A
The production of soda ash, from which caustic
soda is derived in large volume by the soda-lime process, is
(2) U.S. Bureau of Mines. Minerals Year Book. 1954
.(3) Ibid.
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NUMBER AND LOCATION
TABLE X
OF SODA ASH PLANTS IN THE UNITED STATES.
1939
Calif ornia
Louisana
Maryland
Michigan
New York
Ohio
Pennsylvania
Texas
Virginia
West Virginia
Wyoming
Total
MJANUFACTURED SODA ASH (AIONIA-SODA PROCESS).
1945 - 49 average
1952
1954
4,335,077 short tons
4,442,450 short tons
4,701,364 short tons
Source: U.S. Bureau of Mines. Minerals Yearbooks.
3
2
1
2
3
2
1
2
21
2
1
2,
2
1
1
2
2.
16 17
43.
a division of the sodium carbonate branch of the chemi-
cal industry. Two processes, the soda-ammonia and
the electrolytic are employed.
Caustic soda is also obtained as a co-product of
the chlorine manufacture in the electrolysis of
sodium chloride. During the last war large quantities
were available at low prices as by-products of munitions
works. An abundant supply of soda ash is evidenced by the
census data showing the production of three million tons
in 1939 of which 2,0@,000 tons were 'Cor sale. Even the
peak war production of the aluminum industry required
less than 10 percent of this totalS. 4 There has been little
change in this figure in the post war years because of
growth in the chemical industry. (5)
The aluminum industry has no concern about the future
supply of soda ash. Pacific coast plants could easily get
supplies from California or if necessary, by low-cost water
transport from the Gulf of Mexico ports.
4. PETROLEUM COKE.
Carbon paste from which the anodes are made is a
mixture of petroleum coke and pitch used in the proportion
70 parts of coke to 30 parts of pitch. 'The ratio of coke
used varies with its quality. Carbon paste is consumed
within the electrolytic reduction works either in the making
(4) U.. Bureau of Mines. Minerals Year Books.
(5) Ibid.
TABLE XI.
PETROLEUM-COKE PRODUCTION - UNITED STATES.
REGION 1940 1954
'000 tons
East Coast
Appalachian
Indianna, Illinois,
Kentucky
Oklahoma, Kansas, Miss.
Texas, Inland
Texas, Gulf Coast
Louisana, Gulf Coast
Rocky Mountains
California
Continental U.S.
25.6
943.6
163.0
76.8
149.2
Regional
figures
not
available.
119.2
1,526.6 4,600
(3,960 domestic
consumption)
Source: Minerals Yearbooks - 1940 Bureau of Mines
- 1954 Bureau of Mines
of the prebaked anodes or as a continuous feed in the
Soderberg process plants.
Petroleum coke is a by-product obtained from petroleum
refining being the residue af.ter the top gasolines, fuel
oil, etc. have been distilled off. It is generally avail-
able from most petroleum centres of the United States and
would-be available at aluminum reduction plants at refinery
prices plus local freight. The yield and quality are
affected somewhat by the high octane gasoline removed in
the first stages of distillation. Before it can be used
by the aluminum industry, the crude material delivered from
the refining stills must undergo a calcining process, for
which special equipment, and a substantial amount of fuel,
estimated at from 20 to 25 percent of the original coke
are required. In some areas, notably on the West coast,
city gas plants using crude oil for their raw material,
have installed coke calcining units as adjuncts to their
regular plants to supply the aluminum industry. (6), (7)
Considerable research has been conducted in various
parts of the United States over several years, looking for
a suitable substitute for the petroleum source of carbon.
Coal, wood and other cellulose products have been studied,
but to date these researches have met with indifferent success.()
(4) Selwig, W.A. "Coke from Low-Ash Appalachian Coals for
Carbon Electrodes in Aluminum Industry". U.S. Bureau
of Mines, Report of Investigation No. 3,731, 1943.(6) Reported in Engle N.H.,Gregory H.E.& Masse R, "Aluminum" -
Bibliography.
(7) U.S. Bureau of Mines. Minerals Yearbooks.
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Petroleum coke is available to plants in the Pacific
North West at refining costs in Southern California or
Texas plus ocean or coast-wise freight charges. The cost
compares quite favorably with,-prices paid for a similar
quality product used in the South East and North East.
Supplies are ample for the present capacities of the Pacific
coast.
5. CRYOLITE AND FLUORSPAR.
The original Hall-Herault process for the e)mtrolytic
reduction of alumina used natural cryolite as the chief
ingredient of the electrolyte in which was dissolved the
alumina. Cryolite.(sodium aluminum fluoride) is found
commercially at Ivigott on the shores of the Arksut Fiord
in South West Greenland. Although still preferred by most
aluminum makers, natural cryolite has been supplanted largely
by synthetic cryolite made from Fluorspar. Synthetic
cryolite is as effective for the most part as natural
cryolite. (9)
6. SYNTHETIC CRYOLITE.
Synthetic cryolite is produced from hydrofluoric
acid which in turn is derived from fluorspar, a mineral
which is found in several parts of the United States as
well as in other parts of the world. The chief use of
(9) See Technical Literature on the Aluminum Industry.
Refs. 1-9. Bibliography.
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TABLE XII
FLUORSPAN -- SHI.LFENTS FROM MINES
IN THE UNITED STATES.
1940(short tons)
1954
(short tons)
Colorado
Illinois
Kentucky
Arizona )
New Mexico)
Nevada
Utah
Total
7,569
75,257
89,563
59,197
107,830
35,831
6,477 Montana ) 23,978
New Mexico)
3,520 Idaho,
Arizona,
Nevada, )
Tennessee)
385
188,771
14,389
4,403
245,628
TABLE XIII
STATISTICS OF FLUORSPAR IN THE UNITED STATES (SHORT TONS)
YEAR DOMESTIC IMPORTS EXPORTS UNITED
SHIPMENTS STATES
FROM MINES CONSU4PTION
1945-49 (ave.)
299,968 84,149 1,159 357,382
1950 301,501 164,634 740 426,121
1951 347,024 181,275 1,173 497,012
1952 331,273 352,503 675 520,197
1953 318,036 359,569 767 586,798
1954 245,628 294,320 643 480,374
Source: Minerals Yearbooks. U.S. Bureau of Mines.
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fluorspar is in the steel industry, which took about 73
percent of the total in 1939-40. (10) Used as a flux in
open-hearth steel operations, an average from 5 to 8 pounds
per ton, of steel produced is consumed. The second largest
user of fluorspar is the hydrofluoric acid industry which
consumed on the average about 14 percent of the 1939-40
total production. Glass and enamel producers took a large
amount of the remainder.
In addition to domestic sources, substantial quantities
of fluorspar have been imported into the United States.
France and Germany were important pre-war sources of supply
with substantial quantities coming in-from Spain, Newfoundland,
and Africa. In earlier years the United Kingdom was an
important supplier, but very little has come from that
source since 1930. Supplies of fluorspar are now mostly
obtained from Newfoundland and since the aluminum industry
demands but a relatively small amount, supplies are
obviously ample for the presently expanded industry, and may
be expected to remain adequate for future needs. (11)
7. FUEL.
The most important other iaterial (exclusive of electric
power for electrolysis) used in aluminum production is fuel.
(10) United States Bureau of Mines. Minerals Yearbooks. 1940.
(11) Ibid.
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Coal, oil, gas or electricity may be used in the various
processes depending upon availability to a particular
plant and upon prices.
For several decades prior" to World War II coal was
the only fuel used in the refining of alumina - this opera-
tion was centered in East St. Louis, Illinois(.12)The coal
was secured from nearby mines in Illinois. With the
expansion of the alumina refining in World War II more
particularly in the Southern States, a shift to the use
of natural gas occured. Natural gas was substituted
for coal at Mobile, Alabama; Baton Rouge, Louisana; and
at Hurricane Creek, Arkansas(13 ll the other alumina
plants including East St. Louis and Liserhill, Alabama
use coal. From the operational viewpoint natural gas is
superior.
If alumina plants for the refining of bauxite are
located on the Pacific Coast, they have the advantage
of relatively cheap coal, and more recently, cheap
natural gas supplies from the Canadian West Coast. Natu-
ral gas is not found however in -the Columbia River Basin. (14)
The Californian aluminum industry should have no diffi-
culty in obtaining sufficient volume of either natural or
(12) See Technical Literature on the Aluminum Industry. Refs. 1-9.
Bibliography.
(13) Ibid.
(14) U.S. Bureau of Mines. Minerals Year Books - Area Reports.
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petroleum gas to supply fuel for an alumina plant should
one be built there to serve ary reduction works. Sub-
bituminous coal of good grade has long been mined in the
Coos Bay field in the State of "Oregon but the extent of
the reserves is not fully known. The State of Washington
has adequate reserves of high quality coal to meet any
foreseeable fuel demand for alumina refining, either from
bauxite, alumite, clay or any combination of these materials.
The sub-bituminous coal found in Lewis County Washington,
is located within a few miles of the present ingot re-
duction works along the Columbia River. (15)
In summary it can be seen that the aluminum industry
has purchased rather than produced the raw materials (with
the exception of bauxite) As an example, Alcoa has re-
frained from the manufacture of two raw materials which
considerably offset the total costs, namely soda and coke.
Its activities in most raw materials have been confined,
in the main, to the mining of coal, bauxite, and fluorspar.
It has however secured reserves of basic raw materials to
protect its future requirements. (16)
8. ELECTRIC ENERGY.
Electric Energy is one of the two essential raw
materials in the production of aluminum.
(a) Technical Use of Electric Energy.
The consumption of electric energy varies greatly be-
(15) Ibid.
(16) Annual Rep. of integrated Aluminum Producers -Alcoa,Reynolds,
Kaiser, Alcan; Moody's Industrial Manuals.
tween the different stages of the aluminum industry. In
the extraction of alumina from bauxite, and the transform-
ation of aluminum pig into the finished products, it is
used similarly to other manufacturing - as power to drive
mechanical equipment, and as a source of heat. The energy
used in these divisions of the industry is very small in
amount as compared with that consumed in the reduction of
aluminum - approximately two and one half percent of the
consumption of the industry is required in the prepara-
tion of the ore and the extraction of alumina from the
bauxite.(17lJi the fourth stage, the production of semi-
finished products from aluminum pig, the consumption of
electricity has increased rapidly because of the develop-
ment of electric-motor driven equipment and automatic
control devices.
It is in the reduction of the alumina where the indus-
try consumption mainly arises. The energy is used for the
electrolysis process itself, and for heating the electro-
lytic bath. The use of energy in this process is contin-
uous in contrast with its use for mechanical purposes and
lighting. Consequently an electrolytic plant operates
at a load factor of 98 percent or more. This fact is
extremely important matter for the aluminum industry which
(17) U.S. Department of Commerce. Census of Manufacturers, 1954.
Power for Industry.
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thereby has a condition for low cost energy generation
and for the electric utilities which are enabled to sell
large amounts of energy and considerably improve their
load factor, and hence the efficiency of operation. In
areas wle re the alumina reduction plants exist, the
improvement in load factor is considerable, and is even
noticeable throughout the country. The effect of the
aluminum industry on the load factor of generation should
be considered when an analysis is made of the share of
energy allocated or purchased by that industry. To a cer-
tain extent its consumption of energy is not subtracted
from a given total, but drawn partly from otherwise unused
capacity through improvement of the load factor.
EFFECT OF AN ALUMINUM INDUSTRY ON THE LOAD FACTOR OF AN
ELECTRIC POWER SYSTEM WITH FULL CAPACITY OF.1,000,000 kw.
Consumption of Percent Load
Energy Million Factor.
Killowatt Hours.
Before Aluminum Plant Built:
All Industries (max.possible
development at 35% L.F.) 3,066
After Installation of Aluminum Plant:
Aluminum Plant requirements 4,380
All other Industrials 1,533
Total Consumption of Power:
After 5,913
Before 3,066
Additional Capacity for Aluminum: 2,847Allocated to Aluminum from other
Capacity: 1,533
Total for Aluminum: 
,3 0
35.0
100.0
35.0
67.5
35.0
In other words the aluminum industry power requirements
are essentially only one-third of its requirements be-
cause of the improvement in the overall load factor of
the system. There has been some investigation to regu-
late the flow of energy into the electrolytic operations
so as to use off-peak power and consequently further im-
(18)
prove the overall generating plant utilisation, but there
is no immediate prospect of this being done.
Secondary power - power available in the times of
high flows in the hydro-electric plants further effects
the cost of power. This secondary power is normally sold
much cheaper than "firm" (contract commitment) power. (19)
In the past, the -aluminum industry, particularly, the
Mid-Western and Eastern plants, has benefited from such
an arrangement. In the Pacific North West while secondary
power is potentially available, it is not a major factor
because of the large amount of primary power.available.(20)
In the event of the possible competition between Western
and Eastern plants it is significant that part of the
energy supply in the East would be secondary power at
lower rates than primary power.( obvious disddvant-
age of secondary power is that equipament must remain idle
during periods of low or normal flow - the cost of equip-
mhent must be balanced against the revenue which is some-
what difficult to assess.
(1) See Technical Literature on Aluminum Industry.
References 1-9. Bibliography.
(19) Ibid.
(20) See Reports-Bonneville Power Administration.
21) The only exception appears to be the power from St.Lawrence
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(b) Quantity of Electric Energy Required.
As might be expected from the importance of electro-
lysis in the manufacture of aluminum, the consumption
cruve for electrical energy closely parallels that for
aluminumproduction. Over the ten year period 1926-1936
electrolysis accounted for 80 to 90 percent of the total
electrical energy used in the reduction of aluminum.
There has been a gradual reduction in the power
required to electrolyse a pound of aluminum due to improve-
ments in design of both techniques and equipment. (22)
The consumption of electricity in the ancilliary
operations to electrolysis appears to bear definite
relationship with the scale of production. There has
been technological progress in this area with increas-
ing use of electricity in various mechanical operations. (23)
(c) Cost of Electric Energy.
There are two facets of this question - firstly,
looking at the existing rates in the market or in the
specific agreement, or secondly, looking behind the
existing rates to actual costs and the motives of buyers
and sellers.
Existing Rates.
Since there is a tendency for the centre of the
Seaway Project.
(22) (i) U.S. Bureau of Census.Census of Manufacturers.
(ii) See Technical Literature on Aluminum Industry.
References 1-9. Bibliography.(23) Ibid.
TABLE XIV
ENERGY USED BY ALUIMINUM INDUSTRY
PURCHASED GENERATED SOLD
(millions kw. hrs.)
1954
Aluminum Primary 17,239 9, 241 197
Aluminum Fabrica-
ting 1,335 45 15
1926
Aluminum Industry 861 1,190 n.a.
1936
Aluminum Industry 356 2,241 n.a.
Source: U.S. Bureau of Census, Census of Manufacturers.
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(24)
aluminum reduction."industry to shift to the West,it
would appear that the comparative rate structures betwen
the West and other producing areas serves as a basis
for appraising the long-runs prospects for each region.
The country seems easily divided into four production
regions - the North East, the South East, the Pacific
North West and the South West.
Very little data are available on rates in the
North East which vary from very low cost Niagara power,
to very high cost New York City and New Jersey power.
hour .
Rates as low as 1.3 mills per killowatt/have been reported
from Niagara Falls, UAt in view of the nature of the
contract, it is difficult to ascertain actual cost.
Rates on power from the North Eastern pools which pro-
vide energy for the Brooklyn, New York and Burlington,
New Jersey, plants have not been made public. It is
believed however, that the rate is as high as 8 mills
per killowatt hour now roughly twice .to three times the
rate in the South East and the North West. (26)
More data is available on rates in the South East
and the North West where the two Federal Agencies, the
Tennessee Valley Authority and the Bonneville Power
Administration, operate. The T.V.A. sells electric
energy to Alcoa and Reynolds on the basis of several
(24) See Table XXIVAluminum Ingot Capacity, 1957, Chapter III.
(25) Engle N.H.,Gregory, H.E., and Masse R. See reference 7,
bibliography.
(26) See testimony before Judiciary Committee. Study of Monopoly
Power. Reference 18 Bibliography.
57.
contracts carrying different rates. The rates range from
2.5 to 4 mills per kilowatt hour on the assumption of
a 100 percent load factor. (27).8)The Bonneville Power
Administration has sold elegtric energy to the aluminum
industry in the Pacific North West at the rate of $17.50
per killowatt year or for a 100 percent load factor at
2 mills per killowatt hour. (t9(30)Although these rates,
and calculations, do not represent with true accuracy,
the price of energy, chiefly because the contracts con-
tain various clauses which may modify the apparent rates,
the difference between T.V.A. and Bonneville rates is
striking being about 65 percent higher in the South East.
The effect of that difference on the cost of the product
if significant and will be discussed later.
Rates for power in the South West are reported to
be somewhat higher than those of the T.V.A. and is between
2.75 and 3.0 mill per killowatt hour.(,..(2)The rate for
a River Bank plant which was supplied with Hetch Hetchy
power is 4.8 mills.
(Z7) Testimony before Knox J. in U.S. v Alcoa Case.
(28) Testimony before Judiciary Committee Study on Monopoly Power
t,:( 9) Bloch, Ivan. "Industrial Use of Power". U.S. Dept./Ref.18 .
of Interior - Bomneville Project. Paper presented Biblio-
to Reed College. July 14, 1939. See Ref. (8) graphy.
(30) See (28) Supra.(31) Evidence in U.S. v Alcoa Knox, J.
(32) See (28) Supra.
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The cost of producing power for their own purposes
by the aluminum reducing plants it detailed in the testi-
mony in the Anti-Trust suits against Alcoa and also in
the hearings on Monopoly power before Congressional com-
mittees. Mr. L.W. Wilson, President of Alcoa testified
that the average cost of power per pound of aluminumbr
Alcoa has been 2.86 cents. This would make Alcoats cost
of power 2.86 mills per killowatt hour (10 killowatt per
pound of aluminum) which is over 40 percent higher than
Bonneville. The tendency of Alcoa to buy power from
Government built dams rather than to operate their own
plant or build their own dams is thus clearly explained.
In fact the firm power of Bonneville is cheaper than
the secondary power of T.V.A. The only cheaper or equal
rates in the United States appear to be those of a few
old developments such as Niagara Falls where special arrange-
ments have been made with Alcoa. Such rates were based
on limited capacity resulting from past investrmnts now
largely written off. The present competition is between
rates on relatively new plant. In the West this new
output comes from present investments at the common or
possibly at lower costs. In the East new additional
590
hydroelectric, steam, and natural gas engine plants have
to be built and rates are therefore determined by current
prices and wages. It is such rates that the Pacific North
West competes, but there seems to be a large potential
which. can be developed. It is apparent from the above
that it is difficult to measure prices or the rate struc-
ture in the hydroelectric industry particularly there is
need to examine the long run trends.
(d) Sunply and Demand Factors.
The existing rates in the power industry are the
results of agreement between buyer and seller of energy
without the benefit of ordinary market conditions.
For this type of electric power there is no actual market.
There has, until recently, been but one buyer and one
seller. In the long run, of course, lower rates in
one locality could in a period of industrial expansion,
bring in new plants and hence would increase the denand
for power. Likewise in a timeof recession, competition
at work through price differentials would tend to curtail
production in areas with the highest rates. Effective
bargaining for electric energy must take place between
aluminuM plants since other users, except for a limited
number of electrolytic plants, do not offer direct competition.
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The aluminum industry in demanding large amounts of energy
changes the nature of the commodity and excludes other
buyers from giving effective bompetition. As a result,
the bargaining for rates is a private deal and each case
is different. Moreover, when the factors underlying the
final decision of the seller and buyer are investigated
there is disclosed a wide field for bargaining.
The Sellers' Standpoint.
The greatest difficulty in arriving at accurate
costs in a hydroelectric development arises from the
problem of joint cost allocation. The construction
of a hydroelectric plant is often part of a multi-purpose
system. Many of the hydroelectric plants have been con-
structed with appropriations of public funds to be paid
ultimately by the taxpayers, except for part to be
covered by the sale of electric power. Determination of
this part in practice is a matter of arbitary decision
based upon human judgment after consideration of account-
ing data. Upon this decision rests the power rates f or
the .locality. If for example 40 percent of the tol cost
is allocated to power production this means that rates
for energy sold by the agency must be based on that allo-
cated investment. This allocation of cost is not an
unfair trade-practice as is sometimes alleged. Flood
control, irrigation and navigation have an economic
value even if difficult to measure, and there is no reason
61.
why the sale of energy should be used for paying these
purposes - alternatively there is no reason why the
sale of energy should not carry its own load.
In the final analysis the public power agency must
be governed by two motives in determining the rates for
electrical energy, the one economic and the other social
or political. The economic objective is to allocate
rates to various types of consumers so that maximum
utilisation will be achieved, insuring a total revenue
adequate to meet expenses. Thus the rates charged to
the aluminum industry may properly be determined in the
light of other alternative or possible cumulative sales
of electric energy. In view of the importance of the
aluminum industry as a large-scale user of electric
energy, and one that improves the load factor, it may
even be sourAplicy to cut rates to that industry below
average .cost. In the case of Washington State Develop-
ment, the Bonneville Power Administration could cut the
rate and obtain a larger industry trade, and consequently
higher load factor, and lower unit costs, especially
as an inducement to the aluminum industry. This action
could be justified since the B.P.A. is a public agency
concerned, as provided by Congress,with social as well as
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TABLE XV
COST OF ENERGY PER POUND OF ALUMINUM
Based on Consumption of 10 Kwh./lb. Aluminum.
Selling price aluminum - 15 cents/lb.
COST OF ENERGY SELLING PRICE COST OF ENERGY
PER K.W.HR . OF ALUMINUM PER POUND OF
(CENTS) (CENTS) ALUIVINUM AS PER
CENT OF SELLING
PRICE
.05 15 3.33%
.10
.20
do.
do.
do.
do.
do.
do.
do.
do.
.30
.35
.40
.60 do.
do.
6.67
10.00
13.33
16.67
20.00
23.33
26.67
30.00
33.33
40.00
46.7.70
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economic welfare of the region. Its aim'is not to
maximise profits, but rather to take steps to ensure
the widest possible use of all electrical energy.
The Buyers' Standpoint.
From the point of view of the aluminum industry,
the cost of energy must be related to the total cost
of the product which it is a portion. From the table
it can be seen that energy costs are roughly one-fifth
of the total cost of. primary aluminum ingot, (on base
price of 15 cents per pound). It is of interest to
compare the regional cost of energy with the price of
aluminum pig.
The difference between Pacific North West (Bonneville)
power rates and T.V.A. - (South East) can clearly be seen
to have a large effect on cost. T.V.A. rates in 1951 were
3.3 mills per killowatt hour; (the power cost for every
pound of aluminum was 3.96:) at the Bonneville rate of 2
mills per killowatt hour the cost was 2.4 cents, or 1.56
cents cheaper. In other words North Western rates reduced
the cost.of energy approximately 10 percent where there
is a selling price of 15 cents. It therefore appears
reasonable to expect that if these differentials continue,
more aluminum reduction plants will locate in the Pacific
North West, provided that cost of transportation of ingot to
the markets does not destroy this advantage.
64.
Trend of the Aluminum Industry Toward Public Power.
Up to the commencement of World War II the Aluminum
industry (Alcoa) was able to produce, four-fifths
of its required electrical energy. At the peak of pros-
perity in 1929 Alcoa generated about 70 percent of
its requirements. During the years of depression
1931 - 1935 it had an excess capacity and became a
seller of electric energy. In 1936 it generated 86
percent of its consumption. The average for these
eleven years was 80 percent. (33)
Alcoa had almost completely integrated power pro-
duction with its other operations and could carry on
with very little outside energy. The worst that could
happed was the necessity for curtailing production by
some 20-percent if the additional needed power failed.
A policy of producing aluminum for inventory during any
period of abundance of hydroelectric power served to
cushion possible shortages caused by curtailment of
outside electric energy.
Marked changes by Alcoa in the use of private
industrial power appear:: to have taken place since 1936
although comparable data are lacking. While in 1939
private power appears to have supplied more than 80 percent
(33) Reported by Engle, N.H., Gregory, H.E. and Masse, R.,
.See Reference 7. Bibliography.
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of the power used in aluminum production, in 1943 it was
estimated that it furnished only about one-seventh. This
charge is due to the fact that Alcoa's own sources of power
remained almost constant at a time when the production of
aluminum increased sixfold. (33)
Of particular note in the change of policy of Alcoa
towards power development has been the relative cheap-
ness of public power over their own power. No attempt
has been made by Alcoa to build dams in the West, nor is
(34)(35)
there any intention to do so in the future. The other
integrated producers have decided on a mixed policy of
purchase and generation of power determined for each case
on the success of a joint venture with a utility and access
to large fuel supplies. (36)
The-Pacific North West and T.V.A. are both supplying
a large proportion of the power in the Aluminum industry.
Bonneville itself allocated in 195P 70 percent of its in-
stalled capacity to the aluminum industry. Thus the aluminum
industry has become a quasi-monopolistic buyer of power
in this area.
The Pacific North West has a total potential to sup-
ply energy to reduction plants with a total capacity of 0
(37)
1000 million pounds of pig aluminum per annum. When the
(33) Ibid.
(34) Annual Reports. Aluminum Company of America.
(35) Testimony before Judiciary Committee Subcommittee on
(6 Monopoly Power. Reference 18. Bibliography.
(36) Ibid.
(37) Ibid p. 97,98.
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presently existing power plants are fully developed the 'prower cost
expected to be approximately 0.2 cents per killowatt hour
on the basis of other contracts, and there is expected
to be sufficient surplus power for the fabricating incus-
try associated with this reduction capacity.
Labor.
The labor requirements, of the industry as a whole are
difficult to determine, and can at best be computed, in
the absence of any detailed statistics, by employment
from the number of people employed per ton of production
in each of the divisions of the industry.
Bauxite Mining.
According to 1939 (J8.) census there were a total
of 900 persons employed to mine the total output of
381,000 metric tons of bauxite equivalent to an average
of 236 employees per 100,000 metric tons. Assuming that
the improvements in the productivity -of the orkers by
the use of machinery have been offsett by decreasing
hours in the working week, and an increase in the amount
of indirect labor, then it can be assumed that the figure
of 235 persons per 100,000 metric tons is reasonably con-
stant over the years.
Alumina Plants.
Only one plant existed in 1939 - that at East St. Louis.
(38) U.S. Bureau of Census. Census of Nanufacturinr, 1939.
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The output for that year was some 300,000 metric tons of
alumina and employed a total personnel of 800 men thus
requiring 266 men per 100,000 metric tons of alumina.
However, the assumptions as used above cannot be applied
with the same confidence because the labor employed in
an alumina plant is a function of the plant age and
its scale. For a plant of 100,000 tons 400 men are
required, but for a plant five times that capacity,
only 1,000 men are needed.
Reduction Plants.
The alumina reduction industry has expanded five
times over the last two decades. Prior data on the number
of employees are not available, but it may be estimated
that total employment approximated 2,000 between 1935 -
1939. In the Pacific North West some 3,700 employees were
required in 1943 to produce 280,000 metric tons. For
the country as a whole, the average was nearer 1,500
persons per 100,000 metric tons of aluminum. The differen-
tial may be explained by the fact that all of the Pacific
North West plants were new and therefore more efficient
than the older plants in the industry. Much larger pots
were used making a greater output per man possible, or con-
versely requiring fewer men per ton of aluminum than the average.
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It is reported that labor in the Pacific North West has
proved to be relatively more efficient than in the South
and East.
Fabrication and Finished Products.
These two stages of the industry are by far the most
difficult in which to assess the number of people employed.
It is impossible to segregate the classification of census
statistics.
In comparison to the first three stages of the
aluminum industry where the rate of increase of labor
utilisation was unchanged between 1939 and 19 5_4 at the
(39)
same level of production, the rate of increase has been
four times the prewar figure for fabricators in the same
period. The data does not justify further refinements of
the estimates except to point to an increasing effective-
ness in labor usage as the output has increased.
Wage Rates and Salaries.
Since the depression of 1930's the wage rates of
the aluminum industry have tended to be higher than
manufacturing generally, and in excess also of the hourly
rates paid in the non-ferrous metal industry, and the
steel industry. (40)
In every group the average income is higher in alumi-
num manufacturing than is the average for all manufacturing.
(39) U.S. Bureau of Census. Census of Manufacturers 1939, 1954.
(40)U.S.Dept.of Labor Statistics reported in Statistical Abstracts
of United States.
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The spread between salaried officers, supervisory and
technical staff, and hourly workers is approximately
the same in both cases with officers having five times
as much, factory and office workers, managers and pro-
fessionals having twice as much.
Labor Costs and Share of Labor.
Since there are four tons of high grade bauxite to
eachtton of aluminum the labor cost of bauxite mining
per metric ton of aluminum can be determined from labor
rates from the mining industry and the data in Bureau of
Census Statistics on labor requirments of the industry.
No specific data is available on the wages in alumina
plants, but since it takes about 266 persons to produce
100,000 metric tons of aluminum and the census gives the
wages and salaries paid in the chemical and applied pro-
ducts industry of which alumina is part, then it is possible
to determine the average wage for this part of the indus-
try, and consequently the labor cost per ton of alumina
or per ton of aluminum knowing that two tons of alumina
produces approximately one ton of aluminum.
At the reduktion level the numbers of persons needed
to produce 100,000 tons of aluminum is 1,450 workers .(in-
clusive of workers,clerks, management, etc.) Using the
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figure (average) for salaries and wages in aluminum
manufacturing we can obtain estimated cost of labor
per metric ton of aluminum.
The significance of these estimates appears when
comparison is made with the selling price of the end
product the aluminum ingot. The total labor cost in
the price of aluminum ingot is small (under 8 - 10 per-
(41)
cent nd consequently wage rates have never been bitterly
contested by management.
Regional Variation.
Prior to 1939, there was a maximum wage variation
of 25 - 30 percent between the highest (North East) and
the lowest (South Eas), wages in the aluminum industry
for the United States. This spread has been noticeably
reducec 3)If the trend towards equalising the wages all
over the country continues, the South Eastern plants
with special reference to the fabricating plants at Alcoa
Tennessee and other places in Arkansas, Alabama, will
lose what has been in the past one of the chief advantages
of their location, that is low wages. Other factors such
as proximity of natural gas supplies and nearness to
markets may offsett this. The North West may have to
pay more than the South for labor, but the costs of power,
(41) i.Evidence in trial before Knox J. U.S. V. Alcoa. U.S.Dist.Court. Southern Dist.of N.Y. Equity 85-73.ii.Calculations based on labor requirements and wage rates
as set out above.
(42) U.S.Dept. of Labor. Regional Wage rates. Reported inStatis ical Abstracts. U.S.
(43) Ibid.
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particularly, have an offsetting effect in costs. It
may safely be concluded that the North Western plants
are in good competitive position with North Eastern
plants (Niagara Falls) and appreciable advantage over
the Southern plants from the view of labor and power
combined.
Labor Relations.
Several factors have favored good personnel
relations in the aluminum industry. Firstly, the
cost of labor has been relatively small an item in
comparison with the price of the finished product. Con-
sequently operators can affort to be fair or even gener-
ous with their workers. Furthermore, it has been pos-
sible, and is the established practice, to pass on to
the consumer increases in labor cost. The most trouble-
some situations have not arison between labor and manage-
but ha.ve come from jurisdictional disputes between unions.
The aluminum industry has reached a high degree of
union organisation. It is completely organised in the
mining, alumina refining, and reduction stages, and to a
somewhat lesser extent in rolling, extruding, and forging.
There is no clear preponderance of any one labor organisa- (44)
tion. Among the unionised plant-s,-the C.I.0. unions have
()) See.N.L.R.B. Reports - Estimates of Union nembership
reported in Union news papers.
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been a little stronger than the A.F. of L. but within
the C.I.0. there has not always been perfect harmony
between the Aluminum Workers, the Mine, Mill, and
Smelters Union, and the Die Casting Workers Union. The
A.F. of L. has had control of the Reynolds plants. (45)
The expansion of the industry is changing the union
pattern. It is likely however, that the A.F.L. - C.I.O.
union (The Aluminum Workers of America) will obtain
recognition as bargaining agent in the majority of new
plants. This union has a greater experience in the organi-
sation of aluminum workers and an entrepreneuring spirit.
Alcoa has over the years developed a good working relation-
ship with the A.W.A. which was recognised as the exclusive
bargaining agent in many of its plants. With the exhaus-
tion of domestic bauxite deposits, the Bauxite Mine Workers
will disappear from the labor scene. Up to 1957 there has
not been the problem of layoffs and terminations due to a
severe down-turn in business, but in such circumstances, a
change in the relationship is bound to occur. (46)(47)
(45) N.L.R.B. Reports.
46) Ibid. and Aluminum Company of America Annual Reports.(47) There were considerable reductions in the work force
of plants in 19)44 but this'was relatively of no greater
dimension than other wartime plant lay-offs in other .
industries. There was considerable rehiring in 1955.
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CHAPTER III
SOME CONSIDERATIONS OF SUPPLY AND DEMAND OF ALUMINUM.
1. THE DEMAND FOR ALUMINM AND ITS COMPETITIVE POSITION
IN THE METALS MARKET.
The domestic activity of non-ferrous metal producers
is very closely linked to world-wide price movements which
may reflect numerous factors often which are unpredict-
able. The aluminum ingot and pig producers have however,
for the past twenty years experienced a continued rate
of growth of approximately 12 percent per annum until
quite recently. Although there are such factors as slumps
in business activity here and abroad, particularly in dur-
able goods, changes of inventories of metal consumed, com-
petition among producers of metal, competition anong metals
themselves, decisions of the Government on stockpiling
operations, the demands of world war II and Korean war
and there has been an eindiw'a'ddutilisation .of aluminum
for a large variety of uses, and a corresponding expnding
demand which has far outweighed other recessive factors,
and resulted in the rapid and continuous growth of the
industry.
There is no metal for which a substitute cannot be
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found at a price; for example, if copper pric-es rise,
aluminum, nickel, or lead may be substituted in various
uses. Actual shortages are especially effective in forc-
ing substitutes.
The growth aluminum has made has been due specifically
to -
(i) inherently favorable structural characteri.stics
of aluminum and its alloys,
(ii) faivorable and relatively stable prices,
(iii) recurring shortages of older metals during
and since World War II, particularly of
copper, and
(iv) the sharp increase in the output of aluminum
available for civilian use at the close of World
War II.
The great increase in the potential uses and techni-
cal developments in the processing of aluminumhave
naturally aided in increasing consumption of aluminum.
Aluminum's g-ains in terms of per capita consumption (in-
cluding the war years) have parallel increases of dur-
able goods production, while the per capita increases of
other non-ferrous metals have been much less. The gains
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TABLE XVI
APPARENT CONSUMPTION OF ALUMINUM 1937-1957 IN THE UNITED STATES.
YEAR TOTAL U.S. PRIMARY DOMESTIC RECOVERY PRIMARY ALUMINUM
APPARENT ALUMINUM SECONDARY ALUMINUM IMPORTS EXPORTS
CONSUMPTION APPARENT (SHORT TONS)
(SHoRT TONS) CONSUMPTION OLD NEW
(SHORT TONS) SCRAP SCRAP
(SHORT TONS)
1937
1938 81,213
1939 205,000
1940 272,823
1941 395,O0
1942 630,000
1943 910,000
1944 693,500
194.5 724,061
1946 666,000
1947 735,500
1948 78oooo
1949 690,552
L950 972,742
1951 975,.244
952 1,143,598
1953 1,620,994
1954 1,756,876
1955 2,116,000
[956 2,259,000
1957
167,979
89,523
167,646
227,017
302,788
588,969
877,34-9
74.4,627
696,750
575,687
571,789
684,575
635,956
896,384
898,653
1,072,334
1,542,054
1,696,887
1,754,925
1,781,813
(62,860)
(38,800)
37,763
45,806
68,388
16,184
34,556
38,469
22,589
8,870
14,336
18,084
13,413
28,939 115,755 112,136
19,637 176,736 135,822
22,899 302,746 102,753
27,311 271,076 339,285
90,535 187,538
163,847 180,990
57,100
31,329
95,648 191,129 160,881
4.4,596 136,166 125,326
76,358 167,308 255,692
76,591 216,017 161,816
71,264 233,258 150,738
78,940 289,626 359,481
59,989 232,052 243,750
76,372 259,622 239,745
71,673 268,095 264,975
SOrce: U.S. Bureau of Mines. Minerals Yearbooks.
2,692
6,309
37,108
37,841
7,462
38,779
117,638
188,021
6,703
17,334
63,121
49, 546
37,179
23,236
13,415
10,614
15,1355
50,096
33,834
67,977
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TABL VII
UNITED STATES CONSUMPTION OF- BEIECTEDREFINED METALS PER CAPITA (POUNDS)
AR ALUMINUMJI LEAD ALUMINUM1 FEDERAL RESERVE BOARD
(SECONDARY) INDEX OF DURABLES
COPPER ZINC CONSUMPTION
---------- PRIMARY-----------
37 2.6
138 1.4
39 2.6
1202
8.1
12.1
34
11 4.5
42 8.7
43
44
12.8
10.8
23.7
22.5
24.9
23.9
20.9
6.2
8.2
9.4
9.5
6.4
9.6
10.2
u.k. 11.3
u.k. 10.8
u.k. 12.0
u.k. 12.8
u.k. 12.2
46 6.5
47 7.9
3
54
7.9
9.6
10.9
11.9
15.3
18.2
19.0
7.0
18.6 10.3
19.0 10.2
14.1 7.8
19.0 11.7
18.0 8.8
17.7 10.0
17.2
15.2
17.2
9.8
9.4
9.8
1.1
.37
.86
1.3
1.5
3.3
4.4
6.9
49
63
91
126
162
123
11.3
10.9
11.2
86
3.9
2.4
3.3
3.8
3.9
4.5
3.6
4-1
12.7
12.1
10.9
12.4
10.9
13.5
104
116
128
136
137
160
rce: Standard and Poor's Survey of Industrieis - Light Metals Industry,
1956.
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'TABLE XNVII
ALTMINUM PRODUCTION, DURABLE GOODS MANUFACTURE AND PERSONAL INCOME 1937-57
YEAR DURABLE GOODS UITED STATES PERSONAL INCOME
MANUFACTURES PRODUCTION OF BILLIONS OF DOLLARS
FEDERAL ALUMINUM
RESERVE BOARD MILLIONS OF POUNT\DS
(SHORT TONS)
1937
1938
1939
1940
35
Production of Aluminum - Minerals Year Books
Bureau of Mines
Durable Goods Manufacturers - F.R.B. Bulletins
Personal Income - F.R.B. Bulletins(Department of Commerce Estimates)
208,900
182,241
217,492
286,642
415,924
717,570
1,234,140
1,102,091
793,447
667,703
916,507
910,233
74, 224
962,268
1,129,469
1,241,b52
1,620,579
1,752,606
1,900,762
2,018,722
74.0
65.3
72.6
78.3
95.3
122.2
149.4
164-.9
171.6
177.2
190.5
20 d .7
206.5
227.1
255.3
271.8
286.0
287.3
306.1
49
,63
91
126
162
159
123
6
101
104
95
116
128
136
153
137
1949
1950
1951
1952
1953
160
SOURCES:.
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are more remarkable when it is on the basis of volume
(density of aluminum is approximately 45% of.the other
metals).
XIX
Table / gives an indication of aluminum's relatively
favorable position where it can be substituted for other
metals although on a fabricated basis the price advantage
may be apparently less than indicated.
TABLE XIX
METAL PRICE (CENTS SPECIFIC DENSITY PRICE PER
PER POUND) GRAVITY POUIDS/ C.FT.
C.FT.
Aluminum 0.259 2.71 167 $43.77
Copper 0.40 8.89 557 $222.80
Lead 0.66 11.34 706 $112.96
Zinc 0.14 74 445 $59.40
biagne s u
* (average 1955 prices) SOURCE: American Metals Market.
It seems apparent that the production of primary
aluminum follows closely the trends in both consumers
durables and the F.R.B. index of industrial production,
the latter somewhat more closely. The price of aluminum
pig follow the FaRBv Inder.pf produeliMQience 1947, reasonably
closely, but the ten years before '1947 has no correlation with
that index.
TABLE ;XXr
PRICES OF ALUMINM AND OTHER METALS
YEAR ALUMINUM COPPER COMPOSITE ZINC WHOLESALE
INGOT ELECTROLYTIC STEEL PURE PRICE INDEX
CENTS PER CENTS PER CENTS PER CENTS PER 1947-1949
POUND POUND POUND POUND 100.
1936-40 19.85 11.08 2.66 5.5 52.2
(ave.)
1941-45 15.30 11.87 2.67 8.10 64.9
(ave.)
1946-50 16.09 19.62 3.79 11.77 96.4(ave.)
19,51 19.00 24.37 4.71 17.99 114.8
1952 .19.40 24.37 4.83 16.21 111.6
1953 20.93 28.92 5.12 10.86 110.1
1954 21.78 29.82 5.33 10.69 110.3
Increase
from
1936-40
ave, to
1954 ave.%
9.7 169.1 100.4 94.4 111.3
Source: Minerals Yearbooks. U.S. Bureau of Mines.
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TABLE
RELATIVE EXPENSIVENESS OF ALUMINUM - 1937-57
YEAR PRICE PER INDEX OF WHOLESALE RELATIVE EXPENSIVENESS
POUNDS PRICES OF ALL COMODITIES OF ALUMINUM
CENTS OTHER THAN FARM PRODUCTS PRICE PER POUND 1 INDEX
ALUMINUM PIG AI'D FOOD. OF WHOLESALE PRICES
99.7% plus (1947-49 = 100)
1937
1938
1939
1940
1941
1942
1943
20.08
20.00
20.00
18.7
16.16
15.00
1946
1947
1948
1949
1952
15.64
17.0
17.7
19.0
19.4
20.9
21 .'8
23.7
26.0
26.0
SOUR CES:
61.0
58.4
58.1
.329
.343
.345
* 315
.261
.219
.217
.213
.210
.192
63.7
68*3
69.3-
70.4
71.3
78.3
95.3
103.4
101.3
113.2
114.0
.168
.169
.164
.172
.183
.191
.203
.213
.207
117.0
122.2
125.6
Minerals Year Books Bureau of Mines - (Price of aluminum pig)
Statistical Abstract of United States Department of commerce.(Index of Wholesale prices).
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TABLE XXII
PRICE OF SECONDARY ALUMINUM INGOT (PRICE
REPRESENTS AN AVERAGE FOR COPPER AND
SILICON ALLOYS)
YEAR PRICE
CENTS PER POUND
1945 12.55
1946 14.59
1947 14.92
1948  21.36
1949 18.15
1950 21.69
1951 25.84
1952 2o.48
1953 22.19
1954 20.61
1955 28.73
1956 27.01
1957 22.70
Source: American Metal Market.
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TABLE XXIII
SCRAP ALUMINUM PRICES AVERAGE OF DAIIY QUQTATIONS ON THE NEW YORK METALS MARKE'.
YEAR NEW ALUMINUM CAST ALUMINUM
CLIPPINGS SCRAP
1941 13.00 cents/lb. 10.76
1942 9.50 8.62
1943 7-72 6.99
1944 5.12 4. 04
1945 5.73 3.73
1946 7.94 5.24
1947 8.63 6.39
1948 11.82- 9.44
1949 11.40 7.76
1950 13.16 10.10
1951 15.53 12.14
1952 10.40 7.53
1953 12.57 9.10
1954 13.12 10.14
1955 17.93 15.34
1956 16.99 13.99
1957 14.07 10.86
Source: American Metal Market.
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The real price of aluminum since 1940 (average increase p.a.
2-5 percent) is shovm to be relatively constant. The
lack of correspondence between F.R.B. index of pro-
duction and primary aluminum production in 1954 can be
explained in terms of the 1954 drop in the rate of
growth of industrial production together with the fact
that the aluminum industry entered 1954 with low in-
ventories. This period will be discussed in more de-
tail later. The production of aluminum per capita shows
a much closer conformity with the P.R.B. index which per-
haps indicates the spreading of aluminum into all
types of production and through all industrial activi-
ties - a complete diversification of application of end
products. Secondary-aluminum production shows more
sensitivity to the down turns in business activity which
is expected, since there is no stockpile contract option
which the secondary smelter can use in times of over sup-
ply, The drop in secondary production in 1954 could also
in part, be due to a shortage of scrap aluminum because
of exports and purchases by the integrated producers.
A distinction needs to be drawn between the growth Crates
of the aluminum industry and the end-product makers.
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It is in the number of producers of end-products and
range of products that perhaps the greatest growth has
taken place, which accounts for the continued increase
in demand for aluminum in all forms. During the ten
years 1946-1956 the number of manuf'acturing users of
aluminum and other light metals grew from 4,500 to about
24,000. ('11) In 1951 this number was estimated at 17,000.
Included in this group are automobile manufacturers,
makers of containers, appliances, electrical equip-
ment, and includes steel users. - the welding industries,
and the consumer industry and transportation.
INDUSTRY NUIBER OF PLANTS
Building Industry 5,622
Consumer durable goods 2,430
Containers and packaging 414
Electrical Industry 1,951
Machinery and equipment 2,816
Scientific and technical instruments 418
Transportation and parts 1,688
Ordnance and Military 144
Light metals processors 6,805
All other Industries 1,816
Total 24,084
Source: The Light Metals Industry Survey by Modern Metals,
Oct6ber 17, 1955. Figures include about 400 dupli-
cate listings of firms owning more than one plant.(I4 Modern Metals, October 17, 1955.
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The rate of growth of aluminum markets is in excess
of that anticipated by the 1952 study of the President's
Materials Polidy Commission which estimated the demand
of '9,000 million pounds by 19 5 (corresponding to an
annual expand rate of increase of 5.7 percent.) The
rate of increase of total sales of aluminum has been
(2)
more in the vicinity of 12.7 percent per annum. Despite
fluctuations that can be expected from year to year the
opportunities for relative growth seem to invite all
classes of non-integrated users.
The entry into the industry of the independent
extruders is particularly aided by two circumstances -
the small investment needed to make extrusions and the
relatively little penetration into the most promising
markets. It is estimated that it currently takes 4250,
000 to put an extruder in business (13 ) as compared with
an investment of several millions of dollars prior to
the development of the present modern production methods.
The markets for extruded products cover 30 major industries
with heavy use in furniture, appliances, trucks, trailers,
entrances and fronts of buildings and automobiles. The
aluminum window market for example still only supplies
about one-fifth of all new windows. (4)
(Report of Subcommittee
(No'3'.Select Committee for
(13) Aluminum Extruders Council.,Boston. (Small Bus.U.S.Cong. p.41.
(2) Computation on basis of Statistics for Apparent U.S. Consump-
tion. 195o-uo
()See Report gocommittee No.3 (supra) P 41.
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The independent extruders have grown from six in
number with very small production in 1946, to approximately
135 in 1956, scattered throughout 24 states with a total
production of 400 million pounds and taking 54 percent
of the total extrusion business. (15) The independent
extruders are somewhat immune from shortages that occur
in primary ingot and pig, since it is possible for them
to use secondary metal with equal facility, and in some
cases secondary metal is preferable since there is not
the necessity to remelt primary to obtain specification-
type alloys.
The other groups of non-integrated producers - sheet
and foil mills, wire and cable makers, smelters, founders,
and diecasters, do not show such spectacular growth as
the extruders. The sheet producers have not increased
significantly over the last few years 'largely because
of the supply position of primary rolling billets, the
large investment required in a rolling mill, and the cost
differentials in favour of the integrated producers.
The independent foil manufacturers have enlarged their
capacity, but they have not increased their share of this
type of manufacture above the share of 31 percent held in 1952.(6)
(15) Modern Metals, 1956. (March)Reported in Subcommittee No. 3
Report,Select Committee on Small Business. House 84th
Congress, p. 41.
(6) Ibid p/ 42.
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The other groups of the industry have increased capacity,
but have not increased their share of the business. In
fact the smelters, founders and diecaters are now a
smaller part of the industry, than ten years ago. The
diecasters alone 'of this group have shown any rapid
growth - a.56 percent increase in aluminum demand is
(7)
expected from 1955 to 1958. The integrated producers
have made long-term contracts for the supply of metal
to the automobile manufacturers whose use of aluminum
shows considerable potential for increase of the next
few years. It has been estimated that the present level
of 35 - 40 pounds per car will increase rapidly to over
400 pounds in the near future. (10) A six or seven
million car market per year would require up to. 10 times
the consumption by the automobile industry of 300 million
pounds in 1955. Recently Reynolds Metals Company has
signed additional long term contracts with Ford and
General Motors, and has sited new reduction plants ad-
jacent to new foundry facilities built by the automobile
makers. (9)
.It is difficult to estimate the future needs of the
non-integrated users, but it appears that a reliable
(1$) David P. Reynolds - Aluminum in Automobiles -(S.A.E.
Address.November, 1955). Ibid p. 43.
(7) Ibid p. 43.
(9) Ibid p. 4-3.
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method is to estimate national aluminum requirements and
apply an increasing percentage for the share of the non-
integrated users. Even these estimates are subject to
considerable error. In 1945 the most optimistic fore-
cast cited by the Surplus Property Board (10) for five
years after the war was a total market of 1,600 million
pounds of primary and secondary aluminum.. The actual
demand was much greater in 1950 - 2,451 million pounds.
The estimate of the President's Materials Policy Commis-
sion issued in 1952 for 9,000 million pounds in 1975
appears to be much closer than expected. At the Aluminum
Extruders Council meeting on November 17, 1955, the three
primary producers estimated the 1960 market to be around
(11)6,000 million pounds, excluding stockpile requirements.
The additional requirements to that demand in 1955 is
anticipated by the non-integrated users for the production
of end-products in 1958-60 -
Extruders 200 - 300 million of pounds
Sheet and Foil 200 - 300 do.
Wire and Cable Makers 25- 40 do.
SmeltersFounders &Diecasters35 - 50 do.
Allowance for others and
extra margin L.0 - 10 do.
Total Additional Requirements
in Excess of 1955 use. 500 - 700 million of pounds.
(09))) Report 1945, p. 3. Reported by Subcommittee No.3. Ibid r.144.
(11) Report of Subcommittee No. 3. (ibid) p. 44.ft
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2. THE SUPPLY OF PRIMARY AND SECONDARY ALUMINUM IN THE
UNITED STATES.
The most important group of manuf:acturers of alumi-
num in volume of production are the integrated producers
of primary ingot and pig - Alcoa, Reynolds and Kaiser.
Prior to 1939 Alcoa enjoyed a monopoly in the domestic
primary production field, and it did not attempt to
meet the total demand that was offering. In both 1937
and 1939 there were considerable imports of primary
aluminum and scrap which were needed to meet the expand-
ing demand of non-integrated users.
Reynolds Metals Company who at that time were
largely in the foil rolling and fabricating area testi-
fied before the Committee on the Judiciary of Congress
that they were having considerable difficulty in secur-
ing continuity of supplies. The approaching war, and
the accompanying armament manufacture reduced the sup-
plies of European aluminum which Reynolds had previously
obtained from France. In order to assure supplies,
Reynolds entered the primary aluminum industry ending
the long monopoly of Alcoa, and poured its first ingot
in 194l12ihilst ao.tively encouraging the entrance of
(12) Testimony of R.S. Reynolds Jr. before Subcommittee on Study
of Monopoly Power, Committee on the Judiciary. House 82nd
Congress. Hearings Serial 1 Part 1. page. 111.
93.
Reynolds into the primary aluminum industry, the United
States Government attempted to bring about a further
increase in Primary capacity to meet the large potential
domestic demand, and the enormous probable demand for
war material, and strategic stockpiles. The Government
firstly launched, through the Anti-Trust Division of
the Department of Justice, an action under the Sherman
Act against Alcoa, alleging that this Corporation had
illegally engaged in monopoly practices with respect to
the primary aluminum industry, and had joined in world
wide cartels to limit the sale of aluminum and develop-
(1,3),
ment of markets for aluminum productst a Secondly, through
the R.F.C. the Government planned and built alumina and
aluminum reduction plants which were either leased to
Alcoa and Reynolds or operated by Alcoa and Reynolds for
the Government. Not all of the Government owned plants
were planned to be competitive under peace time conditions, a
heJ were located in strategic areas. Thirdly the Govern-
ment entered into long-term buying contracts with Alcan. (14)
In reviewing the statistics of aluminum reduction capa-
city, it is significant to note that the nominal capacity
of the plant (the maximum possible output) is rarely achieved
since the output of the reduction plant will depend on the
available electric power.
(13) U.S. V. Alcoa. 19 F Supp. 374; 20 F Sipp. 608, 302 U.S. 230 -
1937, 44 F Supp. 97 S.D.N.Y.
(14) The Wartime developments of Aluminum capacity described inO.D.M. report. Reference No. 9. Bibliography.
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ALUJMINUMI INGOT CAPACITT - UNITED STATES AND CANADA FROM COMPANY DATA.
(short tons)
End of' 1957 Under Construction Total
ALCOA:
AlcoaTennessee.-
Badin, North Carolina.
Evansville, Indiana.
Massena, New York.
Pt. Comfort, Texas.
Rockdale, Texas.
Vancouver, Washington.
Wenatchec, Washington.
TOTAL
REYNOLDS METALS COMPANY:
Arkadelphia, Arkansas.
Jones Mills, Arkansas.
Listerhill, Alabama.
Longview, Washington.
Massena, New York.
San Patricio, Texas.
Troutdale, Oregon.
TOTAL
157,100 157,100
47,150 47,150
150,000 150,000
122,250 37,500 149,750
120,000 200,000 140,000
150,000 150,000
97,500 97,500
108,500 108,500
792,500 207,500 1,000,000
55,000 55,000
109,000 109,000
77,500 112,500 190,000
60,500 60,500
100,000 100,000
95,000 95,000
91,500 91,500
488,500 212,500 701,500
KAISER ALMINM1 AND CHEMICAL CORPORATION:
Chalmette, Louisana. 247,500
Mead, Washington. 176,000
Ravenswood, West Virginia 36,000
Tacoma, Washington. 38,500
TOTAL 498,000
ANACONDA ALUMINUM COMPANY:
Columbia Falls, Montana. 60,000
HARVETY MACHINE COMPAT:
The Dalles, Oregon.
ORMT INC. (OLIN -REVERE)
Clartngton, Ohio.
UNITED STATES TOTALS: 1,839,000 765,500 2,604,500
SoUrce: Moodyts Industria2s and respective Company Annual Reports and
Press Releases.
109,000
2,500
111,500
247,500
176,000
145,000
4.0,000
609,500
60,000
54,000
180,000
54,000
180,000l8oooo
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TABLE XXIV (continued)
ALUMINUM INGOT CAPACITY - UNITED STATES AND CANADA FROM COMPANY DATA.
(short tons)
End of 1957 Under Construction
ALUMINUM COMPANY OF CANADA:
Arvida, Quebec.
Beauharnois, Quebec.
Isle Maligne, Quebec.
367,000
38,000
115,000
Kitimat, British Columbial86,000
Shawnigan Falls, Quebec. 70,000
776,000
CANADIAN-BRITISH ALU4INUM LIMITED:
Bail Comeau, Quebec. 45,000
CANADIAN TOTALS: 821,000 135,000 956,000
Source: Moodyls Industrials and respective Company Annual Reports
and Press Releases.
Total
90,000
267,000
38,000
115,000
276,000
70,000
866,00090,000
45,000 90,000
96,
TABLE II
UNITED STATES PRODUCTION OF ALUMINUJM
1937 1957.
YEAR TOTAL U.S. PRIMARY PRICE
PRODUCTION PRODUCTION PER
(SHORT TONS) (SHORT TONS) POUND
(CENTS)
1937
1938
1939
1940
1941
1942
1943
1944
1945
1946
1947
1948
1949
1950
1951
1952
1953
1954
1955
1956
208,900
182,241
217,492
286,642
415,924
717,570
1,234,140
1,102,091
793,447
-687,703
916,587
910,233
784,224
962,288
1,129,489
1,241,852
1,620,579
1,752,606
1,900,762
2,018,722
146,340
143,441
163,545
206,280
309,067
521,106
920,179
776,446
495,060
409,630
57l,750
623,456
603,462
718,622
836,881
937,330
l,252,Ol3
1,460,565
i,565,721
l,678,954
20.08
20.00
20.00
18.7
16.16
15.000
15.00
15.00
15.00
15.00
15.00
15.64
17.00
17.7
19. 0
19.4
20.9
21.8
23.7
26.0
57 
-1,649,013
Preliminary
Source: U.S. Bureau of Mines. Minerals Yearbooks.
SECONDARY WORLD PRODUCTION
PRODUCTION (SHORT TONS)
(SHORT TONS) (PRIMARY)
62,56o 530,8o0
38,800 619,300
53,947
80,362 869,000
l06,857 1,009,949
196,464 1525,800
313,961 23123,400
325,645 1,875,600
298,387 1,009,700
278,073 870,000
344,837 1,189,000
286,777 1,398,000
180,762 1,441,000
243,666 1,655,o00
292,608 1,971,000
304,522 2,260,000
368,566 2,710,000
292,041 3,050,000
335,041 3,470,000
339,768 3,710,000
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In the case of plants drawing power from hydroelectic
stations, the available power and hence output is
subject to wide fluctuations because of variations
in rainfall. It is only in the case of reduction
plants with their own power plant integral with the
other installations could the nominal capacity be
thought to approach a reliable measure of actual re-
duction capacity. It can be seen from the statistics
of production and consumption, that with the exception
of the period of the war and immediately thereafter,
the primary industry has not supplied the needs of
their own fabricating capacity, or the capacities of
the non-integrated producers. The development of
fabricating capacity by the integrated producers has
more than kept up with their expansion of primary capa-
city, a situation due primarily to the increased earn-
ings to be made by fabricating rather than selling
ingot or pig. Consequently the primary integrated
producers have made long run contracts for the pur-
chase of primary ingot from the Aluminum Company of
(15)Canada. Prior to the Korean war, it became apparent
to the United States Government that primary reduc-
tion capacity was going to be a serious bottleneck
(l5) Testimony of Executives of Primary Integrated
Producers before Subcommittee No. 3 of Select
Committee on Small Business House 84th Congress,
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in the aluminum industry, and a critical weakness in
the strategic materials supply-line in time of emer-
gency. Consequently the R.F.C., and later the O.D.M.
and G.S.A. -made contracts with the domestic integra-
ted producers for the construction of aluminum ingot
and pig capacity by these companies with the benefits
of accelerated depreciation, tax benefits, and a
guarrantee by the Government to purchase any primary
production that could not be sold on the domestic
market. Primary production was doubled in the five
year period 1950-1955, but as the demand had increased
as least as rapidly, there was a shortage of metal for
the non-integrated producers early in 1955. (16)
The Government attempted to alleviate this posi-
tion by not taking ingot into stockpile, and in fact
(17)
releasing some metal already held there. Secondary
aluminum is in some respects different, although fol-
lowing the general cyclical pattern, variations in
secondary output reveal a few significant departures
from the primary output. During the late 1920's,
secondary output increases by about eight or nine
percent while primary output expanded some 10 percent.
Secondary aluminum advanced from the depression low-
(16) Ibid.
(17) Ibid p. 322,~ et seg.
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point a year ahead of primary aluminum and even sur-
passed primary output in 1934. A third difference
in the market behaviour was the greater sensitivity
of secondary aluminum as compared with primary to
downturns in business cycles. World War II secon-
dary production increased roughly at the same rate
as primary aluminum. The fact that the secondary
market has been relatively free whereas the primary
market has been controlled has an economic signifi-
cance. No matter how effective the monopoly for
primary aluminum is, it is difficult is not impos-
sible to control the scrap market. As aluminum
products wear out and are discarded, they become
a source of raw material for the secondary smelters.
Where there is a heavy flow of scrap metal the
(18)
price of scrap tends to be depressed. Thus the
extent of the secondary supply is of considerable
'importance in the aluminum industry and therefore
shall be studied in some detail in this work.
Secondary production (from scrap) has already
expanded, but nowhere near as rapidly as primary
production, and therefore little relief could be
(18) Refer Table XXII supra.
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given by the secondary smelters to new firms wishing
to buy extrusionbillets or casting ingots, or to
older firms short of metal who had not previously
contracted to purchase. The secondary production is
a relatively decreasing source of metal in the alumi-
num ingot supply.. The short term relief, offered
by the Government release of stockpile material, in 1955
did not change the long-term view of decreasing avail-
able supply of domestic primary metal. In fact, it
has been amply demonstrated, that any increase of
primary production by the integrated producers, is
likely to be absorbed by their own fabricating plants,
or sold by long-term contract to the automobile manu-
facturers, after fulfilling Government requirements. (19)
The Government has given every assistance to potential
integrated producers, but those firms who entered the
industry (Ormet, Anaconda and Harvey Machine Company)
are also using their production for fabricating
activitieY2O) The relative profitability of fabrica-
ting the metal over its sale as ingot or pig leads
to this inevitable result. (21)
Alcan on the other hand has expressed its intention
to increase the amount of metal it will supply to non-
(19) Testimony before Subcommittee No.3 Select Committee on
Small Business. House 84th Congress Hearings on Aluminuij
Industry.
2) Reor t ibid.
21) Ib d.
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integrated users, and has launched a large expansion
program for increasing the production of primary
ingot and pig. Although export of the metal to other
parts of the-world market may prove to be more profit-
able for Alcan, the management of this organisation
feels that it would be,. in the long run, of greater
benefit to them to become the established source of
raw material for the United States non-integrated
users. It therefore, follows that with Alcan's lower
cost structure that the domestic price of primary
aluminum ingots will be reduced on the United States
market (although in 1957 there was a 2 centepar pound
tariff), with consequent improvement in the financial
position of the non-integrated users, and an enhanced
profitability and prospec.ts for any new firm enter-
ing this field. Furtherthe growth in the orimary
production of the metal in the United States will
therefore be almost exclusively of integrated producers
athfrf acmeprordr-Y 1ingo have considerable
rolling capacity.
As the capital requirements for such integrated
operations (assuming that bauxite or alumina can be
(22) Testimony of N.V. Davis before Subccimmittee No. 3 Select
Committee on Amall Business. House 84th Congress. Hearings
of Aluminum.Industry. Part I p. 144 et seq.
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bought from other integrated producers for some years
until the production and fabricating operations are
established) are considerable, (a rolling mill costs
(23)
in the order of $30 million to be competitive), it
would appear that any new integrated producers would
require large capital resources.
The only classes of firms likely to be able to
provide the $50 - 100 million capital needed, are
joint ventures of large non-integrated fabricators,
or firms in other non-ferrous metals wishing to
return to a more rapidly growing industry.
The raw materials for production have not been
in short supply to any of the integrated producers
for any long period, although, Reynolds initially
purchased their alumina from Alcoa until they located
and developed their own bauxite mines in Jamaica and
Haiti. The domestic supplies of bauxite now avail-
able are not of high grade, but the indications
are that these ores could be used in an emergency
to supply the domestic integrated producers. The
supplies of bauxite and Jamaica and Dutch Guiana are
ample for all foreseeable future demand. It is ex-
pected that an economic process for the extraction
of alumina from clay will be developed in the near
future.
(23) N5 rolling mills of Alcoa and Olin cost 036 - 46 million(1955)*
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In respect of cheap power supplies, it is a
fact that little or any cheap power from hydro-
electric sources both privately and Government
owned will be available in the immediate future. (24)
The long run pro.spects of hydro power are very pro-
(25)
mising. However, competitive cost power can be
bought from public utility companies (if in large
amounts contracted to be purchased over long periods
of time), or alternatively generated by any primary
ingot producer from coal or natural gas-fired steam
power stations, or gas engines directly coupled to
D.C. generators. There are ample supplies of both
fuel. There is no shortage of any other material
for the manufacture of primary aluminum. The patents
on alumina and aluminum production are licensed by
the patent holders, Alcoa, at a very small royalty
fee.
In conclusion it can be seen that the long-
term supply position of the industry is largely
determined by considerations of policy of the large
integrated producers with respect to their own fabri-
cating needs and the future intentions of Alcoa with
respect to supolying the non-integrated groducers on a
(24) Exception is the power available fr6m St. Lawrence Sea Way
Project.
(25) Estimated potential development of Columbia River 33.0
million kw. reported by D.L. Marlett. Hearings Subcommittee
on the Study of Monopoly Power, Committee on the Judiciary
House 82nd Congress, p 100.
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permanent basis. It could not be expected that any
integrated domestic producers will sell any large
amounts of their ingot production for use by their
competitors in the fabrications market - the non-
integrated producers. It is to be expected that
productive caphcity for ingot in this country
will always increase at a somewhat lesser rate
than the demand, leaving a gap to be filled by
imports and secondary metal. The cost structure
of Alcan and other overseas producers and the
tariff policy of the United States Government
will largely determine the existence and effec-
tiveness of price competition in primary metal.
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CHAPTER IV
THE STRUCTURE OF THE ALUMINUM INDUSTRY
1937 - 1957
The Period 1937-1914.
The United States aluminum industry in 1937 compri-
sed one integrated producer, Alcoa, and a relatively
small number of non-integrated producers of fabrications,
(1)
castings-and end-products. Since the pattern of the
industry was largely that of the only integrated pe oducer,
Alcoa, it is of importance to review briefly the his-
tory of this company from its inception(2)
Alcoa was originally founded under the name of
Pittsburgh Reduction Company by Charles M. Hall, Alfred
E. Hunt and Arthur V. Davis. It was established on
September 18, 1888 with a capital of $20,000 to exploit
Hall's patent for making of aluminum from bauxite through
an electrolytic process.
The Pittsburgh Reduction Company was protected by
the Hall patent up to 1906 and later by an agreement
with Cowles (potential competitors) on the Bradley Pro-
cess up to February, 1909. Thereafter, the process
automatically became the property of the public.
(1) B.D.S.A. Report for O:DM. Aluminum 1956, p
(2) The historical material drawn largely from B.D.S.A.
Report supra and C.C. Carr, Reference 10 Bibliography.
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The legal monopoly of the corporation thus ran two
decades with the process subsequently open to potential
competition. During the patent period, the Pittsburgh
Reduction Company which became the Aluminum Company of
America in 1907, expanded the size of its operations
and became a vertically integrated business. The price
of the metal went from $200 a pound in 1890 to 22 cents
in 1908. The capital assets increased from one million
dollars to 28 million dollars over the same period.
The original reduction shop in Pittsburgh was given up,
and much larger scale operations launched at Niagara
Falls (1895) and at Massena, N.Y. (1903).
The corporation steadily continued a policy of ver-
tical integration, acquiring deposits of bauxite at first
in Georgia and Alabama, then in Arkansas in the early
1900's. The building of an alumina plant at East St. Louis
and a railroad between two alumina plants and the com-
pany's bauxite fields, completed the vertical chain.
In 1905 it constructed a large carbon electrode
plant at Niagara Falls. It also in this period embarked
on a policy of acquiring water power sites, and develop-
ing power plants at Shawigan Falls on the St. Lawrence
River in Canada and at Niagara Falla. Impressive plans
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for harnessing the St. Lawrence River were relinquished-
because of difficulties between the United States and
Canadian Governments. Alcoa also entered the field of
finished products by way of producing stamped cooking
utensils. In 1910 when Alcoa ceased to enjoy the legal
protection of its patent, it had become a powerful
highly integrated concern.
In the next two decades until 1929 - the corpora-
tion expanded horizontally at each level. It also
entered the international field, and soon became one
of the world's leading producers. Alcoa.started in
1912 to buy bauxite fields in British and Dutch Guiana.
It also acquired properties or .interests in France,
Yugoslavia and elsewhere. But, by 1928 all foreign inte-
rests were turned over to Aluminum Limited - its Cana-
dian subsidiary. Alcoa kept only its interests in
the Surinaama-rdheauxite Maatchappi:3 and in the Saguenay
River Development in Canada. Thus, Alcoa had restricted
its activities to the United States by 1929, but never-
theless its achievements had been spectacular. Fabri-
cating and finishing activities w'era expanded. About
1920 Alcoa had large mills built at Edgewater, N.J.
and Alcott, Tennessee, and facilities for forgings, extru-
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sions and castings were similarly. increased.
After 1929 Alcoa like many other companies went
through a period of depression. Production of aluminum
which was higher in 1930 than in 1929 dropped sharply
in 1931 and reached a low point for the depression in
1934.. Turning up again in 1935 it exceeded the earlier
production level by 1937. Projects for increasing
electric generating capacity, were slowed down - the con-
struction of large Government power systems such as
the Tennessee Valley Authority and Bonneville causing
a. change in Alcoa's policy. The Government had begun
at this time to view with extreme apprehension the
possibility of a shortage of aluminum cayacity in the
time of war, and to conclude further, that the large
monopoly of Alcoa was against the express interest of
public policy as stated in the Sherman Act. The entry
into the industry of another large scale primary pro-
ducer would largely overcome these two difficulties.
The United States Government through the Anti-Trust
Division of the Department of Justice filed a Bill of
Complaint, listing one hundred and forty separate charges
of monopolising interstate commerce in sixteen markets,
and commodities, and charging Alcoa with being a party to
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comprehensive conspiracies with foreign producers to
limit competition in the aluminum and magnesium markets.
The case was set down for hearing in the Federal District
(3.)
Court for the Southern District of New York. In the
Governmentts petition for relief it was asked that Alcoa
be dissolved. After preliminary legal action, the case
went to trial on June 1, 1938 before Judge Francis G.
Caffey. In all there were 155 witnesses testifying,
including senior executives of Alcoa. The actual trial
lasted until August 14, 1940. (The case however was to
continue in this court and the Circuit Court of Appeals
evnlaftenitheudmentof by Chief Judge T.C. Knox in
the Federal District Court in New York on June 2, 1950).
The Government complaint essentially consisted of
three parts
1. Monopolisation,
2. Illegal conduct in domestic competition and,
3. Conspiracy vith foreign producers.
In order to support its claim that Alcoa had intended
to monopolise the industry from its inception, thus
exceeding the privileges granted by its legal monopoly
under the basic patent, the Department of Justice cited
early litigations with Cowles and the alleged legal vio-
730) T14,5 Alcoa 19 F Supp 374, W. D. Pa 1937; 20 F Supp 608
Lxpediting Court W.D. Pa 1937; 302 U.S. 230 1937; 44 F Supp
97 - S.D.NY. 1941
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lations enumerated in the consent decree of 1912. )The
1912 consent decree was entered by Alcoa in order to
dispose of involved suits in respectiopaterits and
(4)
trade practices.) Judge Caffey found that nothing Alcoa
did in its early patent litigation lent any support
to the charge that it was either monopolising or
restraining trade.
"It was simply a fight for survival
between the owners of two conflicting patents". (5)
He also found that the original complaints by the
Government, which ended in the consent decree, had
been settled by that decree (res judicata), and there-
fore deserved scant attention in any attempt to prove
intent of wrongdoing on the part of Alcoa.(6 )
The principal commodities which Alcoa was accused
of monopolising were bauxite, water power', alumina, vir-
gin aluminum, castings, cooking utensils, pistons,
extrusions and structural shapes, foil, .sheet and mis-
cellaneous fabricated products. It was on many of these
commodities that Alcoa had patents on improvements in
manufacture and processing, which enabled their pro-
duction at very much reduced costs and much improved
quality.
(4) U.S. V Alcoa. 44J F Supp. 97 - S.D.N.Y. 1941 Caffey J Opinion.
(5) Ibid.
(6) Ibid.
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In the matter of bauxite monopoly charges, the
(7)
Court decided that no monopoly ever existed. Alcoa
had owned about half of the United States deposits
of bauxite (the deposits with the highest grade ores).
It was admitted by both parties that it i.s impossible
to fortell with any accuracy the extent of any deposit
because of irregularities in the natural placement of
the ore.
"The adequacy of bauxite for aluminum
productionpoecluded any decision that this
raw material was being monopolised".
On the issue whether Alcoa had monopolised water
power, the Court dismissed that charge by taking
judicial notice of the facts. Statistics of the
Federal Power Commission disproved the monopoly charge.
It was evident that it would be physically and financi-
ally impossible for any industrial concern to monopolise
the water-power resources of the United States. Judge
Caffey held the Anti-Trust Case must fail with respect
to charges of monopolisation of alumina and aluminum.
He found nothing in the record to sustain the charge
that ALcoa had excluded,or sought to exclude, any com-
petitor or potential competitor from producing, or sel-
ling, aluminum in the United States.(9)
(7) Iid.
(8) Ibid.
(9) Ibid.
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"I think it is perfectly clear that
with the access to the raw materials of ore
and power named, which is, and, save when
prevented by a patent, always has been, open
to everybody in the United States. Anyone
possessing the f our cardinal tangible elements
of intelligence, industry, courage, and money
or credit is, and has been, able, with confi-
dence to go into the production of virgin
aluminum. Anyone in the United States fitted
with the prerequisites I have mentioned is
now free, and since the expiration of the
Bradley patent in 1909, has been free to pro-
duce virgin aluminum". (10)
Before the complaints regarding the monopolising
of the manufacture and marketing of the other commodi-
ties mentioned in the Government complaint are dealt
with, a discussion of Judge Caffey's opinion is neces-
sary. Clearly, in the strictly legal context, there
was no monopoly in the sense of absolute control of
bauxite or water power resources but it is doubtful
if this criterion is applicable. It can be readily
seen that with Alcoa controlling the deposits of
higher grade::ores, the desirably located water power
resources, and holding a number of basic patents
which would be necessary for any competitor to have
use of if the lower grade ore is to be processed, no
firms could enter the virgin aluminum industry and
be on a competitive basis with Alcoa, at least for a
considerable period of time. How then could a firm
(10) Ibid p. 306.
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obtain the credit, or raise the capital in an endeavour
which could not be in a position to compete and survive
even assuming that the market price of the ingot would
not be very much reduced by the monopolist? It is
obvious that this situation was clearly understood by
potential competitors of Alcoa. In fact the pe ice of
ingot was reduced even in the face of general rising
prices when Reynolds entered the industry.
The charge of monopolising the cooking utensils
business centered largely around Alcoa's ownership of
a minority interest in the Aluminum Goods Manufacturing
Company (Wisconsin). The Court found that vigorous
competition had always existed between the Aluminum
Goods Manufacturing Company and the Aluminum Cooking
Utensil Company, and that the Aluminum Goods' policies
were directed by the Vits, Hamilton and Koenig families,
longtime majority owners of the business. Allegations
of monopolisation of aluminum pistons, produced princi-
pally by the permanent mold method, were dismissed
after a carefull study of the Piston Patent Estate - a
pool of patents by various companies engaged in piston
manufacture.
The charge that Alcoa monopolised aluminum foil
(11) Ibid.
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failed, since the Reynolds Metals Company was shown to
(12)
be a larger factor in the market than Alcoa. However,
the Court did not consider it important that the depen-
dence by Reynolds on Alcoa for ingot in the event of
diffilculties with overseas supplies or prices, virtually
placed the control of Reynolds' production in Alcoats
hands.
The charges by the United States Government that
Alcoa had monopolised aluminum sheet production brought
forth much testimony. The Court did find possible in-
jury to competitors in the narrowness of the spread
between Alcoa's ingot price, and price at which it sold
sheet, particularly in the years 1925 to 19 P) The
Court confined its opinion to twenty out of seventy-
(14)
two items of sheet that were examined. This spread
in the opinion of the Court made it difficult for an
(15)
independent aluminum roller to make a profit. Judge
Caffey noted that Alcoa had widened the spread between
ingot and sheet prices after 1932, and that the company
was on one hand requested by sheet purchasers to narrow
the spread between sheet and ingot prices, whereas the
(16)
owners of rolling mills wanted the spread widened. The
(12) Ibid.
(13)Ibid.
(14) Ibid.
(15) Ibid.
(16) Ibid.
charge of monopolisation of the sheet manufacture was
not sustained. (17)
The conspiracy charges in which Alcoa was accused
of making deals with foreign producers harks back to
the first cartel Alcoa joined in 1895. The Government
in effect claimed that there was a continuous conspiracy
from that time with Alcoa the nucleus of the conspiracy.
The records showed that only one of the Cartels, the
first one organised in 1895, was signed by Alca.) The
others were participated in by Alcoats subsidiary - Alcan.
The 1895 Cartel did not fix prices in the United
States, but allocated markets amongst the signatories -
Alcoa was not to sell in Europe and the Swiss Company
would not sell in America. The 1901, 1906 and 1908 Car-
tels provided for allocation of certain markets and the
fixing of prices. The 1912 Cartel concenned sales only
outside the United States, and Alcoa insisted that it
was in no way a violation ofthe Sherman Act. The 1908
Cartel was terminated by its members on February 17, 1912,
but was also cancelled by the consent decree Alcoa signed
on June 7, 1912. The 1912 Cartel became inactive because
of World War I, and was cancelled by the participating
parties on June 23, 1915.
(17) Ibid.
(18) Ibid.
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The court held that none of' the Cartels could
be considered to have any weight as indicating a
long range plan of Alcoa to conspire with foreign
producers, and thereby fix prices in the United States
(19)
market. No evidence was introduced of any written or
tacit agreement between Alcoa and foreign producers
after 1915. The Government further contended that
Aluminum Limited was created purely as a device by
which Alcoa could participate freely in the European
Cartels, and fix aluminum prices on a world wide
basis, without regard to the prohibitions of the
Sherman Act. The Government contended that the
marketing agreements between Aluminum Limited (Alcan)
and British, Norwegian, and Alliance Aluminum Compagnie,
represented indirect participation of Alcoa in the
European Cartels. The Alliance was composed of
French, British, Swiss and German companies to fix
production quotas of members in order to avoid large
surpluses of aluminum. It did not concern itself
with the United States market directly. The Court
held that there was not creditable evidence of any
conspiracy between Alcoa and Aluminum Limited, or
that there had been any agreement between Alcoa and
foreign producers. (20)
(19) Ibid.
20) Ibid.
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The Court's decision that there was no evi-
dence of any conspiracy between Alcoa and Alcan
cannot be challenged as a matter of "fact", but
since the two corporations were controlled abso-
lutely by the same group of majority stockholders
the finding of the Court is meaningless. The joint
stockholding of the Mellon, Davis and Hunt families
was not neglected by Knox, C.J. in his judgrent (see
later). (In the accompanying tables it can be seen
that 35 stockholders controlled the amjority of pre-
ferred and common stock of Alcoa at the time of this
Court decision).
In concluding its analysis of the charges, deal-
ing with the issue of abnormal earnings, the Court
found that over the entire life of Alcoa the average
earnings on investment had been at a rate slightly
(21)
less than 10 percent, which in itself, could not be
considered an unreasonable rate of return. However,
it is the long-established policy with Alcoa of retain-
ing a considerable portion of earnings within the cor-
poration and as a consequence there has been a consider-
able increase in shareholders' equity. The price of
(21) Ibid.
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TABLE XXV
ALCOA PREFERRED STOCK 1937 - 1939
GROUPS NUMBER OF
SHAREHOLD-
INGS IN EACH
GROUP
NUMBER OF SHARES
.HELD IN EACH
GROUP
('000s)
- 10 shares
-25
- 100
- ~500
- 1,000
- 5,000
over 5,000
it
I"
If
"
"
"
.. 1 1,116
1,713
493
79
82
27
5,311
22
106
117
64
196
1, 253
SOURCE: Temp. Nat. Econ. Commission Investigation
of Concentration of Economic Power. p. 272
76th Congress.
11
26
101
1,001
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TABLXVT
CONCENTRATION OF SHAREHOLDERS
COMMON STOCK - 1937 - 1939.
GROUPS NU4BER OF SHARE- NTMER OF
HOLDINGS IN EACH SHARES HELD
GROUP IN EACH GROUP
(THOUSANDS)
1 - 10 shares 1,348 0
11 - 25 " 515 il
26 - 100 .736 51
101 - 500 " 284 71
501 - 1,000 " .70 51
1,001 - 5,000 " 75 171
over 5,000 " 35 1,110
2,963 1,473
SOURCE: Temp. Nat. Econ. Commission Investigation
of Concentration of Economic Power. p. 272
76th Congress.
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shares has taken this into account. Obviously such a
policy has greatest benefit for the well-established
large stockholders who can benefit tax-wise by taking
their return from the company in the form of capital
gain. It could hardly be expected that a company with
smaller resources wishing to enter the aluminum indus-
try could expect to retain a similar portion of earn-
ings to investment because of higher proportion of
interest expense and a probable lower earnings to invest-
ment ratio.
On July 23, 1943 the District Court (Caffey, J.)
entered its judgment dismissing the petition of the
(22)
Government, and denying the relief sought. The De-
partment of Justice appealed the case to the Supreme
(23)
Court. There was an absence of a quorum in that body
because four Supreme Court Judges,who had previously
'participated in the Anti-Trust action, disqualified
themselves. This stalemate was overcome by an Act of
Congress which made it mandatory for the Supreme Court
in the case of lack of quorum 'to certify a Civil Anti-
Trust case to the Circuit Court of Appeals for the
district where the suit was originally tried. When
(22) Ibid.
(23) U.S. v. Alcoa 320 U.S. 708 - 1943.
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the law was assented, the Supreme court certified the
case to the United States Court of Appeals for the
(24)
Second Circuit. The Appeals Court comprised Judges
Learned Hand, Augustus Hand, and Thomas W. Swan.
Judge Learned Hand wrote the opinion after hearing
(25)
arguments from Counsel. The decision upheld Judge
Caffey on all counts except one - the alleged mono-
(26)
polisation of the aluminum ingot market'. The Court
of Appeals held that Alcoa had monopolised this
market up to August 14i 1940, (the date on which the
(27)
evidence in the original trial closed). The Court
found the monopoly to have existed simply in the act
of growth by the company over the preceeding twenty-
(28)
five years, with the result that Alcoa was supplying
90 percent of the United States market with aluminum
ingoiP)In the opinion of the Court this proportion
of the aluminum ingot market-was al.one sufficient to
show violation of the Sherman Act, vithout any evidence
of Alcoats intent to monopolise. The Court held that
Alcoa monopolised the ingot market simply because it
held too large a share of it. The District Court's
rulings that there was no monopoly of any raw material,
or any fabricated article of aluminum, and that there
(24) U.S. V. Alcoa 322 U.S. 716 - 1944.
(25) do. 148 F 2nd 1946 C.C.A. 2nd 1945. L. Hand. J.
(26) Ibid.
(27) Ibid.
28) Ibid.
29) Ibid.
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was no conspiracy with foreign producers were upheld(30)
The Circuit Court of Appeals was careful to limit its
ruling with respect to the aluminum ingot market to
the period ending August 14, 1940. It recognised that
the war had followed, and that aluminum ingot plants
with capacities greater than-Alcoa's had been built,
and these plants would have to be disposed of under
a program to be approved by Congress. The Court
specifically stated that because Alcoa had a monopoly
in 1940, there was no reason to assume that it would
have one after the war. (31)
On the issue of monopolising the aluminum ingot
market, in which the Circuit Court of Appeals had
failed to agree with the District Court, the higher
Court specifically forbad the District Court to rule,
until disposition had been made of the Government
owned aluminum capacity. The court of Appeals stated -
"It is idle for the plantiff to assume that
dissolution will be proper, as it is for Alcoa to
assume that it will not be, and it would be particu-
larly fatuous to prepare a plan now, even if we
could be .sure that eventually some form of disso-
lution will be proper. Dissolution is not a
penalty, but a remedy. If the industry will not
need it for its protection, it will be a dis-
service to break-up an aggregation which has for
so long demonstrated its efficiency". (32)
(20) Citation to Case: U.S. versus Alcoa.
U.S. District Court of Appeals, Third District.
Learned Hand, J. Judgme nt. April 23, 1946.
(30) Ibid.
3) Ibid.32) Ibid.
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Thus the case was returned to the District
Court. On April 23, 1946, this Court entered a
final judgment, but gave the Attornty General of
the United States the right to institute further
proceedings on the one ground of possible monopoli-
sation of the aluminum ingot markets. The Govern-
ment was privileged to do this, if it appeared,
that disposition of Government owned aluminum plants
in the post-war period had not brought about compe-
tition. Alcoa was also privileged to apply to the
Court for final determination of the issue, if it
appeared that competition had come about.
There were in fact further proceedings in the
District Court within a year, but before any reference
is made to this last and final case, a review of
the development of the industry from 1939 to 1947
is in order. (33)
Prior to 1939 as has been noted above Alcoa
had an almost absolute monopoly of the aluminum
ingot industry. The world wide production of alumi-
num had begun an upturn in 1934, and with the with-
drawal of Germany from the Cartel, the production
of aluminum in Europe continued to increase at a
(33) Historical Material reported in B.D.S.A.report for
0.D.M. Aluminum 1956 (Ref. V (Bibliography)
pp II - 4, II - 7.
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much higher rate. In 1936 Cartel restrictions were
finally removed, and a world wide expansion of aluminum
capacity was undertaken. Canada built its first alumina
plant in 1937, and by 1938 had started ingot and power
production expansion programs. The world situation
was becoming more forboding daily indicating the need
for a major expansion, Alcoa had begun to increase the
production capacity of alumina, aluminum, mill pro-
ducts and fabricated products. World production was
up to 774,500 short tons in 1939, from 304,700 tons in
1929, and the low 156,300 short tons in 1933. In the
beginning of 1939 Alcoa had four reduction plants opera-
ting with a total output of 300 million-pounds; secon-
dary capacity was less than 100 million pounds and the
total fabricating facilities were barely able to pro-
cess the metal that was available.(34)
The world war II period in the aluminum industry
can be divided into three phases 
-(35)
(i) the expansion period,
(ii) production cutbacks and,
(iii) resumption of accelerated production.
The Expansion Period.
A lack of complete information, and the consequent
(34) Ibid.
(35) Ibid pp li - 7 - 13.
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unawareness of the need for sharp increases in pro-
duction capacity, affected the evaluation made by the
Army and Navy Munitions Board in August, 1939. On
the assumption of a possible three-year emergency, it
was determined that existing aluminum productive capa-
city was adequate. In December, 1939 Alcoa announced
plans for a new 30 million pound reduction plant at
Vancouver, Washington, to meet expanding markets
and possible emergency requirements.
It was at this time that the Reynolds Metals Com-
pany was having particular difficulty in securing
reliable supplies of aluminum ingot. (36)
The Reynolds Metals Company was incorporated in
Delaware in 1928, and at that time was a consumer of
ingot for the production of aluminum products. It
manufactured thermostats, various precision and
temperature measuring devices and foils for packaging,
decorative coverings, insulations and advertising
displays. In the first ten years of its existence,
Reynolds expanded by acquisition of companies in the
same line of business. The foil production expanded
at a very accelerated rate, so much so, that supplies
of rolling ingot became a problem in 1939. In order to
(36) Ibid.
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be assured that it could have the expanded supplies
of rolling ingot needed for the domestic market,
Reynolds considered the possibility of entering the
production of primary aluminum. It was apparent
that the Anti-Trust suit by the United States Govern-
ment against Alcoa would be lengthy, and as the out-
come was doubtful, the Government and Reynolds, both
interested in providing increased capacity to the
aluminum industry, made an agreement which would
achieve this end without dependence on a favorable
decision of the trial.(37)
On August 1, 1940, the Reynolds Metals Company
was granted a business loan,at 4 percent,of #15.8
million by the Reconstruction Finance Corporation for
the construction of an integrated aluminum plant,cf
60 million pounds capacity, to be secured by a mort-
gage on all its plants. The Reynolds plant included
all processes necessary to convert bauxite into
finished ingot, and was scheduled for full production
by the end of 1941. Production from the first pot
line was started in May, 1941. (38)
Alcoa concurrently with the announcement of the
R.F.C. Loan to Reynolds reduced-the price 'of 99.7 ingot
from 19 to 18 cents per pound and a few months later to
(37) Reynolds reasons for entering production field given
in testimony before Subcommittee on the Study of Monopoly
Power, Committee on the Judiciary House 82nd Congress
Hearings No. 1 Part 1 pp. 111,112,
(38) Ibid.
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17 cents per pound, and indicated it would expand its
primary facilities at Vancouver, Washington and Alcoa,
Tennessee - (the new production to be available over
the period December 1, 1940 through July 1, 19 . The
reduction in price by Alcoa to meet the threat of compe-
tition is a clear indication of the existence of a
monopoly pricing policy. The price reductions are
all the more important since they were made at a time
of rising price levels. The table of the relative
cheapness of aluminum (supra) shows the real order of
the price decrease.
The supply of aluminum continued to be adequate
during October and November, 1940, but shortages in
various fabricated products began to appear. Reynolds
experienced some difficulties with ingot deliveries
from its fabricating plants. Early in 1941 with
National Defense Advisory Commission approval, and
promise of priority assistance, Alcoa and Reynolds
undertook the expansion of their fabricating facilities440)
It soon became clear that the supply plans were
inadequate. In April 1941, an estimate prepared by
the Aircraft Section of the Office of Production Manage-
ment (successor to the National Defense Advisory Commission)
(39) B.D.S.A. Report for O.D.M. Aluminum 1956 n 11-9.
(40) Ibid.
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based on data supplied by the Air Corps showed the
following relationship of requirements and supply.
ALUIINMI REQUIREMENTS AND SUPPLY (41)
(APRIL,1941)
(millions of pounds per year)
Primary Secondary Total
Aluminum Aluminum
Requirements:
Aircraft 900 900
Other Military 250 50 300
Civilian 280 160
Tot al 1,430 210 1,640
Supply:
Alcoa 730 730
Reynolds 90 - 90
Secondary * 60 160 220
Total 880 160 1,040
Deficit: 550 50 600
* Segregated aircraft scrap
equivalent to primary.
The 600 million pounds per annum deficit was the
basis of the first Government expansion program. The
May 1941 hearings of the Senate Special Committee
investigating the Defense Program highlighted the need
for increasing production, and hastened decisions on
(41) Ibid.
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the expansion program. The testimony also strengthened
the growing opinion that Government financing was
necessary to secure sufficient production for the
Defense Program. (42)
Proposals to participate in the expansion program
were at once entertained from Alcoa, Reynolds and Bohn
Aluminum and Brass Corporation. Later other companies
including Union Carbide and Carbon Company, Western
Cartridge Company, American Cyanamid Company, Fair-
mount Aluminum Company and Olin Matheson Ch'emical
Corporation were considered as possible operators of
Government owned plants. By November 1941, the entire
expansion had been planned and the decision had been
made to proceed with the construction under the
supervision of Alcoa's engineering staff.- Choice
of the operating companies had been narrowed down
to Alcoa, Bohn, Union Carbide and Olin. Bohn and Unbn
Carbide withdrew. Olin contracted with Defense Plant
Corporation to operate one of its plants, and others
were assigned to Alcoa. Reynolds expansion at Lister-
hill, Alabama, was considered to be part of the
program. The expansion brought the estimated total
primary capacity to 1,557.5 millions pounds - Alcoa,
840. million pounds, Reynolds 164.0 million pounds
(42) Ibid.
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and the Defense Plant Corporation 553.5 million pounds. (43)
While the United States primary production was
being increased the R.F.C. was negotiating with the
Aluminum Company of Canada for long term supply con-
tracts. By April 1942., four contracts had been signed
covering 1,096 million pounds of primary aluminum at
15 cents a pound for United States use, and 274 million
pounds at 17 cents per pound for export under provisions
ofthe Lend-Lease Act, delivery to be completed by
December 31, 1944. Alcan received advances totalling
$68.5 million which were used in expanding Canadian
facilities, and in addition was given Export - Import
Bank credits of$34.25 million at 3 percent to be used
to offset payments made against the advances of 5 cents
per pound of metal delivered. 'his reliance on Canadian
imports supplied from facilities (particularly the
Shipshaw Project) developed with advances under these
contracts, brought sharp criticism from Congress in
later years. (44)
Paralleling the development 6f expansion plans on
primary aluminum, the fabricating capacity was expanded.
The pre-war program for fabricating expansion under
Government sponsorship included in addition to increases
in capacity of existing plants, two extrusion plants, a
(43) U.S. Dept. of Commerce. B.D.S.A. Report for 0.D.M. 1956.
p 11-10.(44) Ibid.
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sheet mill, a forge shop and a cylinder head foundry.
In order to establish reliable military require-
ments of aluminum, a Joint Aluminum Committee was
set up in February 1942. Membership was composed of
one or more representatives of each military service,
a representative of the War Production Board and an
Alcoa consultant. ..Estimates of requirements for 1942
and 1943 were established at approximately 1,600 million
pounds for the first year and 2,600 million pounds
for the second. (45)
A second plan for expansion was prepared by the
War Production Board immediately after the Pearl Harbor
attack. Preliminary plans for additions to primary
production capacities were submitted on February 10,
1944. (46)
Responsibility for the construction program was
assigned to Alcoa, since the only engineering personnel
trained in this type of construction, were on its staff.
This second Government program added 640 million pounds
to primary capacity. Additions to fabricating facilities
for processing 890 millions of pounds of metal annually
were required including expansion of existing fabrica-
ting plants and the construction of new plant. This
(45) Ibid p 11 - 11
(46) Ibid.
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program was approved in June 1942, and was completed
in December 1952. The extrusion press program was
delayed well into 1943. During 1942, before this
expansion program was completed, inventories were
drastically reduced to 90-day working stocks of all
aluminum material held by manufacturers. Ingot was
borrowed from the United Kingdom, but was repaid in
1943. (47)
In the first half of 1942 there was a shortage
of alumina which delayed the opening of new primary
aluminum plants. The shortage was attributed to the
long time required to bring the Bayer Process plants-
into production, the operational difficulties of pro-
cessing low grade domestic bauxite, and to a sharp
decline in imports of high grade bauxite - due mainly
to shipping problems. Experimental alumina plants
to use high alumina clays as raw materials were built
at Harleyville, South Carolina; Laroinie, Wyoming; and
Salem, Oregon, and developed to the pilot operation
stage, but these plants were later sold for other pur-
poses when ample supplies of alumina became available. (48)
(47) Ibid.(48) Ibid.
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Production Cutbacks.
The second phase of the war period began in
the f irstquarter of 1943. The supply of aluminum in
all forms eased, although there were local shortages
in certain types of fabrications later in the year
primarily due to an inadequate labor force. (L49) On
June 30th stocks of ingot were 221 million pounds, and
(aircraft manufacturing stocks) were 338 million pounds.
The Metals Reserve Company financed a stockpile to ab-
sorb any surpluses on the market. Stockpile goals were
set at 250 million pounds of primary, and 75 million
pounds of secondary. (50) Additional action was taken
by the Government to reduce the mounting surplus.
Firstly, the less economic plants, five in all , were
closed down and production was cut in the other D.P.C.
and Alcoa reduction facilities, and alumina plants.
Canadian contracts were rescheduled with some deliveries
being postponed. In the latter half of 1944 aluminum
controls were relinquished, and civilian consumption
thereupon increased. Despite these attempts at matching
supply and demand, shipments from producers continued
to decline and reached the lowest for 22 months in
(49) See supra BDSA Report to O.D.M. Ibid p. II -12.
(50) Ibid.
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December, 1944.. Inventory reduction at consuming
plants, in' anticipation of the reduction in war orders,
was an important determinant of the decreased demand.(51)
The Surplus Property Act was passed by Congress,
late in 1944., establishing an agency for the dtposal of
the Government owned aluminum facilities.(52)
Resumption of Acceleated Production.
The final part of the wartime phase of the aluminum
industry began in late 1944., when the optimism of an-
early end to the hostilities was prove erroneous. The
sharpening of resistance in the western front changed
the war material planning requirements. Orders were
immediately placed with fabricators and mills, and since
the inventories were low, the plants began production
immediately.53owever, most of the manpower bad moved
away from the industry, and it became necessary to use
troops on leave to reopen some mills and extrusion
plants. Some private and D.P.C. capacity was re-acti-
vated after being completely shut down. Metal Reserve
Company stocks were drawn on, and negotiations were re-
opened to resume purchases from Alcan, to a total of 4.15
(51) Supra BDSA Report. Ibid.
(52) Ibid.
(53) Ibid.
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million pounds. Supplies to and the capacities of
fabricating plants were on the whole adequate, except
for foil, where the demand in radio, radar, and packa-
ging uses had already considerably increased. Power
requirements continued to move upwards from 19144.. The
demand for extrusions increased markedly because of ex-
panded army bridge and aircraft requirements. ()54
The level of activity continued high in the second
half of 1945. In June, with peace imminent wartime
controls were released, final revocations of M. orders
occuring in August. (55)
In viewing the development of the industry through
the 1939-1945 years, it can be seen that the monopolistic
structure had been broken up by two large competitors,
one the Government Agency - D.P.C., which owned a consider-
able amount of alumina, primary aluminum and fabricating
capacity, and secondly the Reynolds Metals Company, which
had become through direct Government support a completely
integrated producer of aluminum. Clearly no competitor
of Alcoa could have hoped for suchassistance and encourage-
ment in any peacetime situation, and it appears that it
would be highly improbable that Reynolds would have survived
( 5J B.D.S.A. Report supra pp. 11, 12, 13.
Ibid.
(55) Ibid.
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TABLE XXVII
ALCOA'S BALANCE SHEET
1937-1942. (millions of dollars)
ASSETS 1937 1938 1939 . 1940 1941 1942
Fixed Assets: 236.1 215.4 222.2 257.9 373.3 428.8
Lands, Water-rights,
Plants, facilities.
Depletion, Deprecia-
tion, amortization.
Balanc e
Investments in sub-
sidiaries and other
companies not con-
solidated.
OTAL FIXED ASSETS:
lurrent Assets:
Cash.
Accounts and notes
rec. less.res.
Marketable Sec. at
cost.
Inventories.
90.7
148.4
35 .9
184.3
2.3
12.9
2.0
31.1'
OTAL CURRENT ASSETS: 48.
[inking Fund for Bonds: -
ontract for deffered
payment on sale by
fixed property:
efered Charges: 3.
M0TAL ASSETS: 236.
93.5
121.9
36.0
157.9
3.7
14.9
22.0
39.5
80.13
11.9
3.29
6 253-0
96.9
125.3
27.3
152.6
3.5
22.9
21.0
35.6
83.0
11.9
4.0
251.4
100.3
157.6
25.8
183.4
28.4
20.1
34.7
88.9
11.19
8.6
292.9
116.7
286.6
23.7
280.5
9.0
43.9
20.3
50.6
123.8
11.9
11.7
427.9
149.8
289.8
23.8
313.6
41.8 (a)
76..8
41.0
84.6
244.1
11.7
15.7
574.4
a) Among which. (20,600,000 of United States
Treasury for Savings Notes.
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TABLE XXVII. ctd.
ALCOA'S BALANCE SHEET
1937-1942.
(in millions of dollars)
LIABILITIES 1937 1938 1939 1940 1941 1942
Long Term Liabilities:
Common Stock 7.4 7.4 7.4 7.4 7.4 7.4
Preferred Stock
Long tern Debt
(notes, etc.)
TOTAL LONG TER4
LIABILITIES:
jurrent Liabilities
Total:
Pperating and other
Resources.
leserve for decrease
in value of
securities and
investments.
arned Surplus at the
end of Year.
134.0
26.0
167.4
25.9
2.8
10.0
28.5
133.2
26.0
166.6
38.0
2.4
10.0
26.0
125.3
24.0
156.7
30.7
2.7
10.0
51.4
119.2
24.0
150.6
49.6
3.1
10.0
76.6
119.2. 119.2
85.9
212.5
90.2
8.3
10.0
106.9
111.0
237.6
197.5 (b)
4.9
10.0
124.4
'OTAL LIABILITIES: 236.6 253.0 251.4 292.9 427.9
b) Including $76 million due to the United States
Government after renegotiation of war contract.
SOUR CE: Poor's Industrial Manual
Alcoa Annual Reports
Moody's Industrials
574.4
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TABLE XXVIII
ALCOA
YEAR INVESTMENT MILLION NET EARNINGS RATE OF RETURN
OF DOLLARS (AVE. (MILLIONS) PERCENT
PER YEAR)
1910
1914
3.628.5
40.0
1919 114.8
1921 150.2
1929 223.2
1932 240.5
1934 229.6
1935 192.9
1936 184.8
1937 197.9
1938 202.6
1939 208.0
1940 230.7
1941 427.9
1942 574.4
deficit 10.0
def icit
27.3
0.5
8.1
9.4
22.0
27.8
15.6
37.3
40.9
33.4
12.6
18.8
9.1
- 6.7
12.2
- 0.2
3-5
4.9
11.9
14.1
7.7
17.9
19.4
9.6
Source: Wallace Market Control, p. 226
Poor's Industrial Manual
Moody's Industrial Manual for Investment *for
1941 and Net Income for 1941 and 1942.
Rate of return for 1941 and 1942 not strictly
comparable with earlier years.
139.
TABLE XXLDU
ALCOA PREFERRED STOCK:
SALIENT STATISTICS, 1934-1942.
EAR PRICE RANGE DIVIDENDS EARNED PER NET ASSETS NUMBER OF SHARES
(DOLLARS) PER SHARE SHARE PER SHARE
(a) DOLLARS
(DOLLARS)
1.50
2.50
11.374
12.75
6.00
8.25
6.00
6.00
6.00
6.55
15.41
20.60
11.68
29.25
37.02
34.29
27.98
115.65
117.80
121.70
126.72
132.56
146.93
172.92
i95.77
210.52
1.,465,705
1,460,373
1,353,223
1,34.0,823
1,332,581
1,252,581
1,192,331
1,192,331
1,192,331
(a) Figures show actual payments; preferred stockholders
are entitled to a cumulative dividend of 6 percent
per annum.
The payments of 1936, 1937, 1939 include arrears for
previous years since 1932.
SOURCE: Moody's M1anual of Investments.
934 60 - 78
935 695 - 114
936 109 - 125
937 1o5 - 119 3/4
938 93 - 114
939 110i - 1171
940 108 - 119 3/4
941 106 - 116
42 99 5/8 - 114r
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ALCOA COMMflON STOCK: SALIENT STATISTICS
1934 - 19142
TEAR PRICE RANGE DIVIDENEDS EARNED PER WET NUMBER OF
.DOLLARS PER SHARE SHARE ASSETS SHARES
DOLLARS PER SHARE (OUTSTANDING)
(b)
32 - 95
87 - 161
72t - 177-1
58 - 129k
90 - 147
138 - 192e
92 - 155
782 - 107 3/4
0
0
0
0
0
o55
8.65
13.29
5.13
6.00 (a) 19.77
6.00
6.00
6.00
25.12
22.90
17.79
3.88
2.77
11.68
22.28
27.43
39.92
59.04
77.54
89.48
1,472,625
do.
do.
do.
do -
do.
do.
do.
do.
(a) Plus 1 share of Niagara Hudson Power Company
for each 3 shares of Alcoa.
(b) Or equity per share.
SOURCE: Moody's Manual of Investments.
1937
938
.939
942
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TABLE XXXI
BALANCE SHEET
REYNOLDS METALS COMPANY
(millions of dollars)
ASSETS
1938 19L2
Current Assets 7.4 -34.8
Net Property Account
(after deduction of
depreciation reserves) 7.8 10.8
Emergency Facilities
(after deduction of
depreciation and
armortization
reserves) 23.8
Sundry
(receivables, prepaid
goodwill, trademarks,
oatents, etc.) 6.8 9.1
22.0 78.5TOTAL ASSETS:
TABLE XXXI (contd)
BALANCE SHEET
REYNOLDS METALS COMPANY
(millions of dollars)
LIABILITIES
1938 1942
Current Liabilities 1.7 15.2
Long term liabilities
4 percent 1st. M.
serial bonds. - 32.2
Long term notes 2.2 6.2
Preferred stock 5.0 5.0
Common stock 8.9 8.9
Earned Surplus 1.9 8.0
Sundry 2.3 3.0
TOTAL LIABILITIES: 78.522.0
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TABLE XXXII
REYNOLDS METALS COMPANY
PROFITS 1938-42
1938
A. PROFITS COMPARED
TO SALES:
Operating income
percentage of sales. 5.52
Net income
percentage of sales. 3.80
1939 1940 1941 -1942
9.90 13.0 11.66 7.74
7.45
B. PROFITS COMPARED
TO ASSETS:
Net income percentage .
of total assets. 259 6.46 7.58 4.79 1.75
Net income percentage
of net worth. 3.37 8.46 12.19 12.74 5.95
SOURCE: Moody's Industrials.
8.52 5.90 1.59
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TABLE XXXIII
REYNOLDS 1NETALS COMPANY
COMMON AND PREFERRED STOCK: SALIENT STATISTICS
(in dollars)
COMMON STOCK:
Earned per share.
1938 1939
0.29 1.29
Dividend per share. 0.15
Price Range. 10-17
Net Assets per
share. 11.65
PREFERRED STOCK:
Earned per share. 11.42
Dividend per share. 5.50
Price Range. 77-94
Net assets per
share. 338
0
7.14
1940
2.10
0.30
8-15
1941
2.53
0
6-15
1942
1.07
0.50
6-8
12.75 14.57 17.11 17.66
30.54
5.50
78-87.,
27.47
5.50
75-85
48-57
5.50
75-96
361 398
SOURCE: Moody's Industrials.
450
57.35
5.50o
75-95
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a competitive challenge from Alcoa without the amount
of Government intervention it received. Witness the
difficulty that Reynolds encountered with alumina pro-
duction, and the improved profit position of Alcoa in
1939 through 1941 which. clearly indicate monopoly pro-
fit levels and decreasing refining and production costs.
As will later be discussed, the amount of technical
knowledge and operation experience acquired by Alcoa com-
bined with a continued accent on research and develop-
ment was a store of resources which would migh heavily in
Alcoa's favour in any competition with Reynolds.
It is of interest to compare how Alcoa and Reynolds
were able to obtain the supplies of raw materials, deve-
lop the production capacity, and finance the large ex-
pansion which was undertaken in the 1939-1945 period.
Alcoa, as mentioned above, began its expansin
program in September, 1940 with an aluminum reduction
plant at Vancouver, Washington, followed by additional
metal processing facilities at Alcoa, Tennessee, addi-
tional alumina facilities at Mobile, Alabama, and
additions to other company plants engaged in manufactu-
ring mill products. (56) The expansion program under-
(56,) BDSA report Zfe-ren.c 4o-. .9. Bibliography P. 11:9.
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taken by Alcoa for the .Government consisted of two
parts - firstly, Alcoa designed and builts plants for
the D.P.C. and secondly, Alcoa operated these and other
plants built by contract for the D.P.C. The Govern-
ment- owned facilities were of two classes - those
which were located as advantageously as possible so as
to be of use as producing facilities after the war, and
secondly, emergency smelter plants and strategically
located fabrication facilities using high cost power or
otherwise too uneconomic to operate in peacetime conditions.(57)
Aluminum reduction works built by Alcoa for the
Government and operated by Alcoa were Burlington (Phila-
delphia); Jones Mills (Arkansas); Los Angles (California);
Meade (Spokane, Washington); Owens, (Long Island); River
Bank (Sacramento, California); Troutdale (near Portland,
Oregon); and the St. Lawrence Plant adjacent to Alcoa's
works at Massena, New York.(58)
Government-owned Alcoa-operated plants to manufac-
ture aluminum mill products were located at Chicago
(McCook Sheet Mill); Spokane, Washington (Trentwood
Sheet Mill); Newark, Ohio (Rod and Bar Mill); Kansas City,
Missouri (Cast Cylinder Head Plant); Phoenix, Arizona,
(57) See (60) below.
(58) Ibid.
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(Extrusion and Tubing Plant); Monroe, Michigan (Forging
Plant); Newcastle, Pennsylvania (Forging Plant);
Canonsburg (Pennsylvania) (Forging Plant); Glassmere,
Pennsylvania (Aluminum Powder plant). (59 )
The Government-owned Alcoa-operated alumina plants
were located at Hurricane Creek (Arkansas) and Baton
Rouge -(Louisana). The Alcoa combination process plants
to treat low grade oresvnre located at Hurricane Creek,
and East St. Louis, Illinois. Alcoa also built two more
combination process plants located at Baton Rouge,
Louisana, and Mobile, Alabama, but these plants did not
get into actual production. (60) The total cost of
the plants constructed by Alcoa on behalf ofthe Govern-
ment without fee was $462 million. (61) Alcoa operated
all but one of the Government aluminum smelters (the
exception was Tacoma, Washington plant, operated by Olin).
Alcoa operated the Government aluminum smelters and
fabricating plants under a contract which gave the Govern-
ment 85 percent and Alcoa 15 percent of the profits. (62)
The reduction plants showed a profit of 35.3 million of
which the Government received 030 million and the fabri-
( 59) BDSA report supra. Ibid.( 60) Aluminum plants and facilities. - 1st Supplementary
Report of the War Assets Admin. to Congress. Feb. 12,
1947.
(61) Carr, 0.0. - Alcoa An American Enterprise. hinehart, 1952.
p.253.
(62) Ibid. p. 254.
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cating facilities $23.5 million the Government share
of the profits being 620 million. (63)
The capital requirements of Alcoa consisted of %300
million for plant and facilities of' its own expansion
program, and $225 of working capital to operate Alcoats
own plants, and the Government-owned Alcoa-operated
facilities. ( 64) Even with the increase in indebted-
ness the total long term debt was never greater in any
one year than the earned surplus. The ratio of long
term debt to total assets does increase in 1939 to 1942,
but it cannot be considered at any time to approach
the level of the other integrated producer - Reynolds.
The two years 19 4 3-1945 show an improvement in Alcoats
position, far superior to Reynolds, and it is apparent
that although the expansion undertaken by Alcoa was
without parallel in the industry, it was accomplished
with less disturbance to its financial and operating
position that with Reynolds - a clear indication of the
financial and technical resources it had at its command.
The placement of equity capital was not required by
either company.
63) Ibid p. 254.
64 Ibid.
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The striking difference in this period 1939-1945
in the financial situation of the companies, Alcoa and
Reynolds, isothe high proportion of debt capital to
assets ratio of Reynolds Metals Company. It is no
reflection on the management of Reynolds, but rather
stresses again the difficult period through which any
new firm must pass to enter the industry. The testi-
mony of Mr. R.S. Reynolds, Jr. (President of Reynolds
Metals Company) (65) is of interest.
"The Reynolds Metals Company had to borrow
funds required for the aluminum producing facilities.
It obtained a regular commercial loan from the R.F.C.
to get the $15.8 million needed for initial plants.
When the Government requested us to increase our
capAcity to 80,000 tons we had to increase our R.F.C.
indebtedness to $46 million. Reynolds Metals had
to give a first mortgage to the R.F.C. on all its
plants including those to be built. Therefore,
at all times the loan has been completely collatera-
lised. The interest rate was 4 percent. Reynolds
Metals had to risk all its assets to get started
as an aluminum producer. Unlike the Aluminum Com-
pany of Canada (Alcan), Reynolds Metals did not
receive from the Government any long term orders,
advance payments, nor premium prices to reduce
its risk, on the contrary it had to meet a rapidly
decreasing United States market price despite ris-
ing costs, and the existence of a sellerst market".
"The day that the R.F.C. loan was arranged
(August 1st, 1940), the United States price of
aluminum was cut from 19 cents to 18 cents a pound,
and a few months later to 17 cents per pound. By
the second year of the company's (Reynold's) pro-
duction it had to meet a base price of 14 cents per
(65) Subdommitae. on Study of Monopoly Power. Committee on the
Judiciary. House. 82d Congress Hearings. Part I. P. 112.
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pound. Our (Reynolds) theory is that because
competition came in, the price was forced down".
Reynolds was able to use the income from fabrica-
ting facilities to lift the overall operations on to a
profitable level, and thereby continue to meet the
competitive 14 cents base (15 cents market) price.
In review, then, the industry at the end of 1945
consists essentially of two integrated producers,
Alcoa and Reynolds, Alcoa with a capabity for pig pro-
duction approximately five times that of Reynolds, and
the operating position of Alcoa inestimably superior
to Reynolds both in respect to the ratios of debt to
total assets, debt to earnings and net income to sales.
The 1945 figure of 2.96 percent for Reynolds net income
to sales ratio is not encouraging, and could largely
be attributed to the result of both a rising cost
structure and a stable price of aluminum. The survival
of Reynolds in the post war industry appeared to depend
on a high level of demand for fabricated aluminum pro-
ducts combined with a strenuous endeavour and success in
improving the operating efficiency of all plants. The
disposition of the Government plants determined the
structure of the industry for a considerable period of
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time. It was apparent at this time (1945) even if
the Government were to sell the plants at below cost
values, any prospective new firm would have to be
ensured a sellers' market for some years, in order to
reach a stable competitive cost level. In fact, as
will now be discussed, the Government disposal plan did
change the structure from an extremely uncertain duopoly
to an effectively competitive oligopoly. Fartunately
the accelerated demand growth exhibited in 1945 was to
continue for a considerable time since the new firms
were to be able to establish their positions with some
certainty. Perhaps the most important determinant of
demand in the post war aluminum market will be seen to
be the large expansion in the end-product manufacturers;
the non-integrated processors who would be in the market
for ingot and pig made by the integrated producers, and
who were to be the competitors for the integrated pro-
ducers in the fabrications, casting s, extrusions, forg-
ing and rolling, and foil markets, are seen to be an
important factor in the market. The relationship be-
tween the integrated producers and the non-integrated
users will prove to be a continuing area of interest.
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In the discussion of the last phase of development
of the aluminum industry, it will be seen how the inte-
grated producers will reserve the main part of the
production of pig and ingot f or their own relatively more
profitable fabricating capacity acquired mainly as a
result of the Government disposal program.
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TABLE XXXIV
ALUMI A PRODUCTION CAPACITY - 1945.
LOCATION OWNER OPERATOR CAPACITY
MILL ION
POUNDS
Bayer Process Plants
East St. Louis,
Illinois. Alcoa.
Mobile,
Alabama.
Listerhill,
Alabama.
Alcoa
Reynolds
Alcoa
Alcoa
Reynolds
Hurricane Creek,
Arkansas. D.P.C.
Baton Rouge.
Louisana. D.P.C.
Alumite Plants
Salt Lake City,
Utah. D.P.C. Kalumite Inc.
TOTAL U.S.
72
4.,9 2 7
Source: Congresdonal Record - Proceedings and
Debates of the 78th Congress - 1st Session.
800
1,300
200
Alcoa
Alcoa 1,000
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TABLE XXXV.
ESTIMATED AELITM REDUCTI ON CAPA CITY 19L5
LOCATION OF PLANT CAPACITY OWNER OPERATOR
POT MILLIONS
LINES OF POUNDS
NORTH EAST:
Burlington, N.J.
Owens, N.Y.
Massena, N.Y. I
Nassena, N.Y. II
Niagara Falls, N.Y.
SOUTH EAST:
Alcoa, Tennessee.
Badin, Nth. Carolina.
Listerhill, Alabama.
Jones Mill, Arkansas.
PACIFIC NORTH WEST:
Longview, Washington.
Spokane, Washington.
Tacoma, Washington.
Vancouver, Washington.
Troutdale, Oregon.
3
8
5
3
2
21
14
3
5
4
26
3
6
2
5
4
20
106
299
164
105
42
716
341
111
100
141
693
72
216
42
180
141
651
D.P.C.
D.P.C.
Alcoa
D.P.C.
Alcoa
Alcoa
Alcoa
Reynolds
D.P.C.
Reynolds
D.P.C.
D.P.C.
Alcoa
D.P.C.
Alcoa
Alcoa
Alcoa
Alcoa
Alcoa
Alc oa
Alcoa
Reynolds
Alcoa
Reynolds
Alcoa
Olin
Alcoa
Alcoa
WEST COAST:
Los Angeles, California 5 178 D.P.C.
River Bank, California. 3 108 D.P.C.
TOTAL U.S. 75 2,346
SOURCE: First Supplementary Report of W.A'.A. Feb. 12, 1947.
Alcoa
Alcoa
REYNOLDS
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TABLE XXXVI
METALS COMPANY FINANCIAL DATA
1942 -1946.
1942 1943 1944 1945
PRICE RANGE:
Preferred
Common
854-75 1/8 93 3/4-80 100-85w
8 7/0-6t 15 3/5-10,16k-10
1171-98 136-1054
37-15 1/8 452-24i
DIVIDENDS!
SHARE:
Preferred $5.50
Common
EARNINGS/
SHARE:
Preferred
Common
ASSETS/
SHARE:
Preferred
$6.87- $4.12-L
0.50 0.75
627.47
$ 1.07
73.13
3.30
0.75 ~1.00
$60.92 $87.92
$ 2.71 $ 4.03
50,000
1,023,662 1,023,662
Profits to Sales Ratio Net income -as percent of
Operating inc.ome % of Sales. Sales.
1943 9.80 1943 2.65
1944 8.oo 1944 1.84
1945 5.00 1945 2.96
1946 8.79 1946 4.07
Net income % of total
assets.
4.03
3.41
5.11
4.07
Net income percent of Net
Worth.
1943
1944
1945
1946
14.24
11.09
12.18
14.27
SOURCE: Moody's Industrial:Nanual.
1946
$6.872
0.75
$107.68
$ 4.94
Common
Profits
1943
1944
1945
1946
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TABLE XXXVII
DEFENSE PLAlNT CORPORATION 19142-45
plants
ALUMINA PLANTS:
Bayer Process -
East St. Louis, Illinois
Mobile, Alabama.
Hurricane Creek (Arkansas) (a)
(a)
Baton Rouge, Louisana. (a)
(a)
Total (Bayer)
(a) Includes facilities for the
(Alcoa combination) process
ores.
Other Processes -
(b) Kalumite Inc., Salt Lake City,
Utah.
(c) Aucon Corp., Harley Ville,
South Carolina.
(c) Columbia Metals, Salem, Oregon.
(d) Monolith Portland Midwest Co.,
Loraine, Wyoming.
Total Other
(b) Alumite (c) clay (d)
Total Alumina plants:
ALUMINUM REDUCTION PLANTS:
Burlington, N.J,.
assena, N.Y.
Owens, N.Y.
Jones Mill, Arkansas.
Los Angeles, California.
River Bank, California.
Troutdale, Oregon.
Spokane, Washington.
Tacoma, Washington.
Total Reduction Plants:
9,300,000
12,393,000
23,705,000
10,340,000
15,900,000
10,421,000
082,059, 000
lime soda
on low grade
4,954,088
2, 6LL2, 000
4,06,000
3,965,000
$5647, 000
anorthsite.
$97,706,588
12,000,000
16,791,000
34,657,000
27,080,000
21,788,000
12,754,OoO
17,698,000
23,847.,000
6,500o,0o0
$174,o65,000
Cash
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TABLE XXXVII (contd).
DEFENSE PLANT CORPORATION 191.2-45 continued
Cash
ROLLING MILLS:
McCook, Chicago, Illinois.
Spokane, Washington.
EXTRUSION PLANT:
Pheonix, Arizona.
OTHER FACILITIES:
Total R.F.C. Expenditure on
polant s
50,000,000
50,000,000
100,000,000
32,000,000
$633,000, 000
SOURCE: "iiiuipld'teand Facilities" - First
Supplementary Report of the War Assets
Administration to Congress. Feb. 12, 1947.
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CHAPTER V
THE STRUCTURE OF THE ALUMIN1 INDUSTRY
1937 - 1957
The Period 1945-1950.
The period 1945-1950 is the most important of the
two decades in that the pattern which was established
had lasting effects on the structure of the aluminum
industry. Firstly, there was the disposition of the
Government-owned alumina, aluminum, and fabricating
plants. Secondly, there was the judgment rendered by
Knox J. in the Federal District Court in New York on
June 2, 1950 which required as demanded by the anti-
trust laws that the major shareholders in Alcan and
Alcoa sell their holdings in one or the other company.
The judgment virtually closed the Anti-Trust case
against Alcoa, which had its beginnings in the same
court, thirteen years earlier.
At the end of the war the Government emerged as
the largest owner of aluminum producing facilities.
It had $672 million invested in fifty wholly owned
aluminum plants for either aluminum production or fabri-
cation. (i ) A substantial portion of these Government
i ) Carr, C.C. Alcoa -. An American Enterprise. New York
Rinehart and Co., 1952. p. 263.
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plants had been designed and located with the intention
of their beingccompetitive in peacetime. (2 ) The com-
petitive Government-owned plants had a capacity of
552,000,000 pounds as compared to 650,000,000 pounds
capacity of Alcoa plants and 162,000 pounds of Reynolds. (3 )
Carr (4 ) reports that the disposal of the Govern-
ment-owned plants erected under the first part of the
Government expansion program (supra) brought about much
controversy. It appears that the intentions of Congress
were divided on the policy to be followed. The House
apparently favored a speedy disposal of surplus property
with the highest possible cash return to the Government.
The Senate favored a disposal which would encourage
competition. The compromise Surplus Property Bill in-
cluded both sets of objectives. The intent of Congress
.spelled out in the Act was to encourage free enterprise,
facilitate the transition from wartime to peacetime
production, discourage monopolistic practices, provide
for no sale of a plant or equipment costing more than
$5 million until thirty days after the Surplus Property
Board had filed with Congress a report describing the
industry, require the advice of the Attorney-General with
(2) See disucssion in Chapter 3 supra.
(3) See Table XXXV supra.
(4) Opit cit, Carr p. 264 et seq.
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respect to any possible violation of the anti-trust laws
prior to the disposal of any plant costing more than a
million dollars. (5) The administration of policy
was entrusted to a three-man board which was organised
and prepared for business in January, 1945. There were
some changes in White House attitude to the matter of
surplus property disposal, the other members of the
Board relinquished their posts and Mr. Stuart Symington
the then Chairman of the Board was named as Surplus
Property Board Administrator. (6) Since disposal of
aluminum plants was a large part of this Board's
duties, expert advice was sought as to the best dis-
posal plan to meet the requirements of the Act, from an
economist, Mr. S. Moment, formerly with the T.N.E.C. and
Bonneville Power Administration, and Mr. G.W. Reed, a
business man, and former official of the Aluminum
Division of the W.P.B. ( 7)
Carr reports that unhappily these two advisors
did not agree on the policy to be followed in the dis-
posal of the Government plants. The former proposed a
program to establish competition with Alcoa even to the
point of substantial Government aid (subsidy) to newcomers,
(5) Ibid.
(6) Ibid.
(7) Ibid.
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Reed, on the other hand, recognising that Alcoa's leases
of the Government-owned plants did not expire until 1947
and 1948, recommended a program of disposal in which
Alcoa would participate. Reed felt that Alcoa could
not conflict with Judge Learned Hand's ruling (supra)
if it owned 60 percent of the United States capacity -
a figure mentioned in Court as probably being below
monopolistic proportions. ( 8)
In discussing the disposal program in its judgment
on the Alcoa cose the United States District Court of
Appeals in March 1945, stated that the Government dis-
posal agency might believe that it could not perform its
duties "without some plan or design for the industry
as a whole" some comprehensive model, which shall so
far as practicable, re-restablish free independent pri-
vate enterprise, discourage monopoly, strengthen small
competitors, help independents and not foster monopoly or
restraint of trade". ( 9)
Further the Appeals Court said that "If the agency
does form a plan it will have been an attempt to realise
the same objectives for which the Court itself must
strive, and the Court may feel it should accord to the
(8) Ibid p. 266.
(9) United States V. Alcoa 164 F 2nd 159 C.C.A. 2nd 1947
L. Hand, J.
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TABLE XXXVIII
PLANT LOCATION AND FUNCTION
REPORTED ORIGINAL COST
W.A.A.
FEBRUARY 12, 1947
000s.
GOVERNMENT RATED
ANNUAL PRODUCTIVE
CAPACITY
(MILLIONS OF POUNDS)
iumina*
Hurricane Creek, Ark. (1)
'Baton Rouge, La. (1)
0luminum Reduction:
Jones Mills, Ark. (1)
Troutdale, Ore. (1)
ISpokane, Wash. Mead - (1)
.coma, Wash. (1)
Miaspeth, N.Y. (2) Navy
River Bank, Calif.(2) (F.W.A.)
Burlington, N.J. (3)
Los Angeles, Calif. (2)
MYassena, N.Y. (3) (St. Lawrence)
Luminum Sheet:
-pokane, Wash. (1), Trentwood
Chicago, Ill. (McCook) (1)
isterhill, Ala. (1)
luminum Foundries:
leveland, 0. (1)
ernon, Calif. (1)
edford, Ind. (2)
pringfield, Mass. (2)
earboda, Mich. (2)
leveland., 0. (2)
Kansas City, Mo. (2)
lint, Mich. (2)
hicago, Ill. (2)
ockland, 0. (2) War Dept.
lminum Forgings:
Ouisville, Ky. (1)
assilon, 0. (1)
Monroe, Mich. (2)
Canonsburg, Pa. (2)
agmow, Mich. (2)
New Castle, Pa. (2)
aderson, Ind. (2) (F.W.A.)
39,349
26,363.
65,712
29,352
19,387
23,202
6,290
32,863
11,826
16,716
24,493
19,953
184,083
84.,376
43,546
20,767
112, 689
1,938
168
2,766
3,112
7,924
,-9369
,270
9,017
7,4.78
6,416
49,4.58
2,137
794
13,875
26,648
8,703
8,960
9,526
74.,938
1,555.0
1,000.0
2,$55.05
144.0
144.0
216.0
41.5
288.0
108.0
1o8.o
180.0
108.0
1,337.5
288.0
288.0
78.0
654.0
13.2
1.8
10.2
6.0
30.1
14.442.0
.3.2
24.0
46.3
231.2
2.4
Never completed
42.0
74.9
84.0
21.2
15.6
277.6
contd./...
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TABLE XXXVIII (contd)
REPORTED ORIGINAL COST GOVERNMENT RATED
W.A.A. ANNUAL PRODUCTIVE
PLANT LOCATION AND FUNCTION FEBRUARY 12, 1947 CAPACITY
$000s. (MILLIONS OF POUNDS)
luminum Extrusions:
rand Rapids, Mich. (1) 6,730 10.8
-Phoenix, Ariz. (1) 35,363 60.7
Crestona, Pa. (1) 26,026 55.7
os Angeles, Calif. (1) 8,258 11.7
idrian, Mich. (2) 16,623 36.0
lalethorpe, Md. (3) 7,612 14.9
louisville, Ky. (3) 6,235
106,847 235.3
dluminum Rivets:
)etroit, Mich. (1) 780 .8
luminum Powder:
lochester, Mich. (2) 353 27.1
lebster Grove, Mich. (2) (Vet.Admin.) 379 35.3
,leveland, 0. (2) 1,026 37.2
lossmere, Pa. (3) 1,066 33.3
2,824 132.9
luinum Rod and Bar:
[Newark, 0. (1) 23,181 300.0
KAND TOTAL 620,512 5,724.3
Built and operated by Alcoa during the war.
1) Disposition made to the aluminum industry.
2) Disposition made outside the aluminum industry.
3) No disposition made.
OURCE: Knox Judgment in U.S. V. Alcoa. Taken from W.A.A. Report to
Congress. February 12, 1947.
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TABLE -x
COMPARISON OF ALCOAIS CAPACITY IN POUNDS
194 and 1947
December 31, 1940 December 31, 1947 % of change
1947/1940(A) (B) (C)
lumina 1,126,000,000
)ig 490,000,000
heet 192,031,000
and castings 35,856,000
ermanent mold castings 47,976,000
ie castings 10,142,000
xtruded shapes 35,590,000
Poil 14,052,o000
Ilectrical conductor cable 63,600,000
able accessories 1,956,000
irerod,bar and rolled struc-29,885,000
tural shapes
?ubing 8,773,000
orgings 35,214,000
owder and, Paste 7,668,ooo
ivets 3,291,000
Crew m/c Products 816,000
ollapsible Tubes 1,512,000
rpact extrusions and customer 2,880,000
blanks
oking Utensils 12,000,000
obbing 5,500,000
1,940,000,000
650,000,000
465,361,000
35,580,000
41,100,000
12,943,000
92,730,000
22,800,ooo
69,600,000
4,200,000
114,913,000
51,185,000
39,003,000
7,560,000
4,780,000
1,080,000
1,320,000
11,04.0,000
16,800,000
7,400,000
plus 72.3
plus 32.7
142.3
minus .8
minus 14.3
plus 27.6
plusl76.1
plus 62.3
plus 9.4
plusii4.7
plus284.5
plus483.4
plus 10.8
minus 1.4
plus 45.2
plus 32.4
minus 12.7
plus283.3
plus 40.0
plus 34.5
33:3.Source: Judgment of Knox J. in U.S. v. Alcoa 91F Supp.
Federal District Court N.Y. June 2, 1950.
I ||m
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"agency's" plans that presumptive validity which
Courts are properly coming more and more to reco-
gnise in the decisions of -the specialised tri-
bunals". The Court however advised also that,
"We do not, of course, mean that in deciding
whether to dissolve Alcoa or how to do it, the
Court must be governed by any plan which the
agency may have devised, if it does devise one". (1o)
The.Surplus Property Board in its report to
Congress, September, 1945, stated.:
"Even if the Board is successful in
selling some-of the plants to competitors
of Alcoa this fact by itself may not sati-
sfy the requirements of the Sherman Law.
It is not the province of the Board to
work out a plan for the reorganisation of
the properties presently owned by Alcoa
or to express any views on the question
whether, after the completion of the
Board's disposal progr am, Alcoats opera-
tions will be lawful under the Sherman
Act. This is a question which must be de-
termined for the Executive Branch of the
Government by the Attorney-General, and a
question that will presumably be ultimate-
ly decided by the Courts" (11)
In the meantime various offers for Government-
ownded plants were being made to the Surplus Pro-
perty Board.
On July 24, 1945, Alcoa offered to purchase the
(10) Ibid p. 35.
(11) Ibid p. 36.
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Jones Mills (Arkansas) aluminum plant and the nearby
Hurricane Creek (Arkansas) alumina plant or alter-
natively to buy the Jones Mills plant and lease the
Hurricane Creek plant, and in return to give an under-
taking to sell alumina to other producers at the price
set by the Government. (12)
Henry J. Kaiser was interested in adquiring some
Government plants. Columbia Metals which had opera-
ted on experimental alumina plants in the North West
also began negotiations. On August lst, 1945, Rey-
nolds Metals Company made a preliminary offer for
some of the properties. (13) However, before any de-
cisions could be made as to the disposal, two problems
had to be solved before any of the key plants could
be sold. or leased without consultation or negotiation
with Alcoa. Firstly, there was the problem of Alcoa
leases not expiring for another two to three years -
this difficulty was disposed of by the Government
cancelling the leases and the R.F.C. (the titleholder),
taking possession. (The Government used a clause in
the lease contract which allowed summary termination
of the contract if production fell below 40 percent
of capacity - capacity being defined in this case aS
(12) Carr, C.C. Opit cit p. 266.
(13) Ibid p. 267.
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that of all the plants including those uneconomic
plants completely closed down). (14) The second
problem was Alcoa's strong patent position -in all
phases of aluminum manufacture, particularly alumina
processing, and its knowledge of the techniques of
manufacture. (This problem was not solved until some
time later).
Shortly after the Government plants reverted to
the R.F.C. it became apparent that none of the plants
would be sold to Alcoa. (15) There followed a sub-
mission to Congress of a subsidy plan whereby aid would
be given to Alcoa's competitors. (16) After hearings
of the Senate Small Business Committee, this proposal
was dropped. (17) President Truman announced that the
aluminum plants would be disposed of without a subsidy
plan. A lease proposal was negotiated for the Hurri-
cane Creek alumina plant with the Reynolds Metals Com-
pany. This action apparently did not meet with the
approval of Congressional leaders from the Pacific
North West who feared that the aluminum plants in that
area might remain closed. (18) They introduced a
Bill into Congress to reopen the North West plants and
(14) Ibid p. 267.
(15) Ibid p, 268.
(16) Ibid p. 269.
(17) Ibid
(18) Ibid
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stodkile Altinlhum to an amount of one and a half billion
pounds in excess of normal civilian demand - this would
have meant actual Government operation of the plants.
Congress did not favour such legislation and the Bill
was not reported out of Committee. (19)
The prime difficulty with the disposal of the -large
Hurricane Creek alumina plant was the matter of patents.
There was no obstacle facing any prospective competitor
of Alcoa in the manufacture of alumina under the well-
known Bayer process. However the Hurricane Creek plant
was designed to utilise low grade bauxite found in
substantial quantities in Arkansas, involving a patent
process developed by Alcoa (known as the Alcoa patent
combination process). There were also in use at Hurri-
cane Creek two or three other Alcoa patents which were
important in the production of alumina. When Reynolds
Metals Company asked the Government to indemify it
against any action brought by Alcoa for infringement of
these patents, if it acquired Hurricane Creek or other
Government-owned facilities, (20) the Surplus Property
Administration faced a very difficult aituation.
Alcoa solved this problem for the Government and
all concerned by giving Royalty-Free licenses on all
(19) Ibid p. 270.
(20) Ibid.
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its patents in use at Hurricane Creek to the Govern-
ment to pass on to any competitor who might acquire
the plant. (21) This action cleared the way for the
Government disposal of its facilities, since no
aluminum plants would be disposed of until the alumina
plants were first sold. Reynolds Metals Company ac-
quired, through lease and subsequent purchase, the
Hurricane Creek alumina plant, the Jones Mills (Arkansas)
and Troutdale, Oregon aluminum reduction works.(22)
Kaiser Aluminum and Chemical Corporation obtained
the Baton Rouge (Louisana) alumina plant along with the
aluminum producing plants at Spokane (Washington) and
Tacoma (Washington). (23)
Thus the primary aluminum industry capacity was
divided up between three integrated producers - Alcoa
having 50.6 percent, Reynolds 29.4 percent and Kaiser
20 percent, (1946) (24). These figures include Alcoa' s
pounds
401,000,000/N\iagara Falls plant and half the pot line
capacity of Reynolds Jones Mill, Arkansas plant. Alcoa
was permitted to acquire only one Government-owned
aluminum production plant - the St. Lawrence reduction
works adjacent to the Company's Iassena, N.Y. operations.
(21) Ibid p. 271.
(22) Ibid.
(23)Ibid.
(24)Ibid.
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The Department of Justice Anti-Trust Division intervened
to prevent Alcoa from purchasing Government-owned fabri-
cating plants it had built and operated during the war. (25)
The company did however purchase the Government-owned
extrusion plant at Cressona, Pa. - it was the only
company to make an offer. Reynolds Metals acquired
two major mill products plants - the large Chicago
McCook sheet mill and the Pheonix, Arizona extrusion
plant; the smaller sheet mill at Listerhill, Alabama;
a forging plant at Louisana, Kentucky and an extrusion
plant at Grand Rapids, Michigan. (26)
Kaiser Aluminum and Chemical Corporation acquired
the Trentwood (Spokane) sheet mill and the Newark (Ohio)
blooming mill. The River Bank (Calif'ornia) reduction
plant was subsequently dismantled and sold. (7 ) Idle
wartime equipment from the aluminum plant at Burlington
(Pa.) was sold to aluminum producers by the G.S.A..
Apex Smelting Company of Chicago, a prospective new pro-
ducer was the purchaser of one pot line and the necessary
rectifier equipment for a planned future installation
near the Grand River Dam in Oklahoma. Harvey Machine
(25) Ibid p. 273.
(26) Ibid.
(27) Ibid.(2)Ibd
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Company of Torrance, California, a manufacturer of alu-
minum extrusions obtained some of the material of
these plants for three aluminum pot lines to be
located near Hunegry-Horse Dam in Montana. (28)
Reynolds and Kaiser both obbained additional equipment
for use in existing aluminum producing plants owned by
them. The lease and subsequent sales of the Govern-
ment-owned plants and facilities was on terms not
necessarily reflecting the original cost or replace-
ment value. (?9)
Following the reorganisation of the industry,
the three integrated producers consolidated their
respective positions and all continued to expand. There
had been considerable uncertainty in 1945 and 1946 due
to the potential market effect of the scrap and secondary
metal whi6h had been built up at fabricating and con-
suming plants. (30) The scrapping of obsolete and
surplus war material and aircraft, and the huge stocks
of scrap held by dealers added immensely to the available
supply of secondary metal. (31) Further, there was
indecision on the disposition of Government stockpiles
(28) Ibid p. 274.
(29) Knox J. Opinion opit cit p. 35.
(30) B.D.S.A. Report for O.D.AM. Aluminum 1951 P. II - 14.
(31) Ibid.
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of metal and bauxite, on action to be taken on Army
and Navy stockpile objectives as provided in the Sur-
plus Property Act of 1944, and the proposals of the
Army and Navy Munitions Board submitted to Congress
in 1944. (32-)
However, the uncertainty and pessimism was quickly
allayed, on the realisation that the domestic demand
for aluminum would be sufficient to keepthe integrated
producers operating at efficient level. The long term
growth revived in late 1946 and primary production
continued to move upward with the exception of 1949
which may have reflected the recession of 1948 and a
subsequent thinning-down of inventories. As mentioned
before, the stability of -rice and supply position
immediately Post-War greatly assisted in the develop-
ment of new markets for aluminum, and enabled it to
displace other materials in short supply. The sellers'
markets in the Post-War years proved to be of inestimable
value to Kaiser and Reynolds in building up their financial
resources without, having to face price competition. The
growth in the primary integrated producers' output was
largely supported by the great increase in the number and
(32) Ibid.
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diversification of the relatively small non-integrated
manufacturer of end-products. (33) Exports assisted
in reducing the net effect of imports.
On 31st November, 1947 Alcoa petitioned the Dis-
trict court for a judgment that it no longer had a
monopoly in the ingot market in the U.S. claiming that
as of that date competitive conditions existed in that
industry. (34) It can be said that there was little
if any competition between the integrated producers
since (supra) there was a sellers' market and price-
cutting was not in evidence. (35) The price of ingot
under these circumstances appears to be little indica-
tion of the market conditions, since it is not in the
sale of primary that there would be competition, but
rather in the sale of the fabricated products which in
fact were in short supply. (36) Therefore, the fact
that Alcoa kept the price of ingot at the wartime level
(meaning a real price decline) did not have a serious
effect by itself on the financial position of the other
two producers, since the amount of primary ingot sold
by these primary producers was relatively small.
The trial in the District Court was set down for
October 15, 1947, but a month before the final date,
(33) Report of Subcommittee No.3 on Minerals and Raw Materials Select
Committee for Small Business House 84th Congress 2nd Sess. p. 7.
(34) Carr, C.C. Opit cit p. 232.
(35) See Testimony of integrated producers before subcommittee on
Study of Monopoly Power, Committee on the Judiciary 82nd Congress
Part I p. 128.
(36) Ibid.
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the Department of Justice petitioned the Court of
Appeals for a writ of mandamus ordering the Lower
Court to stop the scheduled trial and dismiss Alcoa's
petition. (37) It was the Government's contention
that until such time as it chose to apply for a
remedy, the case should remain indefinitely suspended.(38)
The Department of Justice failed in this action, but
caused the trial in the District Court to be post-
poned. The Circuit Court of Appeals ruled that it
did not have jurisdiction to decide the issue raised
(39)by the Government and therefore a ruling was sought
in the Supreme Court. The Supreme Court decided that
the Circuit Court of Appeals did have jurisdiction, (40)
and returned the matter to that body, which then pro-
ceeded to rule against the Government's request that
(41)Alcoa's petition be dismisse . It also ruled that a
petition of the Government on September 25, 1948 ask-
ing that Alcoa be divested of some of its properties
could be heard by the District Court at the same time
the Alcoa petition was being decided. These legal
actions delayed the District Court trial until March 28,
1949. Judge John C. Knox heard the case in place of
(37) U.S. v Caffey 164 F 2d 159 C.C.A. 2d 1947.
(38) Ibid.
(39) U.S. U.S. Dist.Court. Southern Dist. of N.Y. 171 Fd 2d 285(;.A. d 948.(40) U.S. v U.S.Dist.Court Southern Dist. of N.Y. 334 U.S. 258- 1948.
Douglas, J.
(41) Opit cit (39) supra.
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Judge F.G. Caffey who had retired from the Bench on
October 31, 1947.
Two petitions lay before the court Alcoa's
request that the ingot monopoly charge be dismissed
and the Governmentis request that Alcoa be directed
(42)
to divest itself of some of its properties. The trial
lasted until November 9, 1949. The evidence produced
in the trial was voluminous, and from it, the Court
was able to obtain an accurate picture of the structure
of the aluminum industry in the peitod prior to and
during the existence of Reynolds and Kaiser as competitors
of Alcoa continuing up to the time of closing the evi-
dence in the trial. This judgment is a masterly analysis
of the industry and the discussion that follows will
be at best a composite of its important arguments and
conclusions.
Judge Knox began his judgment with a review of the
changes in Court interpretations of the Sherman Act
which had come about in recent years.
"Now it is not necessary to find that there
is intent to fix prices, but it is sufficient to
find monopoly power exists in order to give the
Government relief.
Nevertheless, reliance upon the existence
(42) United States V Aluminum Company of America 91 F Supp. 333.
S.D.N.Y. 1950. Knox C. J. Opinion p. 21.
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af m6nopoly power as defined by Sherman
Act violations, even without the require-
ments of purpose or intent to exercise that
power does not permit as searching an
enquiry as the remedy phase demands. This
Court must provide against the reasonable
expectations of the resumption of future
.unlawful conditions(44To a certain extent,
this function is accomplished by the rule
which requires all doubts regarding remedies
to be resolved in favour the Government, and
against an adjudged monopolist. But it is
not fully satisfied unless this Court in-
vestigates present power potentials with a
view to their propensities under reasonably
foreseeable market conditions(441.....
Criteria applicable to this case as above
described necessitate two basic inquiries
(i) whether competitors flourish, and
the extent to which they flourish
and whether they do so at the
sufferance of Alcoa;
(ii) whether a foreseeable change in
market conditions can secure an
alteration in Alcoa's present condition,
either by expansion where any competitor,
cannot or by perserverance where any
competitor would fail. (45)
In determining the extent of permissible
power that is consistent with the Anti-Trust
Laws in a particular industry, the following
factors are relevant: the number and strength
of the firms in the market, their effective
size from the standpoint of technological develop.
ment, and from the standpoint of competition with
substitute materials and foreign trade; national
security interests in the maintenance of strong
productive facilities and maximum scientific..
research and development, together with public
interest in reduced costs and increased produc-
tion.'.,. (46)
There remairb a further inquiry - remedial
action is justified even though a defendant re-
tains no vestige of power or intent to obtain
monopoly, (where a relationship exists between
defendant and any one or more of its competitors
(43) Ibid p. 18.
(44) Ibid p. 19.
(45) Ibid.
(46) Ibid p. 20.
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which materially inhibits free competition).
Thus any agreement, conspiracy, or understanding,
which in any way retards the restoration of
competitive conditions to this market, must be
carefully scrutinized by this Court, and if its
effects be found to prejudice the public interest,
undone". (47)
In his appraisal of the industry in 1949, Knox J.
first attempted to define the market position of the
integrated producers. There fundamental problems arose.
Even though in previous hearings Alcoa had been adjudged
to be the monopolist in the primary ingot market, it
remained to be determined whether the market in which
the three integrated producers meet is the primary market
or sce other - in fact Knox J. showed it was the fabri-
cations market where the effect of the actions of Kaiser
and Reynolds is most marked.
"The market price of primary aluminum is
determined in the main by sales of the primary
metal as are made to the non-integrated producers
of fabrications. The evidence in 1949 shows that
Alcoa supplies the fabricators with 62 percent of
the domestic primary metal used by these manufac-
turers. It is therefore obvious that Alcoa is the
price leader in this market. It appears that the
relative significance of the contributions of
Reynolds and Kaiser. to the supply of this market
is a matter of choice rather than disability".
(47) Ibid pp 20 - 21.
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"In fabricating aluminum of their own
production, Reynolds and Kaiser are able to
secure additional profits that arise in pur-
suing these later stages of production.
Alcoa estimates that in the sellers' market
of 1948, allocation of primary to the non-
integrated fabricators reduced its profits
by 05.0 million." (48)
SALES BY INTEGRATED PRODUCERS TO
NON-INTEGRATED USERS
YEAR ALCOA REYNOLDS KAISER
000 lbs. $000 000 lbs. $000 000 lbs. $000
1947 171,934 25519 16,754 2,009 5.823 815
88 90 9 7 3 3
1948 185,650 28,899 22,268 3,030 11,009 1,618
85 86 10 9 5 5
1949 92,926 16,2o5 16,799 2,400 4,o46 663
(ist 82 84 15 13 3 3
nine
months)
Source: Company Evidence in trial.See Knox opinion. p. 40.
Since all integrated producers have capacity for
fabrication approximately twice that of their primary
production (4g) it was at the time of the trial and
later apparent that the fabrications market is the
place to measure the effectiveness of the competition
(48) Ibid p 40.
(49) Ibid.
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between these producers.
"The measure of their share of the market
of the integrated producers is not their contri-
bution as a source of aluminum, but the extent
to which they control a source of aluminum
(primary production and secure possession of
aluminum from uncontrolled sources (secondary,
imports and scrap)."
The non-integrated fabricators are independent
of the integrated producers only to the extent that
they can buy aluminum from other sources - imports
or secondary. -
"The use of the fabrication stage as an
influential determinant of market position is but
superficially inconsistent with the adjudication
that Alcoa had monopolised the ingot stage and
not fabrications". (50)
Reynolds and Kaiser only in the fabrication stage
appreciably enter the market as sellers and because of
the integrated nature of their operations it is in this
market that they must survive as sellers.
"If their share of- this market when compared
to that of Alcoa suggests their impotency, the need
for memedy of such situation is apparent".
"If such is not the case, then the amounts of
metal controlled at the source by the three inte-
grated producers is highly significant that it
measures levera e on the market and indicates
potential power . (51)
The actual market position can be measured as sources
of metal or sales of metal by type of fabrication - the
latter shows up market practices and preferred customer
(50) Ibid p. 45.
(51) Ibid p. 46.
180.
TABLE XL
SOURCES OF ALUMINUM FOR FABRICATION BY THE
INTEGRATED PRODUCERS
ALCOA RETNOLDS KAISER IMPORTS SECONDARY
000 lbs. 000 lbs. 000 lbs. 000 lbs. 000 lbs.
d of /0d
Production
Purchased
Primary
Purchased
5econdary
iotal
9L8
roduction
,rchased
rrimary
'urchased
)econdary
.tal
first nine
roduc tion
urchased
rimary
1r chased
econdary
1otal
637,951
55.8
114,468
85.7
91,431
79.3
843,850
60.6
51.1
652,309
52.3.
146,806
77.7
37, 915
56.3
837,030
55.7
46.8
320,480
28.0
5,152
3.9
19,581
17.0
345,213
24.8
20*9
338,313
27.1
28,837
15.3
25,883
38.5
393,033
26.1
22.0
months)
492,126
51.2
76,223
89.0
23,103
61.2
591,522
54.5
47.1
272,897
28.4
4,924
11,565
30.6
289,386
26.7
23.0
184,979
16.2
13, 949
10.4
4,265
3.7
203,193
14.6
12.3
256,289
20.6
13,154
7.0
35,137
2.2
223,065
13.5
3,487
5.2
272,930
18.2
15.3
196,681
20.4
4,490
5.2
3,096
8.2
204,267
18.8
16.3
160,018
8.9
77,354
125,016
7.2
93,762
6.1
ource: Knox D.J. supra. .
gures show a drop from 51.'l7of or Alcoa in 1947 to 46.8% f or 19480difference was absorbed approximately 
-three-fourths.
TABLE XTT.
MARKET POSITION - SALES
(all stages of production)
ALCOA REYNOLDS KAISER IMPORTS EXPORTS
000 lbs. 000 lbs. 000 lbs. 000 lbs. 000 lbs.
21b7
ig & Ingot
heet
ther
ions
fabrica-
ig & Ingot
heet
ther
ions
fabrica-
first nine
oriths 1949)
ig & Sheet
heet
172,090
76.8
459,589
48.2
297,863
83.0
929,542
60.5
81.5
185,678
84.7
491,010
45.8
354,624
79.7
1,030,592
59.5
50.4
92,983
72.5
201,817
40.6
ther fabrica- 250,233
tons 76.0
otal 545,033
57.1
47.8
23,351
10.4
308 ,L08
32.3
60,900,
17.0
392,659
25.6
21.8
22,288
10.2
319,082
29.7
85,284
20.1
426,654
24.6
20.9
28,899
22.6
166,291
33.6
75,456
22.9
271,276
28.5
23.8
OURCE: Knox D.J. su-ora.
p. 49.
28,762
12.8
105,471
19.5
0
0
214,333
13.9
11.9
11,009
5.1
262,966
24.5
786
.2
274,851
15.9
13.4
6,289
4.9
127,863
25.8
3,1440
1.1
137,592
14.4
12.0
42,923
2.4
186,977
9.2
93,354
8.2
233,065
12.4
125,016
6.1
93,762
8.2
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TABLE XIITL
INOOME OP NETAL (INTEGRATED PRODUCERS).
ALCOA
000 lbs. %
RETNOLDS
000 lbs.
KAISER
000 lbs./0
roduction.
'rchased
rimary.
urchased Secon-
[ary from old
crap and im-por-
ed secondary.
'urchased Secon-
lary from new
cran.
.otai.
637,951 55.8
114,468 85.7
91,4.31
99,439
943,289
79.3
86.9
62.6
320,480 28.0
3.9
19,581 17.0
10,300 9.0
355,513 23.6
81,979 16.2
13,949 10.4
4,265 3.7
4,733 4.1
207,926 13.8
-9L48
)roduction.
'urchased
rimary.
urchased Secon-
lary from old
crap and impor-
;ed secondary.
)urchased Secon-
lary from new
;cran.
.otai.
652,309 52.3 338,313' 27.1
146,806
37,915
61,511
77.7
56.3
54.9
28,837 15.3
25,883 38.5
44,451 39.7
898,541 55.6 437,484 27.1
'roduction. 492,196
'urchased
rimary. 76,223
rchased Secon-
lary from old 23,103
crap and impor-
ed secondary.
'urchased Secon- 36,484
lary from newsca rap
1 tal. 628,006
51.2
89.0
61.2
59.2
54.7
272,897 28.4
4,924
11.565 30.6
19,862 32.2
309,248 27.0
256,289
13,154
20.6
7.0
3,487 5.2
5,988 5.4
278,918 17.3
196,681 20.4
4,490
3,096
5,317
8.2
8.6
209,584 18.3
SOURCE: Knox D.J. aupra.
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relationships. Measures of the profitable or other-
wise disposal of the metal will show the success of
any competitor in the industry. However, the figures
for the sales of non-integrated producers are not
strictly comparable with those of primary integrated
producers because they use as raw material a variety
of semi-finished products, which has already been
counted in as sales to the primary producers.
The statistics of sources and sales of aluminum
for the period indicate an improvement in the market
position of Kaiser and Reynolds even without including
the sales ofingot to the Government stockpile. It
would appear that Alcoa had a comparative advantage
over Reynolds and Kaiser possibly with regard to
diversification of end-products, and consequently
a greater market stability in periods of fluctuating
demands. There is no indication of a monopoly by
(52)
Alcoa on market position alone. The two competitors
of Alcoa have continued to expand their share of
the market in the period under review, 1940-49.
In the matter of competition for the sales of
pig and ingot, it has been shown that the sales of
(52) Ibid p. 53.
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pig and ingot do not measure the relative market
positions of the integrated producers. It has
been shown (in the tables of mill costs), that post-
war pig and ingot prices are not so low as compared
to costs as to preclude Reynolds and Kaiser from
this part of the business. Although Alcoa may
exercise some price leadership in the ingot (primary)
market mainly as a result of its dominant share in
that market, it has not been shown that Alcoa is the
price leader in the fabrications market.
"It therefore, is decided that price
domination on the part of Alcoa has not
been established". (54)
In the matter of physical resources, Knox re-
viewed the dispositions of resources of each of the
integrated producers, but he drew the distinction
between actual rated capacity, and the useful economic
capacity having regard to the availability and cost
of electric energy.
(54) Ibid pp. 54 - 55.
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TABLE XLIII
PRIMARY CAPACITY OF UNITED STATES PRODUCERS (55)
1949
PRESENT ADDITIONS POTENTIAL RE-ACTIVATED MAXIMUM1V
CAPACITY AND RAW ECONOMIC HIGHER COST PLANNED
SMELTERS CAPACITY PLANTS CAPACITY
Alcoa 739.5 240.0 979.5 158.0 1,137.5
Kaiser 340.0 200.0 540.0 540.0
Reynolds 468.0 200.0 668.0 668.0
1,547.5 640.0 2,187.5 158.0 2,3455
(millions of pounds annually)
The reduction capacities of the three integrated pro-
ducers determines the respective abilities to expand out-
put of primary in order to capture new markets. Un-utili-
sed capacity in substantial amounts may also show that
fluctuating demands are met by varying production rather
than price - indicative of non-price competition. Exces-
sive capacity due to carrying charges adds to costs and
therefore prices. The statistics of the individual
companies indicate that Alcoa in 1949 owned 51 percent of
the primary capacity of the United States, Reynolds 31 per
(55)
cent and Kaiser 18 percent. A comparison with 1948 figures
(55) Ibid p. 61,
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(produced in evidence) showed in that year Reynolds
operated at about 90 percent, with Kaiser and Alcoa
over 95 percent of rated capacity. Kaiser alone of
the three producers did not expand capacity in 1949.
It can be seen that if the market did not expand, Alcoa
and any one of the other integrated producers combined
had power to jeopardise the position of the third pro-
ducer. (56)
In respect of alumina production - each of the
integrated producers had its own facilities. Alcoa had
sufficient capacity for 1949 levels of production but
did not have excess capacity. for a considerably greater
expansion in production. Alcoa expected in 1949 to replace
the relatively inefficient St. Louis plant in the near
future. (57) Reynolds M-etals Company, Hurricane Creek
plant had at that time ample capacity and could handle
low grade ores found in the vicinity without loss of
efficiency. ( E) The Kaiser, Baton Rouge plant could
produce at that time 1,500,000, pounds of alumina annually,
a quantity in excess of Kaiser's requirements. The National
Security clause of the Purchase Agreement for Baton Rouge
obligates Kaiser, unless released by the Secretary of Defense,
to maintain the present capacity of the plant until 1964.
(56) Ibid pp. 61 - 62.
(57) Ibid p. 63.
(58) Ibid p. 64.
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The cost of maintaining idle equipment for both Kaiser and
Reynolds, though in excess of lOOOOO annually is not a
serious handicap in their competition with Alcoa. (59)
The bauxite reserves of both Alcoa and Reynolds were
well beyond any immediate or future requirements - Kaiser
alonehad in 1949 no bauxite ore deposits. From October
1, 1946 to September 30, 1949, Kaiser purchased 92 percent
of its bauxite from Alcoa and the remainder from the
Government stockpile. Kaiser has a contract with Alcoa
expiring in 1963 for the delivery of a minimum of 500,000
tons annually. Kaiser is obliged under the contract to
retain Alcoa to transport at least 90 percent of the ore
from mines in Dutch Guiana. Kaiser had taken steps in
1949 to purchase reserves of high grade ore in Jamaica, and
had built a pilot plant at Baton Rouge, Louisana. Until
1950 Kaiser had been hampered by a lack of developed
bauxite reserves, and the contract with Alcoa had raised
the cost of Kaiser's bauxite and reduced Alcoa's. (60)
"To be truly competitive any integrated
producer must develop its own sources of
bauxite and this requires considerable re-
sources of capital". (61)
(59) Ibid p. 65.
(60) Ibid pp. 66 - 71.
(61) Ibid p. 71.
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In the fabrications part of the industry Knox found
that (in 1949) each of the integrated producers had
facilities with a capacity at least double that of their
resoective reduction facilities. Consequently any advant-
age held by a competitor in the fabrication stage of the
industry would and still does play an important part in per-
mitting that company to hold or enlarge its share of the
market. The evidence shows that of the United States
producers, Kaiser's mill costs were some 10 percent higher
than Alcoa - one cent per pound of pig. This differential
represents an additional expenditure by Kaiser of $2.5 million
per year above that for Alcoa producing the identical amount
of aluminum as Kaiser. (62) Alcoats advantage over Reynolds
is only half as great as that over Kaiser, but the additional
expenditure for Reynolds above that for Alcoa with like
output is $2.0 million. (63) Reynolds'costs were expected
to increase with the use of Jamaica bauxite, where as Kaiser
will expect to reduce its costs by drawing on its new supplies,
and fall below that of Reynolds. The indications in 1950
for the future were for Reynoldsicosts to be the highest of
the integrated producers, but not sufficiently high to prevent
effectivecompetition. Alcoa was expected to continue to
(62) Ibid p. 85.
(63) Ibid.
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enjoy the lowest costs of the integrated producers.
The cost of transportation of the finished products to
the markets and the ingot to fabrication facilities showed
an advantage of Alcoa's locations with reference to the
principal markets.
"In conclusion it appears that the abundance
and diversity of Alcoa's physical resources provide
that company with cost advantages considerably su-
perior to those of its integrated domestic competi-
tors. The removal of these differentials cannot
easily be foreseen. In themselves under present
market conditions, they do not bar effective com-
petition. Yet they constitute an important element
upon which the abilities of Kaiser and Reynolds to
survive and expand may at some time depend". (64)
Knox then considered the financial resources of each
of the integrated domestic producers as he believed the
financial statistics could show any disability that any
one company would have in expanding in a competitive market.
"The abilities of the comapnies to survive
and expand are largely dependent on the ease as
well as cost, with and at which, they can obtain
funds for capital expenditures. However, the
financial statistics are influenced by two factors
which have considerable effect on Book Value of
the Assets, and the debt structure. Firstly, the
assets of Kaiser and Reynolds were largely ac-
quired at "give-away" prices, and Alcoa's long
standing assets were almost completely amortized
during World War II. Secondly, the companies
have an option to furnish aluminum pig and ingot
for the Government stockpile in the discharge of
the money still owed to the United States, together
with interest thereon". (65)
(64) Ibid pp. 89-90.
(65) Ibid pp. 90-91.
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TABLE XLIV.
MILL COSTS OF INTEGRATED ALUMINUM PRODUCERS. (cents/pound aluminum)
1947 1948
aterials
ower
£g. costs
OTAL
ALCOA REYNOLDS KAISER
3.71 3.03 4.93
1.73 2.17 1.90
3.96 4.29 3.55
9.40 9.49 10-38
ALCOA REYNOLDS KAISER
3.87 3.34 4.97
1.79 2.60 1.93
4.55 47 2 4.27
10.21 10.66
ALCOA REYNOLDS KAISER
4.00 3.71 5.18
1.78 2.32 1.81
4.73 5.01 4.64
11.17 10.51 11.04 11.63
19_49 MILL COSTS OF ANICAN PRODUCERS. (cents/pound aluminum)
RAW POWER NANUFACTURING NET MILL
MATERIALS COSTS COSTS
Aluminum Ltd.
(Alcan)
Alcoa
Kaiser
Reynolds
n.a.
4.00
5.16
3.71
0.592
1.78
1.81
2.52
n.a.
4.73
4.64
5.01
1948 TRANSPORTATION COST OF ONE POUND OF ALUIINUMv.
(computation of weighted average)
BAUXITE ALUMINA TOTAL
1.08 cents
1.16
0.64 cents
0.84
1.72 cents
2.00
Reynolds 0.096 0.58 0.676
SOURCE: U.S. v Alcoa evidence recorded in Judgment. Knox D.J.
7.705
10.51
11.63
11.04
Alcoa
Kaiser
ALIZI NA T TAL
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TABLE XLV.
194.9 ALUMINA AND RAW MATERIALS COST PER POUND OF ALUMIINUM.
ALUMINA RAW NET MILL
MATERIALS COSTS
PERCENT OF NET MILL COSTS
ALUMINA RAW MATERIALS
dluminum Ltd.
(Alcan)
picoa
Kaiser-
eynolds
3.65
n.a.
3.48
n.a.
4.00
5.18
3.71
11.63
11.04
40.8
34.7
n.a.
31.5
194.9 COSTS OF SMELTING ALUM1INUM. POWER AND CARBON COSTS PER
POUND OF ALUMINUMi.
POWER CARBON
ELECTRODES
NET MILL
COSTS
PERCENT OF MILL COSTS
POWER ELECTRODES
Aluminum
Ltd. (Alcan).592$
Alcoa
Kaiser
Reynolds
1.78
1.81
2.32
1.429-
1.31
n.a.
1.62
7.7o5
10.51
11.63
11.04
7.7
16.9
15.6
21.0
SOURCE: U.S. v Alcoa evidence recorded in the
Judgment. Knox D.J.
n.a.
38.1
44.5
33.6
18.5
12.5
n.a.
14.7
1949 ALTMIINA AND RAW MATERIALS
3.142/
192.
Knox therefore considered that net worth (since
it remained substantially unaffected by the purchase
of the War-assets plants in 1949; there was a like
effect on both assets and liabilities) provided a more
accurate comparison of the change in resources from year
to year. A comparison shows that Alcoa had a net worth
five times greater than Reynolds and nine times greater
than Kaiser in 1949. Even if the assets of Kaiser and
Reynolds were appreciat-ed to an estimated realistic value,
the net worth of Alcoa is still 66.lpercent of the total
figure. The financial strength revealed by these figures
was disproportionate at Alcoa's share of the total pro-
duction capacity. The apparent financial resources advan-
tage of Alcoa is accentuated by the debt structures of all
three companies. Judge Knox concluded -
"The equity of Alcoa is so vast in comparison
to its two domestic comDetitors, that, unless some
serious offsetting factor is evident, it must be
concluded that Alcoa is in such a position, that it
alone can freely embrace new opportunities for
development and expand with the market." (66)
Alcoa's share of earnings is larger than the statistics
indicate, since it has been admitted in evidence, that in
1948 profits of '5,000,000 were foregone to supply pig and
ingot to the non-integrated producers, rather than fabri-
cate the metal and sell it in its finished or semi-finished form.
(66) Ibid p, 97.
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TABLE XLVI
NET WORTH (BOOK VALUE)
December 31,1947 December 31,1948 September 30,1949
$000's % 000's % 4000's %
271,739 82.6 300,567 78.5 314,118 78-1
Reynolds
Kaiser
43,202 13.1
13,980 4.3
52,717 13.1
30,222 8.3 35,323 8.8
Appreciating Assets of the Appreciating the Assets
three companies. September only of Reynolds and Kaiser.
30, 1949. September 30, 1949.
Alcoa
Reynolds
Kaiser
449,000 73.6
98,200 16.1
62,600 10.3
314.118 66.1
98,200 20.7
62,600 13.2
SOURCE: Knox D.T. Opinion p. 93. Supra.
LONG TERM DEBT STRUCTURE u INDUSTRY - SEPTEMBER 30, 1949.
Alcoa:
Total Debt
Assets (B.V.)
Net Worth
Debt: Notes mat. 1967
1973
No
§125.3 millions
516.7 do.
314.1 do.
2.55% int. 40 million
3% it. 460 do.
25.3 do.
None of these notes is secured.
Alcoa
50,44 13.2
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TABLE XLVII. c ont d.
LONG TERM DEBT STRUCTURE ALUMINUM INDUSTRYSEPTEMBER 30,1949.
Reynolds:
Total Debt
Assets (B.V.)
Net Worth
Debt:
$96.8 million
170.6 do.
"52.7 do.
lst mortgage bonds 1960 4%
(R.F.C. Loan)
Purchase Money Notes1950-59
Bank Notes 1951-53
Debentures mat. 1951- 32's
Mortgage notes 4%
Kaiser:
Long Term Debt
Assets (B.V.)
Net Worth
Debt:
$29.2 million
$
2.3
3.8
0.9
3.8
b-. 7
do.
do.
do.
do.
do.
37.9 million
087.4 million
35.3 do.
1st mortgages 4% 1969 $36.3 do.
(War Assets Administration)
Most of Kaiser's assets in mortgages.
SOURCE: Moody's Industrial Manual 1950.
Knox DJ. Opinion pp. 94, 95, 96.
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TABLE XLVII contd.
ASSETS % DEBT NET WORTH A DEBT
Alcoa 4.1 2.5
Reynolds 1.8 0.58
Kaiser 2.3 0.93
These ratios are not significantly altered by using
the apreciated value of the assets of Kaiser and Reynolds.
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The short term abilities of the companies are an
indication of the resources available to survive mar-
ket recessions in particular working capital is of
importance. The Reynolds Company had in fact serious
working capital difficulties in 1947. A temporary
decline in orders in 1946 reduced Reynolds cash account
from A17.2 million in June 1946 to 06.6 million by June,
1947. The company had to increase short term bank loans,
shut down the Long View reduction plant and subsequently
sell approximately 50 percent of its interest in the
formerly fully-owned Robertshaw-Fulton Controls Company,
to repay the loans. When the demand for metal suddenly
rose in 1947 the shut down left Reynolds with an insuf-
ficient inventory of primary metal to fully exploit the
market opportunities. In the words of Mr. J.S. Reynolds,
Jr. "Reynolds Company was "whip-sawed". (67) In the same
period Kaiser's sales fell off considerably, more than
the average of the industry, but it did not shut down
any plants; Alcoa seemed relatively unaffected by the
market downturn. It cannot be said that Kaiser and Rey-
nolds were in financial danger as a result of a short-
age of working capital. The provision in the Purchase
(67) Testimony before subcommittee on Study of Monopoly Power.
Committee on the Judiciary House. 82d Congress p. 114.
Part I.
197.
Contract of Government plants permitting Reynolds and
Kaiser to pay part of their debt to the Government in
metal is an important stabilising factor. In periods
of decreased market demand it can permit the reduction
of inventories and the conservation of cash.
In conclusion it can be seen that although Kaiser and
Reynolds were capable of operating in the market success-
fully although their financial resources did not approach
Alcoa's. In so far as expansion was expected in 1950,
Alcoa was seen to be able to grow at a faster rate than
Kaiser or Reynolds.
PATENTS.
Judge Knox reviewed the patent situation in order
to ascertain whether there was in Alcoa's large port-
folio or patents an appreciable deterrend to new firms
entering the industry. In September, 194;9 Alcoa owned
775 patents, was exclusive licensee under 57 additional
patents, and was a non-exclusive licensee of more than 125
others.
Little information was presented at the trial on
the policy of licensing of patents by Alcoa. Only 10
of the 172 basic patents are licensed to other producers
although Alcoa is obliged to license all but two to Kaiser
and Reynolds. (68) No evidence was produced of discrimi-
(68) Knox D.J. Opinion (See citation above) p. 106.
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nation against potential licenses by Alcoa. (69) Some un-
licensed patent are concerned with some minor process
improvements which were considered part of Alcoa's
operating knowledge; other patents which.have been sus-
pended or covered by later patents. Only eleven of Alcoa's
patents have been declared to be significant and meet a
twofold standard. (70) Alcoa must use the patent to the
extent of five million pounds of aluminum per year, and
the Patent must be without an alternative providing a
like result in quality and quantity at a comparable cost.(/l )
It appears that the most important of these patents at
the time of the trial are the combination process for the
extraction of alumina, (expiring 1962), alumina recovery
process, (1957), continuous digestion process (1955),
fluoride materials (1950), direct shell castings (1959),
and clad products (1962). None of these patents had
been contested in Court.
The patents owned by Reynolds (fifteen in all) are
little used and Kaiser in 1949 apparently owned no
patents. (n8)
Until 1949, Kaiser and Reynolds were required as
a condition of license of Alcoa patents, to grant-back
(69) Ibid p. 106.
(70) Ibid p. 108.
(71) Ibid p. 108.
(72) Ibid p. 112.
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TABLE XLVIII
ALCOA PATENTS - 19149
PATENTS
PATENTS OWNED EXCLUSIVELY LICENSED
TOTAL NI14BER NUMBER TOTAL NUMBER NUMtBER
NUMBER USED BY LI- NUIMBER USED BY SUB-
ALCOA CENSED AL COA LICENSED
OR OTHERS OR' OTHERS
Basic Industry 321 76 50 2 1 .
Pheripheral
Industry 435 89 12
Magnesium 19 6 2 43 0 0
TOTAL 775 236 141 57 6 2
SOURCE; U.S. v Alcoa. Knox opinion. Supra p. 105.
to Alcoa any improvements which they made and patent on
any Alcoa patent process. Judge Knox held that this re-
quirements was not enf orceable.
The royaltiespayable to Alcoa for the use of its
patents were of trifling amount. (73) Judge Knox de-
cided that the patent situation was no deterrment to any
new firm entering the industry, and that the patents
position of Alcoa did not constitute a serious threat of
effective competition. The court concluded that Alcoa's
ability to spend large sums on Research and Development
was a much greater competitive advantage.
(73) Ibid pp. 114, 115.
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ALUMINUM LIMITED.
The Court inquired into the role of Alcan in the
domestic primary aluminum market,with its long term
relations with its associate company, Alcoa, and in
particular the purchase contracts entered into by the
two firms. The Court found that Alcan had become, by
19149, a very important factor in the limiting of the
potential growth and stability of Kaiser and Reynolds
for the following reasons
"it cannot be disputed that whatever power
may exist in the hands of Alcoa, or its stock-
holders to secure a sympathetic management of
Alcan, it is a resource which might well in-
f luence the market position of the two companies,
(Kaiser and Reynolds). The greater the assistance
that Alcan is capable of extending to Alcoa if it
be so disposed, the more potent the danger which
overhangs the future development of Reynolds and
Kaiser" ('74)
(The Davis, Hunt and Mellon fmnilies had at the
time under review, complete control over Alcoa and
Alcan through their major stockholdings in each company.)
"To permit their potential power to continue
where it now resides and thus supplement Alcoa's large
resources may constitute a hazard of the utmost
danger to the competitive efforts of Kaiser and
Reynolds". (75)
Due to the lower cost structure of Alcan, it can
compete on very favorable conditions in the domestic market
(74) Ibid pp.. 118-119.
(75)Ibid pp. 122.
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TABLE XLIX.
ALCAN STATISTICS 1948
Net Worth
Assets (B.V.) 3
Long Term Debt1
Current Assets
Current Liabilities
Earnings before taxes
Taxes 2
Earnings after taxes and
dividends
Research and Development
expense
Total pig and ingot
capacity(1948)
Mill costs per pound of
aluminum(1949)
United States Tarriff on
primary metal imports
(1949)
23.8
34.6
141.0
2.9
47.8
8.1
17.5
1.5
million
do.
do.
do.
do.
do.
do.
do.
992,000,000 pounds
8.28 cents
2.0 cents
SOURCE: Moody's Industrials Manual..1,49.
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TABLE L.
ALUMINUM IMPORT CORPORATION - SALES OF VIRGIN INGOT AND
PIG IN THE UNITED STATES
1949.
(pounds)
YEAR TOTAL SALES TO SALES TO SALES TO SALES TO
SALES ALCOA REYNOLDS KAISER 0THERS
1946 58,917,073 6,000,000 50,117,203 2,797,870
100% 10.2% 85.1 4-7%
1947 24,475,924 23,54.0,370 54.,763 24,670 856,121
100% 96.2% 0.2% .1% 3.5%
1948 159,575,433 104,142,363 10,558 034 5,251,857 39,P593 179
100% 65.2% 6.6% 3.3% 24-91
1949 90,774,237 71,078,881 4,971,184 3,889,436 10,834,636(ist 100% 78.3% 5.5% 4.2% 12.0%
nine
months)
333,742,667 204,761,614 65,731,184 9,166,063 54,083,806
100% 61.4% 19.7% 2.7% 16.2%
SOURCE: Knox D.J. supra. p . 125 .
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primary ingot and pig. In fact the evidence presented
in court was that Alcoa intends to do just that and
become the accepted long term supplier for the non-
integrated producers.
Alcan had increased the sales of primary metal to
the United States from 1947 through 1949' Hcwever, the
company has dealt preferentially with Alcoa and was
in 1949 contracted to sell to Alcoa, according to evi-
dence in Court, 300,000,000 pounds between April, 1948
and November 31, 1950, originally at 14 cents per pound
f.o.b. cars at United States great sales ports at
Edgewater, N.J.,and raised in 1949 to 16 cents. The
court found that - "the price paid by Kaiser and Rey-
nolds is identical to that price paid by Alcoa."
In addition Alcan soldsome 41.5 million pounds
of scrap during the same period (92 percent to Alcoa).
The .situation seems aptly described by Knox - "I
think it is too much to expect that the competition be-
tween Alcoa and Alcan now that they both participate in
the same market will be as keen and competitive as the
Sherman Act demands. While there may be active rivalry
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them for customers, since the controlling shareholders
of these corporations may prefer one of these com-
panies over the other as to the source of dividends,
it is doubtful that the stimulants to price compe-
tition and efficiency, from which the public benefits,
could exist to the same degree, as would be the case,
if these firms were iholly dissociated." (76)
"The sales contract made between Alcan and Alcoa
for long term supply in what was indicated to be a
possible future period of short supply of primary ingot
illustrates this point".
The Court in fact decreed that the shareholders in
both Alcan and Alcoa must disipose of their stock in one
or other company in a manner approved by the Court.
ENTRY OF NEW FIRMS INTO THE INDUSTRY.
The Court decided, in view of the existing cost
structure of the industry, it is reasonably apparent that
in order to compete successfully in the domestic and
overseas industry, the new firms would require the
economies which follow upon the integration of operations
from the extraction of ore through the manufacture of semi-
(76) Ibid pp. 130, 131.
205.
fabridatd products.
"To build an industry.establishment of
this size, ..... would reguire a-very large
investment. Such a firm would have to com-
pete with Reynolds and Kaiser who have acquired
choice facilities at "give-away" prices, and
- Alcoa some of whose more recent facilities are
completely amortized." (77)
It seem's doubtful that funds for the development
of a new integrated aluminum company could be readily
found.
"The present producers have pre-empted the field".
The management of Alcoa has stated -
"That if a separate integrated operator were
conceived out of Alcoa's present establishment,
and such facilities paid for at their true
value, the newcomer would face bagnkruptcy from
the day it started". (78)
This conclusion does not stem from the inefficiency
of Alcoa equipment but rather from the disporportionate
capital investment that would be required.
Knox continued,
"If this be conceded, then the company that
had to construct its own plants, and then attempt to compete
against all the capacity now found in the industry
would have even less chance of survival". (79)
The Court therefore came to the conclusion that
there was no prospect for any domestic competition
arising in the aluminum industry as then constituted to
(77) Ibid p. 135.
(78) Ibid.
(79) Ibid p. 136.
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challenge the three producers.
"For this reason the status of Alcan
assumes augmented importance, because, in
that company resides a competitive potential
of greater magnitude than that which can be
generated in the United States". (80)
The Court decided that with the probable future
competition from Alcan there was no reason to
accede to the plea of the Government and divest Alcoa
of some of its properties.
"In the absence of any clear evidence of
that Alcoa is, as it were, operating unlawfully,
there is need to recognise the perils that might
result in the impairment of Alcoa's indotrial
potential in these times of international tension". (81)
In concluding the case the Court said "no instances
of unfair competition by Alcoa have been presented"' (82)
"The most that can be said is that Alcoa
yielded its unlawful market position reluctantly". (83)
"It is concluded that the activities of Alcoa
have not caused a need. for drastic divestiture of
resources, irrespective of the difficulty of achiev-
the result. It is therefore decided that in addition
to the relief to the reepective parties that is in-
dicated above with respect to patent grant-backs,
and the disposition of the St. Lawrence plant, the.
shareholders of Alcoa be required to dispose of their
stock interests in either Alcan or Alcoa". (84)
( On January 16, 1951 Judge Knox accepted with
slight modifications, a stock disposal plan submitted by
(80) Ibid p. 136.
(81) Ibid p. 137.
(82) Ibid p. 171,
(83)Ibid -p. 172.
(84) Ibid pp. 178.-179.
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the major shareholders of Alcoa and Alcan to the Court.
Under this plan, Alcoa's major shareholders (except one)
would dispose of their holdings in Alcan over a ten
year period, during which time the voting power of 'the
stock would be exercised by the Court-appointed trustees.
All but one of the major stockholders of Alcoa elected
to sell their holdings in Alcan, the exception being
Edward K. Davis, retired president of Alcan who decided
to dispose of his Alcoa stock. (85)
The Court stated,
"A final order should now be entered dismissing
Alcoats petition and the relief for which the
Government has petitioned except to the extent
herein before setforth, shoull presently be
denied. Nevertheless the Government for a period
of five years, if conditions so warrant may
petition the Court for fuller and more complete
relief". (86)
(85) Carr, C.C. Opit cit p. 236.
(86) Knox D.J. Opinion pp. 179-180 opit cit.
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CHAPTER VI
THE STRUCTURE OF THE ALUMINUM INUJSTRY
1937 - 1957
The Period 1950 - 1957.
The pattern of the industry, as described in the
Knox judgment, namely the price leadership of Alcoa in
the primary metal market and the largely oligopolistic
fabrications market (in which the integrated producers
dominate) continued in this period. The non-integra-
ted processors have continued to increase in number,
but have decreased in actual share of the fabrication
market even though the expansion of reduction capacity
of the primary producers has increased in total the
aiailable supply of primary metal. Alcan imports have
risen in the same period.
The Integrated Producers.
It has been the policy of Alcoa to continue to
sell to the non-integrated users the same share of the
production of primary capacity. ( j) Reynolds' policy
(outlined in the evidence of Mr. J.S. Reynolds) before
the Small Business Committee, has stated the position of
(1). Response to questions. Subcommittee No. 3 Select Committee
on Small Business House. 84th Congress. Report p. 30.
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TABLE LI.
PRODUCTION IN THE UNITED STATES OF THE THREE LARGEST PRODUCERS OF PRIMARY
METALS - 1953 or 1954
METAL YEAR PERCENTAGE TOTAL TOTAL
OUTPUT NUIBER OUTPUT
THREE OF (SHORT TONS)
LARGEST COIPANJE S
PRODUCERS
Aluminum (primary) 1954 100 3 1,461,000
Copper refined (primary origin) 1953 71 8 1,293,000
Lead refined (primary origin) 1953 93 5 467,891
Zinc slab (primary origin) 1953 50 12 916,105
Pig iron 1954 59 34 57,903,951
Steel ingots and castings 1954 55 391 89,608,321
SOURCE: Bureau of Mines Report to Subcommittee No. 3. p. 19.
PRODUCTION IN THE UNITED STATES BY THE THREE LARGEST PRODUCERS OF SECONDARY
METALS - 1953 or 1954
NETAL YEAR PERCENTAGE TOTAL TOTAL
OUTPUT OF NUIMBER OUTPUT
THREE OF (SHORT TONS)
LARGEST 0DMPANIES
PRODUCERS
Aluminum, secondary (as metal
alloys and in chemicals) 1954 36 105 292,041.
Copper, secondary (as metal and
alloys) 1953 14 800 958,000
Lead Secondary (as metal and in
alloys) 1953 51 800 486,737
Zinc secondary, in chemicals'
alloys and as metal. 1953 13 1,030 294,678
SOURCE: Bureau of Mines* Report to Subcommittee No. 3 p. 19.
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TABLE LII.
SUPPLY AND PRODUCTION OF PRI4ARY AND SECONDARY ALUMINUM
PERCENT INCREASE 1950-5,4
Integrated Producers:
Primary metal produced. 104.
Total aluminum supply initially
acquired by production, purchase,
tolls and conversions.
Total aluminum supply after resale
of primary metal to non-integrated
users.
73
78
Non-Integrated Processors:
Total aluminum supply initially
acquired, secondary and imported
primary.
Total aluminum supply of the purchases
of primary metal from integrated pro-
ducers.
Secondary ingot produced by smelters
and reclaimers.
63
- 23
SOURCE: Report of Subcommittee No. 3. supra p. 16.
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TABLE LIII.
SHIPMENTS OF ALUMINUN4 MILL SHAPES BY INTEGRATED AND NON-INTEGRATED
PRODUCERS. 1950-1955. (percent of totals)
MILL SHAPES 1950 1952 1953 1954 1955
(first six
months)
Sheet and Plate:
1. Integrated producers
2. Non-integrated pro-
ducers
Foil:
1.
2.
Wire and Covered Cable: n.a.
100 100 100 100 100
96 95 94 94 93
45 6 6 7
100 100 100 100 100
73 68 69 69 69
27 32 31 31 31
100 100 100 100
61 60 57 60
39 40 43 40
A.C.S.R. & Bare Cable:
1.
2.
Extruded Shapes and
Drawn Tubings:
1.
2.
PowderPlake and Paste:
1.
2.
100 100 100 .100 100
76 73. 72 75 77
24 27 28 25 23
100 100 100 100 100
65 60 57 47 46
35 40 43 53 54
100
74
100 100 100 100
62 55 58 80
26 - 38 42 20
SOURCE: Aluminum and Magnesium DivisionB.D.S.A. Department of
Commerce and Reports of Aluminum Producers to Sub-
Committee No. 3.
Report of Subcommittee No. 3 p.17.
1.
2.
n.a.
n.a.
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TABLE' LIV.
SHIPIMENTS IN THE UNITED STATES BY INTEGRATED PRODUCERS
OF VARIOUS SEMI-FABRICATED METAL PRODUCTS - 1953 - 1954
IETAL AND PRODUCT YEAR TOTAL PROCESSORS
SHIPMENTS INTEGRATED NON-INTEGRATED
NUMBER % OF NUMBER % OF
OF TOTAL OF TOTAL
PRO- SHIP- PRO- SHIP-
DUCERS iZENTS DUCERS IMIENTS
ALUMINUM:
Sheet and plate
(pounds)
Foil (pounds)
Wire and covered
cable (pounds)
ACSR and bare cable
(pounds)
1954 1,057,485,000
1954 151,598,000
1954 72,751,000
1954 147,166,000
3 94 16 6
3 69 9 31
3 57. 44 43
3 75 12 25
Extruded shapes and
drawn tubing (pounds)l954
Powder, flake and
paste (pounds)
TOTAL:
Castings-
COPPER PRODUCTS:
Brass sheet, strip,
plate and rolls
(pounds)
Other Brass mill
products (pounds)
Copper wire mill
products (pounds)
523,248,000
1954 46,909,000
1,198,657,000
1954 650,000,000
1953 907,881,000
1953 1,437,757,000
1953 1,394,631,000
3 47 80 53
2
3 74
1 9
6
7 42
26
- 91
68 29 32
6 57 61 43
6 43 175 57
IRON AND STEEL PRODUCTS:
Flat rolled steel
products (tons)
Other steel mill
products (tons)
Foundry products
(tons)
1952
1952
32,214,000 44
35,913,000 44
13,535,000 22
97 43 3
81 43 19
24 2,499 76
SOURCE: Dept. of Commerce and Reports of Aluminum Producers
to Subcommittee No. 3. Report p. 20.
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TABLE LV.
MAIN PRODUCTS OF THE INTEGRATED PRODUCERS
JUNE 30th, 1955
PRODUCT ALCOA REYTOLDS KAISER
Secondary Ingot x x
Sheet x x x
Foil x x x
Sand castings x
Permanent mold castings x
Die castings x
Extrusions and tubing x x x
Electrical conductor
cable x x x
Cable accessories x x
Wire, rod and bar and
rolled structural
shapes x x x
Drawn tube x x x
Forgings x x
Powder and paste x - x
Rivets x -
Screw-Machine Products x -
Collapsible tubes x -
Impact extrusions and
customers blanks x - x
Jobbing x x
Welded tube x x x
TOTAL 19 8 12
SOURCE: Report of Subcommittee No. 3 supra p. 9.
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TABLE LVI.
EARNINGS BEFORE TAXES, AFTER TAXES, AID DIVIDENDS OP
TIE INTEG-R-ATEB-PRODUCERs- -
EARNINGS BEFORE
Alcoa
Reynolds
Kaiser
Alcan
Alcoa
Reynolds
Kaiser
Alcan
Alcoa
Reynolds
Kaiser
Alcan
1950
92.630
25.966
54.048
EARNINGS
46.857
12.560
n.a.
31.087
EARNINGS
27.117
1.767
n.a.
38.534
TAXES (millions
1951 1952 1953
118,269 95.954 105.649
48.126 34.457 35.165
35.318 23.004 23.953
53.923 46.434 43.982
AFTER TAXES (millions o
39.301 43.527 48.848
15.838 14.731 18.320
15.798 12.799 11.768
24.508 19.118 20.909
AFTER TAXES AND
23.851 18.532
1.756 1.666
4.056 4.814
22.630 15-523
DIVIDENDS (millions of'
18.194 17.156 20.210
2.661 2.810 5.024
5.622 6.231 7.757
16.896 17.075 22.301
of dollars)
1954 1955
89.138 176.851
38.596 69.987
27.616 56.122
64.225 76.068
f dollars)
46.471 87.601
20.280 34.306
14.016 28.565
33.115 41.160
SOURCE: Moodyts Industrial Manual, 1957.
1956
174.571
83.786
83.667
84.774
89.621
41.239
43.293
45.321
dollars)
12.255
8.379
12.663
27.179
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TABLE LVII.
ALUMINUM COMPANY OF AMERICA (ALCOA) - FINANCIAL STATISTICS - 1950 - 1956
1956 1955 1954 1953 1952 1951 1950
ASSETS:
Current
Total
LIABILITIES:
Current
375.421 315.318 304.413 276.729 246.852 220.713
1157.468 1010.522 917.002 905.735 865.663 640.378
185.790 90.760 121.714 186.999 148.217 152.316
Stock. P.
C.
65.990
20.553 20.381 10.055 9.842 8.162 8.151
Debt 273.8
Earnings/share
P. 135.81
C. 4.21
Current assets
? Current
liab. 2.02
% sales to total
assets 74.67
% long terrm debt 30.56
Div./share P.
C.
Sales (net)
3.75
1.20
864.4
308.3 33$.3 322.0 32$.9 12$.6$9 . $6
.132.75
4.18
3.47
70.42
4.38
2.50
74.02
4.71
1.48
65.96
8.38
1.67
59.56
7.53
1.45
83.62 77.25 78.12 66.74 83.47
35.72 42.51 39.58 45.72 25.55
3.75
1.15
3.75
1.60
3.75
1.95
3.75
3.30
3.75
2.75
845.0 708.3 707.5 577.8 534.5
SOURCE: Moody's Industrial Manual, 1957
RENYOLDS
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METALS COMPANY - FINANCIAL STATISTICS 1950-56.
1956 1954 1953 1952
ASSETS:
Current
Total
191.789
608.962
185.946 143.076
482.665 436.619
129.425
428.299
116-190
422.181
102.359
318.657
LIABILITIES:
Current
Stock Preferred
Common
Debt (Total)
Earnings/share P.
Current assets
Current liab.
sales to total
assets
% long term debt
Div./share P.
C.
69.663 63.484 59.116 48.874 44.534 50.860
39.2
48.840
- - 1.026 2.178
48.840 48.221 34.496 29.137 19.972
228.10 213.69 148.0
52-60
C. 3.93
2.75
3.41 16.59
2.93 2.42
167.6 186.5 175.90
2.65
8.71 10.58
2.61 2.01
66.54% 79.74 70.25 67.22 55.60 67.69
53.57% 59.13 53.88 70.26 74.84 70.05
1.74
0.65 1.75 1.50
5.50
1.00
5.50 5.50
1.00 1.10
80.064
201.751
36.090
4.389
17.631
96.5
8.84
2.22
82.74
5.50
1.20
Sales net
Production
primary tons
405.206 384.887 306.778 287.892 234.738 215.704 166.925
M.5
488-500
SOURCE: Moody' s Industrial Manual, 1957.
1951 1950
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TABLE LIX.
KAISER ALUMINUM AND CHEMICAL CORPORATION - FINANCIAL STATISTICS
1950-56.
1956 1954 1952
209.662 133-719 98.022 94.907 138.243
1951
72,527
489.826 372.115 340.747 333.410 286.890 140-225
LIABILITIES:
71.046
65.00
4.898
60o4OO 49.655 49.854 37.079 31.147
4.630 3.784 3.604 3.432 3.120
Debt (total)
Earnings/share
P.
C.
Current assets
t current
liabilities
150.420 150.750 163.840 191.596 169.617 55.287
(
(
61.92
140.66
2.86
2.95
1.95
2.2
3.36
2.0
1.56
1.93
3.25
3.73
5.06
2.31
% sales to total
assets
% long term
debt
Div./share P. (
(
C.
Sales (net)
Production
primary (tons)
67.4
36.1
1.78
2.33
0.78 3/4
330.712
854,534
m. pounds
72.0
56.2
66.8
67.7
1.53 3/41.30
268.133 226.640
55.0
68.o
1.30
49.5
68.o
1.30
87.8
50.6
1.30
. 182.652 141.871 123.166
812,992 713,938 4LL4,424 362,574 316,848
SOURCE: Moody's Industrial Manual, 1957.
ASSETS:
Current
Total
Current
Stock P.
C.
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TABLE LX.
ALUMINUM COMPANY OF CANADA LIMITED (ALCAN) - FINANCIAL STATISTICS
1950 - 1956
1956 1954 1953 1952 1951 1950
186.644 172.884 138.470 120.271 108.44 105.363 147-823
793-936 711.466 640.918 522.974 453.928 307.028 264.327
LIABILITIES:
Current
Stock P
C
Long term
debt (total)
49.468 40.847 36.263 71-081 51.432
71.856 72.254 42.514 42.663 12.981
8o.ooo 8o.ooo 68.000 60.000 60.000
359.490 322.308 332.202 294.637 279.546
44.737 28.907
13.231 13.589
30.000 30.000
172.336 149.237
Earnings/sh.P( 95.56
( 37.37
C -
Current assets
L- current
liabilities 3.78
% sales to
total 'assets.. 4.7
%long term
debt
Div./sh. P.(
C.
Sales net
48.3
1.00
2.16
83.97
33.89
4.23
42.2
48.1
1.00
66.15
129.94
3.86
40.0
54.9
1.00
5.25
41.28
67.99
1.70
49.5
65.3
1.00
3.30
36.82 46.31 57-19
2.11 2.36
53.6
69.3
1.00
66.5
6 5.8
1.00
355.552 307.700 256.597 258.378 243.072 203.980
n.a.
63.2
1.00
n.a.
Prod. primary
ingot 705,058 681,310 592,318 597,779 538,224 478,223 442,020
m. tons.
SOURCE: Moody's Industrial Manual.
ASSETS:
Current
Total
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his company in clear terms -
"Reynolds is primarily a fabricator"...
"and should not be regarded as a supplier
of pig as compared to Alcoa"...
"Our plans are to increase our fabricating
capacity and our ingot capacity. We are fabricators,
we are merchants and we intend to continue to go
on in every way we can"...
"When the stockpile ends we are going to
expand our fabricating capacity to take care of
what the Government contracts permit us to do,
at least that much". (2)
Mr. D.S. Rhoades of Kaiser in his testimony before
the Judiciary Committee declared a policy, in 1955, of
supplying the non-integrated users to an increas-
ing degree. But Rhoades also testified that Kaiser is
concerned with creating additional facilities to utilise
the expanded primary capacity when the Government's
market guarrantee expires in 1958. (3)
The difference in the expressed attitude of Alcoa
to Reynolds and Kaiser in part may have been due to the
fact that the Government could still petition the District
Court for divestiture action against Alcoa if there
appeared to be any lessening of the competitive condi-
tions in the aluminum market (which the Court interpreted
as the fabrications market).
(2) Ibid p. 34.
(3) Hearing Pt. I p. 306. Ibid p. 34.
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TABLE LXI.
SALES OF PRIMARY ALUMINUM AND ACQUISITION OF PRIMARY AND SECONDARY
ALUMINUM -(MILLIONS 'OF POUNDS)
1946-50 1951-54
ALCOA
1946-50 1951-54 1946-50 1951-54
KAISER REYNOLDS
Sale of primary
metal to
domestic non-
integrated users: 802 456 64 401 134 476
Acquisition of
primary and
secondary metal
by purchase,
tolls and
conversions:-
Percentage
acquisition to
sales:
1,390 901
174 198
SOURCE: Report of Subcommittee No. 3. Supra p. 15.
341147
230
448
335
289
61
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TABLE LXII.
SALES OF PRIMARY ALUMINUM AND ACQUISITION OF PRIMARY ALUM14INMI
(millions of pounds)
ALCOA KAISER REYNOLDS
16-L0 1951 5-5 1946-50 195-5 94-50 1915
Sales of
primary metal
to domestic
non-integrated
users: 802 456 64 i01 134 476
Acquisition of
primary metal
by purchase,
tolls and
conversions: 819 511 75 168 185 138
Percentage
acquisition to
sales: 102 112 117 42 138 29
When secondary metal acquisitions are
added to primary acquisitions, the
same result ensues.
Source: Report of Subcommittee No. 3 supra p. 15.
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It is no surprise that the trend of the expansion
of fabrication facilities of the integrated producers
should keep pace with increased reduction capacity,
since the profitability of fabrications over primary
ingot sales was clearly shown in the Alcoa case (supra
Knox J.) and in the testimony of Alcoa,Reynolds and
Kaiser before the Small Business Subcommittee.
The other important determinant of the expansion
plans of the industry has been Government policy,
formulated apparently to provide for strategic stock-
pile and increasing military uses of aluminum, and to
secure adequate supplies of raw material for the ex-
panding number of non-integrated users whose competition,
contribution to product development increasing the uses
of aluminum, and manufacturing capacity in times of
emergency, warrant some form of Government assistance.
The outbreak of the Korean War apparently caused
the armed services to re-evaluate the future needs of
stockpiles of aluminum, aluminum reduction and fabri-
cating capacity and the need for expansion of capacity
of non-integrated fabricators. The Defense Production
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Act of 1950 authorised the G.S.A. to negotiate con-
tracts with the existing integrated producers and
any new firms entering the primary ingot industry,
for an expansion of primary capacity with the re-
quirement that these contracts require the firms to
dispose of the new production in the following- order -
1. Priority required by law (military orders and other
allocations).
2. All or any amount of the balance of output purchased
by the Government in consecutive six month
periods upon 90 days advance notice.
3. After priorities, up to teo-thirds of the production,
less the amount ordered by the Government, was
to be offered publicly to non-integrated users.
The Government guarranteed to purchase whatever
primary metal was produced under these contracts but
not absorbed by the market. The facilities which were
built under these contracts were allowed to claim accele-
rated depreciation for income tax purposes. (4)
In applying the formula, each integrated producer,
in accordance with Government direction, first deducted
an estimate for the military orders he might receive,
and prorated this estimate between the aluminum capacity
subject to contract, and the other company capacity. From
(4) Ibid p. 25,
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TABLE LXIII
SHIPMENTS OF UNITED STATES ALUMINU4 SUPPLY TO CUSTOMERS
1949-55
(millions of pounds)
YEAR TOTAL SHIPMENT TO CUSTOIMERS
UNITED
STATES TOTAL DIRECT CIVILIAN
SUPPLY MILITARY AND INDIRECT
MILITARY
1949 1,796
1950 2,401 2,391 113 2,278
1951 2,541 2,421 622 1,799
1952 2,804 2,662 793 1,869
1953 3,891 3,211 742 2,469
1954 4,032 3,010 356 2,654
1955 2,135 1,947 165 1,782
(first
six months)
SOURCE: Department of Commerce BDSA
Aluminum and Magnesium Division
Diecaster Statistics t Census: Facts for
Industry.
Report Subcommittee No. 3 supra p. 55.
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TABLE LXIV.
SHIPMENTS OF UNITED STATES ALUMIINUT SUPPLY TO CONSUMERS.
1949-55
(millions 6f pounds)
YEAR SHIPMENTS TO CONSUMERS BY PRODUCT CLASSES
TOTAL NET CASTINGS INGOT INGOT DIE
MILL SHIPNENTS DESTRUCTIVE EXPORTS CASTERS
PRODUCT USES
SHIPEN TS
1949 1,607 1,158 352 81 16 98
1950 2,391 1,713 543 134 1 167
1951 2,421 1,756 515 148 2 158
1952 2,484 1,925 519 137 3 170
1953 3,114 2,287 658 164 5 239
1954 2,866 2,087 625 146 8 245
1955
(First six
months)
SOURCE: Department of Commerce BDSA
Aluminum and Magnesium Division
Diecaster statistics 1 Census: Facts for
Industry.
Report Subcommittee No. 3 supra p. 55.
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two-thirds of the balance subject to the contract, the
producer then deducted the amount estimated for military
set-asides. The rest of the two-thirds was to be
offered to the non-integrated users. ( 5) The "non-
integrated user" was defined as "any manufacturer,
fabricator or finisher, or producer in the United States
who is not a producer of primary aluminum ..... and who
is purchasing such aluminum for his own manufacturing,
finishing, fabricating or producing operations". The
published offers must be made for each six months
period and at least 60 days in advance of it. (6 )
The G.S.A. (General Counsel, Elliott) stated that
the form of metal offered must be pig, ingot or billet,
but conceivably a non-integrated user could take the
metal in that form and turn it over to another company
(but hot to the source of the metal) and have it fabri-
cated further for his own use. (7 )
The Federal Trade Commission and the Attorney-General
held that re-rolled or redrawn aluminum could not b e
substituted for pig, ingot or billets, because it was
desirable to maintain non-integrated fabricators for the
development of competition in the aluminum field. ( 8)
(5) Ibid p. 25.
(6) Ibid.
(7) Ibid p. 26.
'8)' Ibid.
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The integrated producers participated in the three
Government expansion progris of 1950, 1951 and 1952 as
would be expected. The longstanding excess of fabri-
cating capacity was available for production with the
new increased supplies of metal produced with the faci-
lities that were given accelerated depreciation. The
requirements of any new firm entering the industry as
outlined in the Knox judgment discloses that even with
the tax allowances and assured market offered under the
G.S.A. contracts, few non-integrated producers acting
alone would have the resources to enter the reduction
phase of the industry, nor could they be expected to
produce as efficiently or at comparable cost with the
integrated producers' long established in the field.
Further, they would be dependent on the primary
producers or Government stockpiles for their supply of
alumina, which wi.th continued expansion in the reduction
part of the industry restrictions could occur on output.
The price of aluminum pig was kept at a oernanently low
figure by Alcoa and the lower cost producer, Alcan.
Evidence that pig prices were not determined by the
market was given by Kaiser. They had felt at times that
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the price of the metal had been too low. ( ) Tney
nevertheless refrained from raising their own prices
at times when demand was greater than supply. That a
higher price could have been attained is illustrated
by the fact that for most of the period since 1946 the
price of secondary ingot has been above the price of
primary pig, sufficiently higher to remove any differ-
ential not only attributable to value of assured supply.
The indications in the primary market were for an
expanding share to be supplied by Alcan whose lower
cost structure would keep the basic price of pig below
that of the United States producers. Since the tarrif
position is subject to overall trade policy, considera-
tions which may not be influenced by any pr6spective
primary pig and ingot producers; the position of new
primary producers purely as suppliers of pig would be
hazardous. Therefore, the most likely companies (ex-
clusive of the domestic integrated producers) to enter
into contracts with the G.S.A. would be fabricators
wishing to assure themselves of supplies of their exist-
ing or increasing fabricating capacities at a price lower
than that of secondary ingot, and preferably equal to
(9) Ibid p 6.
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the domestic base price - or at least if they enter
primary production to achieve that cost in the proxi-
mate future. Even more likely to enter the primary
production field were' combinations of two or more firms
with metallurgical and fabricating facilities and experi-
ence.
When the Government expansion program was announced
several companies showed interest. However, on closer
appraisal of the industry several companies who had
originally advanced plans for entering the industry with-
drew from the program. The Kennecott Copper Company
interested at various times in entering the industry
since 1944, advised the Defense Production Adninistration
in 1952, that it would not participate in the Government
expansion program, because of the extremely low estimated
rate of return on investment in primary metal production,
as compared to alternative fields of investment. (10)
Apex Smelting Company (originally certified in the
first expansion program) reached a similar conclusion
in 1951 and also withdrew, although it had been assured
both tax amortization certificate, and a supply contract.
Apex contended that in order to produce primary metal
exclusively for non-integrated users, a price increase
(10- Ibid p. 39.
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would be necessary. (il).
Harvey Machine Company was certified in the first
Government expansion program in 1950, but did not oro-
ceed. It was succeeded by Anaconda Aluminum ihich is
owned five percent by the Harvey Machine Company, and
95 percent by the Anaconda Company (formerly Anaconda
Copper and Mining Co.) Up to 25 percent of Anaconda's
aluminum production is subject to call by the Harvey
Machine Company. The balance will be needed by Anaconda
for its existing and proposed fabricating facilities.
The rated capacity of the reduction plant is to be 120
million pounds per year by 1956. (12) Anaconda is
seeking orders from independent fabricators, and were
trying in 1956 to affect as wide a distribution as pos-
sible. "We do not intend to establish dealerships or
warehouses, and as we have set up only a small sales
organisation, our sales will of necessity be limited to
car-load lots". (letter to Committee from R.B. Caples,
President, July 22, 1955). (13)
Harvey Machine Company was recertified in the third
Government expansion program in 1952. The Company con-
tracted with the United States Government to start con-
(11) Ibid p. 39.
(12) Ibid p. 37.
(13) Ibid.
231.
struction not later than May 1, 1956 of a reduction
plant with a capacity of 180 million pounds per year.
The company has obtained a tax amortization certificate
and a Government supply contract, including the assur-
ance of advance payments on the purchase of metal up to
$65 million to the extent that private financing is
not available for the new facilities. The scheduled
completion date, slated for May 1, 1958, subject to un-
avoidable delays. (14) Once production begins it is
affected by the same G.S.A. contract requirements as
other primary producers.
Olin Mathieson Chemical Corporation was certified
in the third Government expansion program in 1952 - the
purpose of entering primary production stated by the
company is to obtain its own sources of aluminum and to
become a substantial fabricator of sheet, strip, extru-
sions, and other aluminum products. (Olin subsidiary,
Western Brass Mills is a large producer of brass fabri-
cations). The Company expects to be in full production
in 1958 and reach full capacity of approximately 120
million pounds by the endof that year. The company has a
certificate of amortization, but no supply contract with the G.S.A.
(14) Ibid p. 38.
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Revere Copper and Brass filed an application on
August 2, 1955 for a tax amortization certificate for
an alumina and aluminum plants of 120 million pounds
annual capacity. This application was rejected by the
O.D.M. as a result of the closing of the aluminum
expansion goal for Defence on September 29, 1955. (i5)
-Subsequently, August, 1956, this company joined Olin
Mathieson in the construction of alumina and reduction
plants, the output of which (180,000 tons) is to be
shared; 60,000 tons to Revere and 120,000 tons to Olin.
Each company will benefit by having metal at a lower
cost than wouldbe possible with separate facilities.
The joint firm, Ormet has a total capitalisation of
$231 million - $100 million of short term bank loans,
$100 million First Mortgage bonds purchased by an in-
surance company (rate of interest undisclosed) and Z31
million of Subordinated Debentures and common stock
purchased in equal amounts by the companies. OrrA has
constructed the alumina plant at Burnside, La. the redu-
ction plant at Ormal, 0., and joined with American Electric
Power System in building a power station at Cressap, W.Va.,
eleven miles up the Ohio River from Ormal, 0. Low cost
(15) Ibid.
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power is produced from coal mines in Consolidation Coal
Company's large mine nearby. Power is transmitted to
the Ormet reduction works, and Olin Mathieson rolling
mill near Clarington, 0. (lb)
St. Joseph Lead Company jointly with Pittsburgh
Consolidation Coal Company filed the remaining applica-
tion for a tax amortization certificate on May 16, 1955,
for a power plant and an aluminum plant with 132 million
pounds capacity. This application was unique in so far
as the Company proposed to sell all its metal in the
open market - in line with company policy for the other
metals it produces. One economy available to St. Joseph
Lead is a possible reduction in the cost of power, since
the new power plant would serve both an aluminum plant
an an expanded zinc smelter at Josephtown, Pa. About
$80 million would be required (1956 prices) for the
aluminum investment. This project would be necessarily
exposed to greater risk than the -aluminum capacity of
the newer integrated producers. The Company was advised
by J.P. Morgan and Company that "if the application for
tax amortization is not granted, and there are no sale
contracts for metal, the cost of financing the prospect
would be considerably increased and the required funds
(16) Business Week. June 5, 1956, Olin Mathieson Annual
Report, 1956.
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TABLE LIV.
PER CENTAGE INCREASE IN SHIPMENTS
1950-1954
PRODUCT INTEGRATED NON-
PRODUCERS INTEGRATED
PRODUCERS
Sheet and Plate 1
A.C.S.R. 11
Foil 41
Powder, flake and paste 68
Wire and covered cable - 4
Extruded shapes and
tubing 26
Foundry shipment all castings
n.
Foundry shipment, die
castings n.
12
34
12
175
a.
a. 47
Report of subcommittee No. 3. supra. p. 17.SOURCE:
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more difficult to obtain, for two reasons -
(i) (a) the time of repayment for debt capital
would be prolonged and
(b) the equity share of the capital would have
to be increased, and
(ii) the competition position of the proposed
company would be weakened in relation to
other companies enjoying the tax benefits. (L7 )
It is believed that no action was taken on St. Joseph
Lead Company's proposal.
The integrated producers continued to expand in
the period 1950-1957 availing themselves of G.S.A. con-
tracts and taking an increasing share of the fabrication
business. There was a continuing trend of diversification
of fabrications. Relative gains appear to have been made
at the expense of the non-integrated producers in the
times of shortage, for instanc e, 1954.. The ratio of
purchases of primary metal to sales of the integrated
producers as a group, has continued to increase, so that
the supply of pig and ingot available to non-integrated
producers has relatively declined. Kaiser and Reynolds
have shown greater interest in supplying the non-integrated
(17) Subcommittee No. 3 Select Committee on Small Business
House 84th Congress 2nd Session Report p. 39.
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users than Alcoa, but since their chare of the primary
ingot market continues to be minor compared to Alcoa
their beneficial effect is swamped. ((18))
The secondary ingot production has expanded at a
relatively slower rate than the total sales of the
industry, and as the foundries and diecasters largely
rely on this source of metal their share of the market
fabrications wgs no greater in 1955 than 1950.
Since the integrated producers make less profits
on the sale of primary metal than from their fabricating
facilities because of the low market price set by Alcoa,
as a result of the Anti-Trust suit, it may be more pro-
fitable for them to a limited extent to offer to "toll"
or to convert primary metal owned or purchased by their
customers. This is particularly true in times of short-
age of primary metals. Under a "toll" arrangenent the
customer brings or leaves his primary metal with the inte-
grated producer, pays a toll charge, and received an
equivalent amount of semi-fabricated metal. Under a con-
version arrangement, a purchase is made where the customer
sells the primary metal with an agreement to buy back
an equivalent amount of metal converted into semi-fabri-
cated form. Strictly, tolls and conversions apply to specific
alfoysisuplied by the customer and returned. However, the pro-
ducers may take metal of one alloy or purity and supply a dif-
ferent grade in another form.
(18) Ibid.
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The cyclical fluctuations in demand for fabri-
cated products which lead to shortages and oversup-
plies of primary metal assist the integrated pro-
ducers to gain larger shares of the fabrications mar-
ket since, they alone are in a position to restrict
their sales of ingot in favour of fabrications leading
to a reduction in supply of pig sold on the market and
therefore a deterioration in customer relations of the
non-integrated users and consequent continued drop in
sales. This is shown to have occured in 1955. The
shortage of 1955 will be discussed more fully later.
The integrated producers have great interest
in the outcome of the continuing action by the Anti-
Trust Division of the Department of Justice against
Alcoa in the U.S. District Court. On July 23d, 1953,
the Anti-Trust Division reopened the earlie'r litiga-
tion in a supplemental action asking that the stock
disposal program be vacated and that the Aluminum Com-
pany of America be injoined from carrying out a six
year contract to purchase aluminum pig from Aluminum
Import Corp - a subsidiary of Alcan. This contract
was entered into in May 22, 1953 and involves an
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aggregate delivery. of 600,000 tons over a six year period.
On April 23, 1954, seventeen years after the case
was first begun, Judge Knox entered an order consented to
by all parties. The order left undisturbed the stock
disposal program (previously agreed to) and permitted
Alcoa to carry out its contract with Aluminum Ltd. Sales
Inc. (previously Aluminum Import Corporation) upon con-
dition that deliveries under the contract would be sub-
ordinated to deliveries by Aluminum Import Corporation
to non-integrated users in the U.S. of up to 110,000 tons
which Aluminum Imoort Corp. was by the order required
to offer to such users during each of the years 1954
through 1959.
In the matter of the Knox judgment of June 2, 1950,
there has been further action by the Government. The
so called trial period was set to expire on January 16,
1956. On January 13, 1956, the Department of Justice
moved to continue the period for an additional five years.
Alcoa entered an opposing plea and the case was continued
through 1957. (19)
The Non-Integrated Producers.
The number of non-integrated processors in the
(19) Moody's Industrial Manual 1957. p. 2894.
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TABLE LXVI.
NON-INTEGRATED USERS INCREASE IN SHARE OF THEIR INDUSTRIES
1950 - 1953
Sheet and plate producers: up from 4 - 5 percent of shipments
Foil producers: up from 27 - 32
ACSR and bare cable producers: up from 24 - 27 " "
Extruded shapes and drawn
tubing producers: up from 35 - 40 " " "
Powder, flake and paste
producers: up from 26 - 38 " "
With the removal of the Government controls, from
the groups of small processors caused them to loose
position; two gained but little and only the extru-
ders gained substantially.
The changes from 1952 - 1954 or 1955 were as follows:
Sheet and plate producers: up from 5 - 7 percent of shipments
Foil producers: up from 32 - 41 "
Wire and covered cable: up from 39 - 43 and down 40%
Extruded shapes and drawn
tubing: down 27 to 25 and 23%
Powder, flake and paste: up from 38 - 42 and down to 20%
SOURCE: Report of Subcommittee No. 3 supra p. 18.
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TABLE LXVII
PRIMARY ALMINUMI SALES BY ALCAN AND UNITED STATES PRODUCERS
TO UNITED STATES NON-INTEGRATED USERS
(millions of pounds)
YEAR A L C A N S A L E S SALES TO NON-INTEGRATED USERS
UNITED STATES NON-INTEGRATED BY
PRI4ARY USERS
PRODUCERS ALCOA KAISER REDIOLDS
1946 56 3 164 0 9
1947 24 1 169 6 11
1948 120 40 181 11 18
194.9 125 20 128 11 29
1950 255 65 160 36 67
1951 108 113 112 50 77
1952 75 151 118 89 120
1953 211 249 112 126 143
1954 126 234 114 136 136
1955 130 120 106 107 85
(six
months)
SOURCE: Testimony of Alumirfum Limited
and Company data furnished to
the Subcommittee No. 3.
Supra p. 36.
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TABLE LXVIII.
MONTHLY SALES OF PRIMARY METAL TO DOMESTIC NON-INTEGRATED PROCESSORS
BY PRIMARY PRODUCERS
(millions of pounds)
AVERAGE MONTHLY SALES, TOTAL ALCAN ALCOA KAISER REYNOLDS
19540
15.4 19.8 95 11.3 10.8
1955 January 64.5 22.9 11.0 16.8 13.8
February 62.0 16.1 13.0 18.9 14.0
March 72.6 23.5 14.0 18.3 16.8
April 70.7 19.3 19.0 17.5 14.9
May 77.0 19.5 25.0 18.0 14.5
June 75.4 18.5 24.0 17.1 15.8
Average six months 70.2 19.9 17.7 17.8 14.8
SOURCE: Companies' Reports to Subcom-mittee No. 3.
Department of Commerce B.D.S.A.
Aluminum and Magnesium Division.
Report of Subcommittee No. 3 p. 23.
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NUM4BER OF NON-INTEGRAT C RK0 RS (COMPANIES) IN THE UNITED STATES
ALUMINUTM- INDUSTRY- {EXGLUDING -POUITDRIES)
Wrought product Makers
1955
PRODUCT JUST BEFORE DURING SEPT. UNITED B.D.S.A.
WORLD WAR WORLD 1952 STATES
II WAR II CENSUS
BUREAU
SEPT.1955
Undiicated total
of companies,
approximately.
Sheet and Plate:
Non-treatable )
Heat-treatable)
Foil:
Extrusions:
Soft alloys)
Hard alloys)
Dr awn Tubing
Soft alloys)
Hard alloys)
Welded Tubing:
Not heat-treatable.
Wire and Cable:
Wire:
Nonconductor
ALCR and aluminum
cable base:
Bare wire conductor:
Insulated or covered
wire and cable:
Rolled rod and bar:
Forgings:
Powder and paste at
least:
12
4
2
143
6
3
64
13 ( 19l1)
8 9
43 (( 835
8
)) 71
8
2
11 48
11 10
129
2
3
2
2
4 2
45
c ontd.
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Wrought Product Makers
1955
PRODUCT JUST BEFORE DURING BEPT. UNITED B.D.S.A.
WORLD WAR WORLD 1952 STATES
II WAR CENSUS
II BUREAU
SEPT. 1955
Atomized and Grained
powder:
Flaked powder:
Paste:
2)
3)
3) 7
Secondary Producers
Unduplicated total:
Smelters:
Reclaimers (smelted
pig only):
Reclaimers producing
oxiding grades:
70 - 80 166 105
88 76
2362
Other smelters: 16 6
Plants not Selling in the Open Market
Unduplicated total:
Extrusions:
Sheet:
33
24
2 6
Foil:
Wire:
Tubing:
SOURCES: Reports to the Surplus Property Board, 1945
Defense Production Act - Progress Report # 24
1st Session House of Representatives, January 2,
1955.
Bureau of Census and B.D.S.A.
Bureau of Minos.
130
77
1.8
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aluminum industry has been increasing and is an in-
dication of the growth of competition within this group
and to some limited extent with the integrated producers.
(See accompanying table).
Secondary producers in 1956 numbered 200, wrought
product makers 33, with the largest portion of this
growth occuring since the Korean War. Foundries pro-
ducing aluminum castings have likewise increased. The
actual firms with aluminum foundries number about 4,000
in 1955.
The questionnaire circulated to the non-integrated
producers by the Minerals and Raw Materials Subcommittee
of the House Small Business Committee on August 5, 1955
elicited replies indicating that the majority of non-
integrated producers are specialised small businesses
with sales being made in a limited area. The same result
has been found for the period 1955-57 by a questionnaire
recently circulated by the writer. The increase in the
non-integrated processors is believed to have expanded
the aluminum markets. They are sited in areas where they
serve customers more rapidly than the centrally managed
operations of the integrated producers. The growth of
local foundries was believed to be due to the diverse lo-
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cations of secondary smelters and the network of scrap
dealers. ( 20
The rapid growth of extruders, the Mineral and Raw
Materials Subcommittee believed, was due initially to the
realisation by the end-product manufacturers of the savings that
for example, window makers, could be made by extruding
their own sections. Similar circumstances influenced
the growth which occured among the aluminum wire makers.
The widening of the markets by the non-integrated
processors has stimulated product development and improve-
ments in metals and service by both the integrated and
non-integrated producers. The laboratories of the
integrated producers do a considerable part of the total
research into new alloys, finishes, processing methods and
packing, and new uses for aluminum. (21) There are no
clear indications of the respective shares of the addi-
tional product development market expansion that can
be attributed to the integrated or non-integrated proces-
sors.
The Committee reports that the most benefit from
competition is in reduced prices to customers. This is
strikingly illustrated on those products claimed by the
(20) Report Subcommittee No. 3 Select Committee on Small
Business House 84th Congress 2nd session. p. 11.
(21) Ibid p. 12.
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integrated producers to involve for them the greatest
competition - powder for paint, and extrusions. Alcoats
price for most of its products had risen between 30 and
36 percent between January 1, 1949 and March 1, 1955.
But for the most common soft-alloy extrusions made by
over 100 extruders (1955) the price increase was only
10 percent; For aluminum powder, standard paste 205, the
price increase was only 11 percent.
However, some non-integrated users have complained
that the relatively lower price in areas where they are
in competition with the primary producers is a discrimina-
ting price set by the primary producers to retard or dis-
courage the growth of competition. There have been state-
ments by extruders that the price squeeze did not exist
to a like degree in the hard alloy extrusion business. (24
The End-Product Users.
The Committee reports that during the ten years 1945-
1955 the number of manufacturing users of aluminum and
other light metals increased from 4,5oo (1945) to 17,000
(1951) and 24,ooo in 1955. (23) Included are all of
the non-integrated users in some form or another - auto-
mobile manufacturers, aircraft manufacturers, appliance
and electrical equipment manufacturers.
(22) Replies to questionnaire reported by Subcommittee No. 3.
Ibid p. 96.
(21) Ibid p. 5.
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TABLE LXX.
FINAL USE OF ALUMINUM BY INDUSTRY
Contruction 19
Aircraft 17
Appliances and equipmentl3
Machines and equipment 11
Electrical and
communication 11
Automotive 10
Paint, chemical and
decorative 7
Packaging 5
Miscellaneous 7
percent
100
SOURCE: Report No- 3. supra p. 5.
Iron Age. April 21, 1955.
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TABLE LXXI.
END-PRODUCT USERS BY INDUSTRY
INDUSTRY NUM4BER OF PLANTS
Building industry 5,622
Consumer durable goods 2,430
Containers and packaging 414
Electrical industry 1,951
Machinery and equipment 2,816
Scientific and Technical instru-
ments 418
Transportation and parts 1,668
Ordnance and Military 144
Light metals processors 6,805
All other industries 1,816
Total - 24,084
SOURCE: The Light Metals Industry. Survey by Modern ietals,
October, 17 - 1955.
Figures include about 400 duplicate listings of
firms owning more than one plant.
Report of Subcommittee No. 3 supra p. 7,
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The Joint Committee on Defense Production in its
report in 1953 indicated that out of 17,000 aluminum
fabricators only 133 plus a relatively small number of
foundries relied on the integrated producer. (21
It would appear that the extruders of aluminum have
made the greatest relative increase in the number of
firms and output particularly the growth of numbers of
new small firms.
It is becoming more the established practice for
the integrated producers to enter into long term supply
contracts with the large end-product users - in the auto-
mobile, aircraft, construction and furniture industries.
This is especially true of Reynolds and the automobile
manufacturers. The purchase contract and agreements call
for the automobile manufacturers' foundry and the aluminum
reduction plant to be located on adjoining land. Thus
the metal can be transferred in the molten stage if desired
with obvious savings in fuel costs in the foundry. The
use of aluminum in automobiles being estimated from one-
fifth to one quarter of its technical potential. (see
Chapter IV). The joint location of primary reduction
works and automobile manufacturers' foundries will appear
more frequently in the future. Since the foundry can be
(24) Ibid p. 7.
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most economically operated on a twenty-four hour basis,
inventory and handling costs, will be reduced in the
aluminum reduction plant since with transfer of molten
metal there would be less casting, storage and moving
costs in the foundry.
In times of short supply, the end product users
who have long established relations with a reliable
large scale producer whether integrated, non-integrated
or secondary smelter, will be able to enlarge their share
of the respective trade or market they serve. Having in
mind the added hazards of small business as evidenced
by the higher rate of failures, it is therefore from
the viewpoint of the small firms in the industry, un-
desirable to have periodic shortages of supply. The
Small Business Committee of Congress has spent a con-
siderable time and effort to ascertain the causes of the
shortage of aluminum in the early part of 1955. The
writer has followed the Subcommittee on Minerals and
Raw Materials of that Committee, questionnaire of August
1955, with a similar inquiry covering the period, June
1955 to December, 1957.
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The Shortage of 1955.
Complaints were made to the Minerals and Raw Materials
Subcommittee No. 3 of the House Select Committee on Small
Businesses by non-integrated producers that they could not
get supplies of primary ingot to keep their plants operating
to capacity in early 1955, in many cases not even to 1954
capacity. The most serious shortages were reported by
extruders, and die casters. (25 )
During the first quarter of 1954 there were surpluses
of metal, renewing the seller's market of 1953. During
the 1954 mild business recession there was an attempt to
reduce inventories. Shipments of aluminum to consumers
droped below 1953 figures, and the integrated producers
exercised their option under the "put" clause of G.S.A.
contract. The price of secondary aluminum was relatively
constant for the whole of 1954. The extruders and other
non-integrated processors had expanded their fabrication
capacity to meet the continued demand expected of 1955
and 1956. In some cases they were encouraged to do so by
the integrated producers and the assurances of ample sup-
plies of metal. However with the upturn of orders in 1955,
there was a shortage of ingot and pig throughout the
industry, particularly of extrusion billets. In order
(25) Replies to questionnaire. Report subcommittee pp 22,
23, 24, and Appendices Al, A2, A3 and D.
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TABLE LXXII
STATISTICS ON QUESTIONNAIRE
MAILED AUGUST 5TH, 1955
MAILED REPLIES
NUMBER PERCENT
Extruders
Smelters
Foundries and )
diecasters
Purchasing and)
melting )
Aluminum scrap)
Sheet, Foil,
Forgings, Wire)
and cable )
manufacturers)
TOTAL
98
86
23
74
281
39 40
29
10 43
23 31
3697
SOURCE: Report Subcommittee No. 3 Select Committee on Small
Business, House 84th Congress 2nd Session, p-i:-21.
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to provide relief, the Government reduced stockpile re-
quirements, but as was discussed earlier, the supply
position of the non-integrated producer cannot be ex-
pected to improve materially, particularly if there is
reliance by firms on casual buying of metal from distii-
butors and warehouses or from an integrated producer.
Allegations of discriminatory practices and failure to
meet the G.S.A. requirements by the integrated producers
were shown to be unfounded. In fact, the shipments by
the integrated producers to the non-integrated producers
increased in the period of the greatest shortage. The
survey by the writer indicates that the smelters and die-
casters required more metal in late 1955 and early 1956
than they obtained in 1954; about the same amount during
the latter part of 1956 and early 1957 as in the best part
of 1954, and less during the latter part of 1957 than in
1954. This what would be expected, since aluminum pro-
duction parallels the general level of business activity.
Very few cases were reported where there was any restric-
tion on capital expansion since June, 1955 because of an
unsatisfactory ingot surply position. It would appear
however, that for the small company, expansion of extrusion
or diecasting plant since June, 1955 has not been contem-
plated.
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In conclusion, the industry structure of primary ingot
production is oligopolistic since the three new firms
entering have little intention to engage in competition
in the ingot market. Competition for price leadership
in this market is from Alcan alone and the degree of com-
petition it can offer,even with its lower cost structure
depends largely on Government international trade policy
and the tarriff it has to meet. Compoetition from over-
seas Euimpean sources is uncertain.. The fabricating part
of the industry is- largely in the hands of the three esta-
blished integrated producers and although there is no
direct evidence of collusive action, the cost structure
and similarity of operations and organisation make the
likelihood of tacit collusion not inconsiderable. It is
more likely that these firms will act in collusion to
keep the price structure of the fabrications market un-
attractive to the non-integrated producers, who will
thereby be forced to move more into the end-products manu-
facturing, where product-differentiation, improved efficiency
and overall lower costs will enable them to compete more
favorably.
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SUMARY OF PRESENT STRUCTURE AND FUTURE OUTLOOK.
It is established that there are three stable
groups in the industry. The d6minant group will always
be the integrated producers marketing primary metal,
fabrications and semi- finished products. These firms
could not be expected to enter into consumer product
manufacturing very greatly. The second group- the non-
integrated fabricators will be expected to enter more
into product and component manufacturing with a de-
creasing- accent on fabricating alone. The third group
is the end-product users who purchase fabrications and
semi-finished forms of aluminum for manufacture into a
wide range of consumer products or components. It would
seem that the second and third groups will be increasingly
competitive with each other as well as within the group.
The entry of new firms into the oligopolistic inte-
grated primary production and fabrication phase of the
industry without considerable Government support is impos-
sible. The large amount of Government assistance which
has been afforded to integrated primary producers has al-
most become a permanent feature of the industry. The
patent situation is no deterrent to any new firm entering
the industry since Alcoa licenses are granted without
restriction.
256.
The pricing policies for primary ingot and pig are
set by Alcoa as a consequence of its dominant sales position
in this market. In the market for fabrications and semi-
finished forms, the oligopolistic price behaviour, implicit
not actual, is apparent. Prices are apparently set to
restrict the share of the non-integrated producers and in
fact over the latter period under study, this share has
proportionately decreased.
The Government stockpile requirements were met in
1956 and 1957 by the expanded production of the integrated
producers; consequently Government assistance and interest
to new firms in the primary industry will not be forth-
coming. It is of interest to note that the largest new
integrated producer is a joint venture of two fabricators.
The markets showing evidence of prive competition are
those of secondary ingot, extrusions, diecastings, castings
foil, and scrap. The future prospect for long term demand
is an increase at the same rate hitherto namely 12 percent
annually. Both sections of the industry will expand except
non-integrated fabrications. In end-product manufacturing
particularly, extrusions and diecastings, small firms
will continue to predominate.
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Shortages will tend to follow recessions in busi-
ness activity and particularly in the early recovery
period, being most critical for the end-product manu-
facturers. Cyclical behaviour and the operating character-
istics of the integrated producers will cause the non-
integrated fabrication industry to occupy a decreasing
fraction of the fabrications market. Imports if they
expand at planned may assist the non-integrated pro-
ducers to hold their share of the market. Secondary
production will increase but will always relatively be
a small part of the industry.
The low price of the primary aluminum metal', conmared
to other metals enables aluminum to assume increasing im-
portance in non-ferrous metal uses irrespective of its
advantages of physical properties and ability to accept
various finishes.
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APPENDIX.
QUETIONNAIRE SENT TO NON-INTEGRATED FABRICATORS
AND SECONDARY SLELTERS. OF ALUMINUM.
The questionnaire was sent to three hundred and
eighty six companies engaged in the Aluminum Industry,
that were secondary smelters, or fabricators obtaining
their supplies of metal from anyone of secondary smelters,
the domestic integrated producers - Alcoa, Kaiser and
Reynolds, or imports per Alcan Sales Incorporated.
The companies were classified according to the type
of operations and the replies were segregated into these
classes.
The form of the questionnaire is similar to that
circulabed to the Industry in August, 1955 by the Minerals
and Raw Materials Subcommittee .of the House Select Committee
on Small Business, 84th Congress, in order that a comparison
could be made of the replies received on the two inquiries.
The lessened interest shown generally by all classes of
companies in the recent survey is apparently a result of the
improved supply position for primary aluminum and. the current
business recession. However, a more than average interest
shown by the Sand and Permanent Mold Casters, Die Casters and
Extruders is indicative of a continued sensitivity to their
supply position and possible uncertainty about the future posi-
tion of their sources of supply, particularly imports from Al-
can.,
The questionnaire and results of the recent survey appear
in the subsequent pages.
A2.
CONFIDEINTIAL D.A. Dodds
School of Industrial Management,
Massachusetts Institute of Technology,
Cambridge 39, MASS.
QUESTIONAIRE
This information will not be revealed for any individual company for any
purpose.
Please fill in the questionaire for all plants of your Company.
l Check each kind of aluminum operations of your company.
Sand or Permanent Mold Castings.
Die Castings.
Extrusions.
Secondary Smelting.
Forging or Rolling.
Other Kind(please identify).
2c Answer this question, only, if in the second six months of 1955, the
first or second six months of 1956 or 1957, you needed as much ar more
aluminum than you obtained in the best six month period of 1954. If you
wanted less metal please do not answer. Check each type of aluminum you
needed for the periods specified.
I'ype of Aluminum ISix lonth Period Compared to the best six months
period of 1954 your CompanyIattainedo
ess 1 |Aot the ae3o
Primary Aluminum
(Ingot or Pig)
Primary Foundry
Alloy Pig (Pot
Ietal)
imary Foundry)(Alloy Ingot
Uefined Alloys)
July-Dec.,1955
Jan.-June,1956
July-Dec.,1956
IJan.-June,1957
IJuly-Dec.,1957
July-Dec.,1955
Jan.-June,1956
July-Dec. ,1956
Jan.-June,1957
July-Dec.,1957
July-Dec. ,195
Jan.-June, 1956
July-Dec., 195
Jan.-June,1957
July-Dec.,1957
____________________ t _____________________________________ ___________________________
____I I _____
____ I I _____
-1
______________________________ I _______________________________________________
____________________ I _____________________________________ __________________________
__ ____ I ___
I ________I_
____________________ _____________________________________ I __________________________
A3.
2.
Type of Alurinum Six onth Period Compared to the best six months
period of 1954. your Company a tained.
ILess f About the Same IIore
Primary July-Dec.,1955
Extrusion Jan.--June, 1956
Billets July-Dec.,1956
Jan. -June, 1957 J
July-Dec.,1957
Secondary July-Dec. 9_1955
Aluminumn Ingot Jan. -June,1956
July-Dec .,19.6
Jan. -June,1957 J
July-De c.,1957
Aluminun Re-Roll July-Dec.,1955
Stock or Residual Jan.-June,1956
S3tock or Forging July-Dec.,1956
Stock Jan-June, 1957 [
July-Dec.,1957
Alumimmin Scrap July-Dec., 1955
Jan.-June, 1956
July-Dec., 1956
Jan.-June, 1957 L
July-Dec., 1957 _
Other !Tpe July-Dec., 1955
'(please specify) Jan.-June, 1956
July-Doc . , 1956J
Jan.-June, 1957
July-Dec., 1957
3. If you obtained less aluminum metal in the second six months of 1955 orthe subsequent periods, please check the type of supplier with whom you
you had difficulty.
or upplier |July-Dec.
I 1955
A4.
30
During any of those periods have you had anyrAiinu'I Product Capacity
idle that you wanted to use, but could not, because you could not
obtain Alminum?
Yes No
July-beec. 1055
Jan -June 1956
July-Deco ti
Jan - June 1957
July-Deo c,
During any of these periods have you ever refrained from investing
in additional Aluminmi Product capacity because you could not get
assurance of the metal younwo4uLdneed?
July-Dec. 1955
Jan -June 1956
July-Doc. 1956
Jan ~June 1957
July-Doc. 1957
Yes NoI
I
6c Only answer this quostion if you are willing and able to expand
Aluninum Product capacity. If you were assured of enough metal of the
kind you want year-in and year-out, would you expand your Aluminum
Product capacity. Yes No
7- What is the presont number of your employees in all Aluminm operations?
8Q What is the presont total investment (total assets) in all your
Company's Aluminma oporations? (
Only answer this question if you buy metal from Alcoa, Kaiser, Reynalds,
or Aluminum Sales Inc.
Since the lot July 1955 have your business connections with any of
those suppliers boon satisfactory to you with respect to~
Yea
(a) SupplI of metal.
(b) Delivery comrmiatments.
(c) Price of metal you bought .
(d) Difference botwoen price
of met al you bought and the
price at which you sold
your products.
(0) Competition for customers.
(f) Other problems (please
specify)
* If you cFhek No, ate in wiat months nd year.
10o Do you believe that if you have any Aluminum problems today there is
some agency in the Government to which you can go for assistance.
Yes N
If the a e t agency.
Date Signature
City State Name of Company
10
5.
9.
A5.
PERCENTAGE OF FIRMS REPLYING TO THE
,STIONNAIRE
QUESTIONNAIRES REPLIES
SENT RE-
CEIVED
PERCENT-
AGE OF
FIRMS
REPLY-
ING.
Forging or Rolling
Sand or Permanent Mold
Castings
Die Castings
Extrusions
Secondary Smelting
Other
386 59 ave. 15.3fo
100
82
70
70
47
17
6
16
15
14
3
5
6
19.5
21.2
20.0
6.5
29.2
A6.
RESULTS OF QESTIONNMAIRE.
1. K.nd of aluminum operations of companiek,g 11 a.-'11' i nw la-'O -n .1 '- m t .,j 1 .i. u1a .. -a- . -' ~ -1 e- I-eC d -- i .--x s. i~a.'1 91
Type of Aluminum
S up~pie ofI S metROa\
Period obtaine as compared
to best Lix month,
of 194'
About theLess ame 'I1 MOre
Primary Aluminum
(Ingot or Pig) July-Dec.1955
Jan- 'Jun .1956 4
uly-De c 1956
Jan.gJun 1957 LL4
July.-Dee 1957 L
Primary Foundry
Alloy Pig (Pot
Metal)
July-Dec .955
Jan.-Jun 1956
July-Dee 1956
Jan-June 1957
July-Dec. 1957
Iz-
L
Primary Foundry July-Dec 1955
Alloy Ingot Jan -Jun 1956
(Refined Alloys) July-Dec 1956 j- L - -jan-June -1957 L13
Jul.y-Dec '19.57 L-_-L-
Primary Extrusion July-De c 1955
Billets Jan- Jun 1956
July-Dec 1956
Jan-June 1957
July-Dec 1957 2
Secondary July-Dec 1955 2 [ 2
Aluminum Ingot Jan-June 1956
July-Dee 195 I
Jan-June 1957 J
July-Dee 1957
Aluminum Re-Roll July-Dec 1955
Stock or Resi- Jan-June 1956 j
dual Stock or July-Dej 1956 1jL
Forging Stock Jan-June 1957.
July-Dec 1957
etMeimell".mahl MMI slim I mi"Emin Marinal -mennd@eimtit"90-F.ME-emi. .gi.pMsg. 'yg ,mfir.I -n 1 .IMS.1-( fmGhii
i
A7.
2 (cont).
Type of Aluminum Perid Supp-ies of metal
obtained as compared
to best six months
of 1954.
Less Ame MoreSame.
Aluminum Scrap July-Dec 1955
Jan-June 1956 1
July-Dec 1956.
Jan-June 1957
July-Dea 197M
Other Type uly-Dec 1955
Jan-June '1956
July-Dec '1956
Tan-June 1957
July-Dee 1957 1
Type of July- Jan,- Ji .y- I Jan- July-
Supplier Dec, June Dc- June Dec.
1955 1 1 1957
Primary
Producers 2--
Secondary
Smelters
Scrap
Suppliers
Other
Suppliers
Period Yes No
uly-Dec 1955 /
an-June 1956 .5~
lY-Dec._19_6_
Jan-June 1957
Jly-Dec. 1957
39.
440
-2-&
A8.
5.
Yes 4 No
Average nimber of employees in aluminum psn t ionB
Range of replies 3. to boo
Average total investment (G.FA) in alrlnum operations
Range of replie
(a) Supply of Metal.
(b) Delivery Commit-
me nt s
(c) Price of metal.
(d) Difference betweer
price of metal
bought and sale
price of products.
(e) Competition for
customers.
(f) Other problems
Yes No
71
p~- - -
// _ _ _ _ _ _ __-
Yes No
/
Period Y No
July-Dec.1955
Jan-June 195b
-u-iyDee 19 6
Jan-June 1957 d
July-Dec 1957
60
7v
8.
10.
A9.
n Q U01 Y1 . .
2.4
supp7, 'ilieL
of19
About
P~rimary Ailiumium( Igot or Pig) J.ly-
Janrt u L1956
9 5
Primary Foundry Ju ly-1 7 D e c 195")
Alloy Pip, (Pot J a nJun 9r.
B i L .1
Me a ul y-De c !91--6
Jan Jun 9
J u.JO, Y, / ) 9! .
Seconay Julr~ 1 ;y-22U 195
Allonw I t Jn-Jun 1952an- une
July-Dec 1957
Plriary e-Rul July-Dec 1955
ABci e Rei Jan-June 1956
July-Decl 1956
Jan-June 1957
July-Dea 1957Alumonda r -o July-Dec 1955 / ~JAluminu orngot Jan-June 1956 7j j
dual Sock or July-Dec 1956 jj
Foriing tock Jan-Jun~e 1957 1/
July-Deo 1957 j
A10.
2 (cont).
Type of Aluminum Period Supplies of metal
obtained as compared
to best six months
[of __19 54.
-LessI About the
Less Same Moe
Aluminum Scrap July-Dee 1955
Jan-June 1956
July-Dee 1956
Jan-June 1957 L
July-Dee 19571.
Other Typa July-Dec 1955
Jan-June 1956 1 L
July-Dec 19561
Jan-June 1957
July-Dec 1957 _
3. Type of July- Jan.- Juy- Jan- July-
Supplier Dec, June Det. June De.
1955 95 19 6 19p-7 J157,
Primary
Producers
Seacondary
Smelters
Scrap
Suppliers
0the -
suppliors
-Period Y0s
July-Dec 1955
Jan-June 1956
Jly-Dea.
Jan-June
JlyaoDec.
-19 b
1957 /154-
11957( 4'
IFI
I
I
I
All .
Period esyo
July-Dec.~ t955 ;
Jan-June 19J56/.
July-Dec 1955
Jan-June 195 3
5.
6.
7,
8.
9.
Average number of employees in aluminum 9Uois ion
Range of replies Uo to
Average tOtal investment (GeFAA) in alutinum operations
R2 Oa-o
Range of replies~ to/
(a) Supply of Metal.
(b) Delivery Commit-
me nt s.
(c) Price of metal.
(d) Difference between
price of metal
bought and sale
price of products.
(e) competition for
customers.
(f) Other problems
)
I
Yes No
/ I
/
3 /
3.
No100 Yes
July-Dec 19.57!
Yes _ . No
,, ~ 
.
13
A12.
RESULTS OF QESTIONNAIRE4
1A Kind of aluminum operations of companies
Type of Aluminum Period obtaind as compeed 
to best six monthi\
of 19 5 .
Less IAbout theSsame I
Primary AluminumI
(Ingot ^or Pig) July-DeCov1955 -
Jan.-Jun 1956 L1 L ,Z
July-Dec 1956 , *
Jan.-Jun 1957 L/ ---- -
July--Dec 1957 T
Primary Foundry July-Dec.1955
Alloy Pig (Pot Jan.-Jun 1956
Metal) JuyDc1956
Jan-June 1957
July-Dec.J1957 .
Primary Foundry July-Dec 19 55
Alloy Ingot Jan -Jun 1956
(Refined Alloys) July-Dec 1956 1
Jan-June 1957
July-Dec 1957
Primary Extrusion July-Dec 1955 .... s
Billets Jan- Jun 1956
July-Dec 1956 -7
Jan-June 1957 7
July-Dec 1957
Secondary July-Dec 1955
Aluminum Ingot Jan-June 1956
July-Dec 195
Jan-June 195? 7
July-Dea 1957
Aluminum Re-Roll
Stock or Resi-
dual Stock or
Forging Stock
July-Dec
Jan-June
July-Dei&
Jan-Junie
July-Dec
1955
1956
1956
1957
1957
1 I
J.
41 - ,- ,
.- , k, __ - --- __ - - __
i
I I
Al 3.
2 (cont).
Type of Aluminum
Aluminum Scrap
Other Type
114W061c.4X s //
- '
Period
July-De c
Jan-June
July-Dec
Jan-June
July-Dec
July-Dec
Jan-June
July-Dee
Jan-June
July-Dec
II
1955
1956
1956
1957
1957
1955
1956
1956
1957
1957
Supplies of metal
obtained as compared
to best six months
of 1954.
Type of
Supplier
Primary
Producers
July-
Dec
1955
(
Jan.-
June
1956
/
Jily-
De.
19.\6
Jan-
June
1957
July-
Dec.
1957
Secondary
Smelters
Scrap
Sippl ier e
Other
Suppliers
.Period yes No
July-Dec 1955 2-
Jan-June 1956 
_
Jly-Dec. 1956 2
Jan-June 1957
Jly-Dec. 1957
3.
I - - - - -- I W - - - ---
& M WAW1,16
A14.
5. I
(a) Supply of Metal.
(b) Delivery Commit-
me nt s.
(c) Price of metal.
(d) Difference between
price of metal
bought and sale
price of products*
(e) Competition for
customers.
(f) Other problems
( I 5 YX,////,.
p4 -:)
Yeo N
2
/03
Period Ye1 No
July-Dee.1935 7
Jan-June 1956
-July--Dec 1956
Jan-June 19577
July-Dee 1957
Yes No
Average number of employees in aluminumi pan, ffn
Range of replies 5 uto 3 oo
Average total investment (G.PA) in alutainum operations
Range of replies t/o A 0 to/ do o
7*.
8.
10. Yes No
9.
A15.
..SULSO TQ ,.3IMTA9R1E .
1-. Kind of aluminum operations of companieE,
Type of Aluminum
Primary Aluminum
(Ingot or Pig)
Period
July-Dee 1955
Jan.-Jun 1956
July-Dec 1956
Jan.-Jun 1957
July-Dec -1957
S uppls of meF-7ta
obtained as compiped
to best Lix monthi\
of1954.
Less Abou te Mor
2.
L
Primary Foundry July-Dec.1955
Alloy Pig (Pot Jan.-Jun 1956 L
metal) IJuly-Dec 1956 I
Jan-June 1957
July-Dec.1957 I.~
Primary Foundry July-Dec 1955
Alloy Ingot. Jan -Jun 1956 
(Refined Alloys) July-Deo 1956
Jan-June 1957 7~/
July-Dec 1957
Primary Extrusion July-Dec 1955
Billets Jan- Jun 1956
July-Dec 1956
Jan-June 1957
July-Dec 1957/ j9
Secondary July-Dec 1955
Aluminum Ingot Jan-June 1956
July-Dec 195 1
Jan-June 1957
July-Dec 1957
Aluminum Re-Roll July-Dec 1955
Stock or Resi- Jan-June 1956
dual Stock or July-Dec 1956
Forging Stock Jan-June 1957 
July-Dao 1957
20
A1 6.
2 (cont).
Type of Aluminum Period SupplIes of metal-
obtained as compared
to best six months
of 195.
About theLess. moreSame
Aluminum Scrap July-D.e o 1955
jan-June 1956 .
July-Doe 1956 -,1z.
Jan-June 1957 - TW ~
July-Dec 1957 :
Other Typi July-Dec -1955
a-June 195 6
July-Dec 1956
Jan-June 1957
July-Dec 1957
Type of July- Jan Jy- Jan- I July-
Supplier Dee, June, D. June Dec.
195 195 196 15 957
Pr imary
Producers
Secondary
Smelters
Scrap
Suppliers
Other
Supplie rs-
Period Yes No
July-Dec 1955 3
Jan-June 195b 
_
Jly-Deco. 1956 --- 7_----
7an-June 197
3
J .LIY-DeC . 19%f.)
L 17 6-ft.-IMMOM"
Al?.
Period Yeo No
July-Dec.1955
Jan-June 195b
July-Dec 196 3
Jan-June 1957
July-Dec 1957 3
Ye ___- No
Average number of employees in aluminum p.itions
Range of replies : to 00
Average total investment (GeF*A) in alucinum operations
Range of replies to
(a) Supply of Metal.
(b) Delivery Comnit-
mae nts .
(c) Price of metal.
(d) Difference between
price of metal
bought and sale
price of products*
(e) Competition for
customers.
(f) Other problems
YearI7z
2-
3
7
Yes No
6.
7,
8.
9,
IoI
10.
A18.
RESULTS OFQj.IONA.P
Ind of al uminum operations of companies
Type of Aluminum
Primary Aluminum
(Ingot or Pig)
Prinmary Foundry
Alloy Pig (Pot
Metal)
Primary Foundry
Alloy Ingot
(Refined Alloye)
Primary Extrusion
Billeta
Period
July-Dec.A955
Jan.-Jun 1956
July-Dec 1956
Jan,-Jun 157
;July-Dee 1957
Suplie of mfii
obtainecd as compared
to best Lix montht\
_of 1954.
About theLess MreSame
1
~ ~L - I
lJuly-Decu1955 1
Jan,.-jun 1956
July-Dec '956 L
Jan-June 1957 LZ
uly-Doc.1957 L
July-Dec 1957 LJan -Jun 1956-l o 6
3an-June 1957
July-Dec 1957
July-Decn 1955
J'an- Jun 195'6
July-Dec -1956
Jan-June 1 957
Juvily-Dec 1 957
Secondary July-Dec 1955 -
Aluminum Ingot Jan-June 1956
July-Dec 195? L
Jan-June 1957 W.1 qwnw
July-Dee 1957 L2-
Aluminum Re.-Roll July-Dec 1955 L
Stock or Resi- Jan-June 1956 7
dual Stock or July-Dea 1956
Forging Stock Jan-June 1957 
_7
July-Da 1957 J
.'
A19.
~2e-
2 (cont).
Type of Aluminum Period Supplies of metal
obtained as compared
to best six months
of I
e J's About the J
Same
Aluminum Scrap july-Deo 1955
Jan-June 1956
Juiy-Dec 1956 LJan-June 1957 L L
July-Dec 1957
Other Typa july-Dec 1955-
Jan-Jtune '1956
July-Dec 19561
Jan-June 1957
July-Dec 19571
Type off July- Jan.- J Jan- July-
Supplier *Dec June Df. June Doe
19515 1956 19 195
Primary
Producers
Secondary
Smelters
Scrap
Suppliers
Other
Suppliers
Period yes N
July-Dec 1955
Jan-June1956
j~ao 1956
Jly-Dec. '1957 4
Ij - -- . w -
3,
444
A20.
Pero. ye
Ju1y -Dc195
Jan-June i956
uIvly-Dec, 1956E I
4an-June 1957
ul~Ts -Dec -1957i
______ I
Average nwmfar of employees In aluminuri .,1tCis 11
Range of replies 2 AO0
Average total investment (GA' 4 A) in aImtinum operations
Range of rep, to
Supply of Uetal.
Delive'ry Com-mit-
Me nt s.
Price of metal.
Difference between
price of metal
bought and. sale
price of produc.ts%
Competition for
customers.
)
() Other problems
Yes
4474
No
& *1
4.
/ j/
10, Yes No -
54
614
7#
8.
(a)
(b)
(c)
(d)
(e)
No
A21.
RESULTS OF QUESTIONNAIRE.
ind of alumI Im operations of com91E6
Type of Aluminum Period
1 C
Primary Aluminun
(Ingot or Pig) July-Dec.1955 2
Jan.-Jun 1956
July--Dec 1956
Jan, -Jun 1957
july-Dee 1957.L
Primary Poundry July-Dec.1955L
Alloy Pig (Pot Jan.Jun 1956 C
Metal) July-Dec. 1956
Jan-June 1957
Jul-y-Dcc1957
Primary Foundry July-Dc 1955 a_11
Alloy IngOt Jan -Jun 1956
(Refined Alloys) July-Deo 1956
Jan-June 1957
July-Dec 1957
Primary Extru-ion July-Deo 1955
Billets Jan- Jun 1956 -
July-Dec 1956 1
Jan-June 1957
July-Dec 1957
Secondary July-Dec 1955 4
Aluminum Ingot Jan-June 1956 j
July-Dec 1950 .
Jan-June 1957 L
July-Dec 1957
Aluminum Re-Roll July-Dec 1955
Stock or Resi- Jan-June 1956
dual Stock or July-Deo 1956 ~
Forging Stock Jan-Junie 1957,
July-Dec 1957 M-J-jp
SuppI 7,,lf~ fmeaf
obtained as comp'red
to best i monthl\
of194
Less AottreMoreS ame r
A22.
2 (cont).
3,
'4,
-'2C'
Type of Aluminum Period Supplies of metal
obtained as compared
to best six monthsI of
About heLess More
Aluminum Scrap ly-De c 1955
an-..June -19.5 6L
uly-Dee 1956
tan-june 1957 Ei 
_[___
July-Dee 1957 J
Other Typa july-Dec 1955
_a n-June -19.56
4 july-Dec 19561
Jan-junei 1957
July-Dee 1957 1
Type of July- Jan.- JuLy- Jan- July-
Supplier Dec June De . June Dece.1955 96 196 1957 15
Primary
Producers
Secondary
Smelters
Scrap
Suppliers
Other
suppliers
Period Yes No
IJuly-Dec 195
Jan-June 1956
Jly-Dec.
Jan-June
1Jly1De~
4 'I
195b
195'2 (
157
A
i~IIIii-~1
. -* _.Uwj
A23 9
P r i od
A;-
Ran~fge of: r(epI. e 2
IA~era2' toa
A7
Ti
( - -~ ..-
of ~yp:Li~m~/~,Doo tc~,~'~' See, 0cc
(a) d-upply off mat&si
(b)
(C) 1i'rica of n~rI
(d) Io offfaxll.e bC
ptric of ir i- ~sl
(f Othe~r probldas
2-
. Yes N
69
70
V
9 0
- -- 4-j-u.3.y-?)0nc,
jarv- Una 1 57,.1
Delivery Colmrait-
100 o
